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Consumer Sovereignty (fwd)
I had so many requests to see a copy of my suggested antitrust law that I
am posting a 2 page version of the proposal. For the longer version,
together with supporting arguments, please see the full article in the
Antitrust Law Journal, vol. 65 (1997). If you cannot find that journal,
just let me know and I will mail you a copy. In the meantime, I will try
to find and post an 8 page version.
Comments are most welcome.
Bob Lande
Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and Consumer
Protection Law
Neil W. Averitt and Robert H.Lande
A country could frame its trade regulation laws in terms of
preserving the options that competition would bring and preserving
meaningful consumer choice among these options. A country writing its
trade laws on a clean slate might wish to express them specifically in
these terms. A statute embodying this option-oriented approach could be
worded as follows:
It is the national policy to foster an economy in which consumers
can make free choices among goods and services in a competitive
marketplace. Conduct that unreasonably impairs this goal is hereby
declared illegal. It is specifically illegal to engage in: (1) A, B, C,
and any other conduct that unreasonably limits the range of competitive
options that would otherwise have been present in the market; and (2) X,
Y, Z, and any other conduct that unreasonably impairs consumers' ability
to choose among these options.
A legislature enacting this statute would complete it by filling in the
blanks for ABC, and XYZ, with those specific items that the country was
confident, in light of its own national experience, that it wished to
ban. If the United States were using this approach, for example, it
would include specific bans on such things as monopolization, mergers
that may substantially lessen competition, and deception.
A statute along these lines would have several attractive
features. The specific prohibitions will give the business community as
much notice as the nature of the subject matter permits. At the same
time, the general residual clauses that are written in terms of options
and choice among options will preserve the flexibility necessary to deal
with changing conditions. In this respect our model statute is similar
to a combination of the Sherman Act and the FTC Act in American law. The
proposed model seems to be an improvement over the present combination in
two important respects, however. First, by putting the specific and the
general clauses in a single statute it encourages the enforcers and the
judiciary to employ general principles to guide the development and
application of the specific prohibitions. The statute itself, in other
words, will set out internal, general principles of construction that
will provide a context within which it is most likely that the specific
provisions will be interpreted in the proper manner. Second, even the
general clauses are framed in a relatively objective way. Conduct is
banned, not on grounds of "unfairness" (the approach used in the FTC
Act), which can cause considerable judicial uncertainty, but because of
its unreasonable effects on the exercise of consumer choice. The
underlying concept of consumer choice will tend to focus the inquiry.
Even though the concept of "unreasonable" effects does still leave room
for interpretation, this uncertainty will tend to be limited to questions
of degree -- identifying the threshold level of net effect that becomes
actionable -- rather than leaving the door open to broader uncertainty
about what kinds of harm are improper.
Perhaps the greatest advantage of an option-oriented statute is
that it will help governments explain to their citizens -- particularly
those businesses and individuals who are relatively inexperienced at
dealing with a market economy -- why a system of competitive capitalism
is in their best interests.