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(no subject) (fwd)
For those who asked about it - here is an 8 page version of the article
that I co-authored which presents our proposed antitrust law. The model
statute appears near the end. Unfortunately, the footnotes did not copy.
But this should give you a rough idea of the proposal. Comments are of
course welcome.
CONSUMER SOVEREIGNTY: A UNIFIED THEORY OF ANTITRUST AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW
Neil W. Averitt and Robert H. Lande
This is a condensation of an article
by the same name that appears in
65 Antitrust Law Journal 713 (1997)
This article is about the relationship between antitrust and
consumer protection law. Its purpose is to define each area of law, to
delineate the boundary between them, to show how they interact with each
other, and to show how they ultimately support one another as the two
component parts of an overarching unity.
That overarching unity is consumer sovereignty. Antitrust and
consumer protection law share a
common purpose in that both are intended to facilitate the exercise of
consumer sovereignty or effective consumer choice. Consumer sovereignty
exists when two fundamental conditions are present: one must have a
range of consumer options made possible through competition, and
consumers must be able to choose effectively among these options.
The boundary between antitrust and consumer protection is best
defined by reference to these two elements of consumer sovereignty. The
antitrust laws are intended to ensure that the marketplace remains
competitive so that a meaningful range of options is made available to
consumers, unimpaired by practices such as price fixing or
anticompetitive mergers. The consumer protection laws are then intended
to ensure that consumers can choose effectively from among those options,
with their critical faculties unimpaired by such violations as deception
or the withholding of material information. Protection at both levels is
needed in order to ensure that a market economy can continue to operate
effectively.
Legal protection of this sort is required, on a practical matter,
only when the free market is not working properly. "Market failures" can
arise, however, which may create or permit competition or consumer
protection problems. This article will demonstrate that antitrust
violations (which impair the menu of options) stem from market failures
in the general marketplace external to consumers, whereas consumer
protection violations (which impair the individual's ability to choose)
flow from internal market failures that take place, in a sense, "inside
the consumer's head."
While this approach appears on its face to be of almost Doric
simplicity, it provides a coherent theoretical platform from which
antitrust and consumer protection law may be better understood and
applied.
The development of a unified theory of consumer sovereignty not
only is of conceptual interest, but also has significant practical
consequences. First, it can explain why the Federal Trade Commission was
created to have responsibility for both antitrust and consumer protection
issues and why it should retain this dual jurisdiction. An awareness of
this relationship between the two halves of the FTC's statutory charter
also may be useful in identifying specific categories of cases that it,
rather than the Department of Justice, is best suited to handle. Second,
a unified theory of antitrust and consumer protection law will assist the
FTC in determining when particular conduct or transactions should be
pursued on antitrust, as opposed to consumer protection, grounds. Third,
the consumer sovereignty model we propose can help to determine when
borderline business practices contravene the underlying purposes of the
consumer protection or antitrust statutes to such a degree that they
warrant prosecution. Fourth, the broad importance of marketplace options
in consumer sovereignty model suggests that antitrust should devote more
attention than it now does to the role of nonprice competition. In
certain sectors of the economy--for example, high-tech or media-related
industries--diversity of options may be far more important to consumers
than price competition. Finally, by defining the elements of consumer
sovereignty in an intuitively understandable way, this framework should
be useful to those countries that are establishing or reorganizing trade
regulation programs for the first time.
The full article is divided into five principal sections, not all
of which are summarized in this piece. Part I introduces and defines the
concept of consumer sovereignty, and shows that it requires both the
availability of consumer options and the ability to choose among them.
Part II reviews the antitrust and consumer protection case law and shows
that it is consistent with (and explicable by) this option-oriented model
of consumer sovereignty. Part II identifies and discusses the market
failures that may tend to prevent the exercise of consumer sovereignty by
impairing either the menu of options or consumers' capacity to select
among them. Part IV then considers more complex applications of our
proposed theory in which the two types of protection interact in
simultaneous or sequential ways. Finally, Part V explores the practical
implications and consequences of the proposed theoretical framework.
AN OPTION-ORIENTED CONCEPT OF CONSUMER SOVEREIGNTY
Simply put, consumer sovereignty is the state of affairs that
prevails or should prevail in a modern free-market economy. It is the
set of societal arrangements that cause that economy to act primarily in
response to the aggregate signals of consumer demand, rather than in
response to government directives or the preferences of individual
businesses. It is the state of affairs in which the consumers are truly
"sovereign," in the sense of having the power to define their own wants
and the ability to satisfy those wants at prices not greatly in excess of
the costs borne by the providers of the relevant goods and services. The
concept of consumer sovereignty goes so far as to embody at least some
implicit notions about the proper relationship between the individual and
the state. It is part of the Western world's answer to the prescriptions
of Marxism.
The essence of consumer sovereignty is the exercise of choice.
It is by choosing some goods or some options over others that consumers
satisfy their own wants and send their signals to the economy. It is
therefore critical that the exercise of consumer choice be protected.
We have already seen that effective consumer choice requires two
things: options in the marketplace, and the ability to choose freely
among them. In order to turn this conceptual paradigm into operational
policy, however, at least some rough degree of quantification is
required. Just how many options must be present in the market? Just how
free from external influences must consumers be? In an imperfect world,
of course, the answers to these questions must be standards of
sufficiency rather than standards of perfection.
Thus, we do not simply require the maximum number of options.
Antitrust law does not prevent all conduct or transactions that have the
effect of reducing the number of options available to consumers. Nor
does the law affirmatively require the creation of options. Rather, it
prevents business conduct that artificially limits the natural range of
options in the marketplace. Indeed, the law permits even some artificial
reductions, such as some mergers, if the benefits of the action appear to
outweigh the costs. Through these means, the antitrust laws aim to
preserve a sufficient, although not a perfect, array of choices for
consumers.
Consumer protection laws are similar in the sense that they seek
to protect the ability of consumers to make informed choices among
competing options, but do not necessarily strive to ensure that consumers
have absolutely perfect information or that they act with absolutely
perfect rationality. Probably no consumer is a perfect reasoning
machine, essentially free from all the extraneous influences of early
upbringing, cultural values, or half-remembered advertising campaigns
from years ago. What we ask of consumer protection law is, therefore,
something relatively modest. We ask that consumers be enabled to make
rational choices to the extent that they wish to concentrate on doing so.
Consumer protection law ensures that buyers are protected from coercion,
deception, and other influences that are difficult to evade or to guard
against, but it does not protect buyers from the milder, knowable
influences of things like "image" advertising, which they could set aside
if they desire.
As protected by these two principles, the exercise of consumer
sovereignty should be beneficial to society in a number of concrete ways.
It will support and lead to an efficient economic market. That, in
turn, will tend to produce an environment offering the lowest prices, the
best product quality and variety, the highest degree of consumer surplus,
and all the other benefits of a competitive economy.
market, and the consumer protection case law can explained in terms of
protecting consumers' ability to choose among the available options. The
model that we are presenting thus becomes a means of unifying,
explaining, organizing, and interpreting a long line of legal precedents.
COUNTRIES ESTABLISHING OR REORGANIZING TRADE REGULATION PROGRAMS CAN DO
SO IN A MORE BENEFICIAL MANNER
Many nations are currently deciding whether to establish trade
regulation programs and, if so, which legal areas should be the subject
of concern and how the different parts of these programs should relate to
one another. The framework suggested here should help with this task,
and may also help the governments involved explain the program in a
relatively coherent way to their citizens.
A country could frame its trade regulation laws in terms of
preserving the options that competition would bring and preserving
meaningful consumer choice among these options. A country writing its
trade laws on a clean slate might wish to express them specifically in
these terms. A statute embodying this option-oriented approach could be
worded as follows:
It is the national policy to foster an economy in which
consumers can make free choices among goods and services in a competitive
marketplace. Conduct that unreasonably impairs this goal is hereby
declared illegal. It is specifically illegal to engage in: (1) A, B, C,
and any other conduct that unreasonably limits the range of competitive
options that would otherwise have been present in the market; and (2) X,
Y, Z, and any other conduct that unreasonably impairs consumers' ability
to choose among these options.
A legislature enacting this statute would complete it by filling in the
blanks for ABC, and XYZ, with those specific items that the country was
confident, in light of its own national experience, that it wished to
ban. If the United States were using this approach, for example, it
would include specific bans on such things as monopolization, mergers
that may substantially lessen competition, and deception.
A statute along these lines would have several attractive
features. The specific prohibitions will give the business community as
much notice as the nature of the subject matter permits. At the same
time, the general residual clauses that are written in terms of options
and choice among options will preserve the flexibility necessary to deal
with changing conditions. In this respect our model statute is similar
to a combination of the Sherman Act and the FTC Act in American law. The
proposed model seems to be an improvement over the present combination in
two important respects, however. First, by putting the specific and the
general clauses in a single statute it encourages the enforcers and the
judiciary to employ general principles to guide the development and
application of the specific prohibitions. The statute itself, in other
words, will set out internal, general principles of construction that
will provide a context within which it is most likely that the specific
provisions will be interpreted in the proper manner. Second, even the
general clauses are framed in a relatively objective way. Conduct is
banned, not on grounds of "unfairness" (the approach used in the FTC
Act), which can cause considerable judicial uncertainty, but because of
its unreasonable effects on the exercise of consumer choice. The
underlying concept of consumer choice will tend to focus the inquiry.
Even though the concept of "unreasonable" effects does still leave room
for interpretation, this uncertainty will tend to be limited to questions
of degree -- identifying the threshold level of net effect that becomes
actionable -- rather than leaving the door open to broader uncertainty
about what kinds of harm are improper.
Perhaps the greatest advantage of an option-oriented statute is
that it will help governments explain to their citizens -- particularly
those businesses and individuals who are relatively inexperienced at
dealing with a market economy -- why a system of competitive capitalism
is in their best interests.
CONCLUSIONS
Trade regulation law is ultimately about choice, and choice is
ultimately about options--getting them, keeping them, and selecting among
them. The disciplines of antitrust and consumer protection law are best
defined in terms of their roles in this process. An antitrust violation
may be understood as an activity that unreasonably distorts or restricts
the options that otherwise would be available to consumers. A consumer
protection violation may be understood as activity that unreasonably
interferes with consumer choice among the options provided in the
marketplace. These two fields of law, acting together, give consumers
the tools they need effectively to exercise consumer sovereignty.
A number of benefits should flow from this unified conception of
the trade regulation laws. It should make lawyers practicing in these
disciplines more alert to the possibility that a case focusing on one
element of consumer sovereignty will also raise issues involving the
other element. It may also remind practitioners that a violation under
one half of the consumer sovereignty model might sometimes best be
remedied by a solution that deals with factors normally considered in
actions under the other half. It also suggests that economists
practicing primarily in one field should gain insights from the other.
Both types of market failures seem to be of equal importance, so both
would seem equally deserving of professional study.
The final purpose of this article has been to help focus the
attention of both fields on options, a shift in focus from the current
administrative and judicial emphasis on price. Although price
competition often is of utmost importance to consumer welfare, so too is
the variety, quality, and innovation of products. These attributes have
sometimes been treated as afterthoughts when they actually should be at
the forefront of debate and analysis in this important area of the law.