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ISDN Pacific Bell Protest Letter (fwd)
- To: isdn@tap.org
- Subject: ISDN Pacific Bell Protest Letter (fwd)
- From: James Love <love@tap.org>
- Date: Wed, 21 Feb 1996 14:29:27 -0500 (EST)
-----------------
Date: Tue, 20 Feb 1996 17:47:53 -0800
From: J Sylla <jsylla@westworld.com>
To: love@tap.org
Subject: ISDN Pacific Bell Protest Letter
I came upon your ISDN page. FYI following is my letter sent to California
PUC. If you are inclined to upload the letter, or redistribute, please
feel free.
[letterhead]
John R. Sylla [jsylla@westworld.com]
[address and phone omitted]
31 January 1996
California Public Utilities Commission
505 Van Ness Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94102
Att: Public Advisor's Office
Reference: Pacific Bell ISDN Application No. 95-12-043
filed December 5, 1995
Dear Commissioners:
I write on my own behalf as a Pacific Bell Home ISDN subscriber to
urge the Commission not to approve the rate increases proposed in
the above filings.
The California public, particularly the high value adding "knowledge
worker" professionals most likely to be early adopters for ISDN,
should not be subjected to a "bait and switch" gambit on ISDN
pricing.
Unlike most any other rate issue the Commission is likely to face, this
proposal negatively affects a broad class of individual consumers in
a compounded, leveraged way. Many consumers like me have
already directly and expressly relied on current tariffed rates to
spend hundreds if not thousands of dollars on ISDN terminal
equipment. Will the Commission allow that reliance to be
invalidated? To raise rates now would penalize early adopters and
could undercut confidence in the tariff system, with implications for
both innovation and investment in technology, business and job
creation in California.
While the local loop market is not presently competitive, consumers
increasingly benefit from vigorous competition amongst, for
example, ISDN equipment vendors and ISDN-friendly Internet
Service Providers. These elements and ISDN services together,
rather than separately, make up the "product" we consumers decide
whether to buy. Until there is viable competition for high speed
digital services in the local loop, the consumer surplus resulting from
competition in other areas should not be given away as a revenue
opportunity for a market-dominant carrier.
On the matter of "costs," if a carrier claims it isn't making its desired
profit on ISDN because of incorrect cost assumptions, it should not
use its regulated position to alter the pricing premises after the fact.
Compare an ISDN equipment vendor that fails to make its desired
profit because its costs exceeded expectations: it can't just ask the
government to help it charge its customers more. The carrier should
not avoid the deal that public consumers relied on, nor appropriate
the beneficial consumer surplus enjoyed in the competitive equipment
portion of the overall "product" consumers decided to buy.
More perilous, revising the pricing of ISDN could neutralize
unforeseen but beneficial cross-tariff competition between the
carrier's own service offerings (for example, to disfavor intelligent
customer premise equipment that competes with or bypasses
otherwise bundled, central office implemented services.) I strongly
urge the Commission to request and study information on potential
indirect cross-tariff effects, which are in some ways the flip-side of
cross-subsidization.
In other words, what is the effect of an ISDN price increase in the
markets for other carrier services (e.g., Custom Calling Services,
leased lines, Centrex, voicemail, Automatic Number Identification
[whether or not bundled with 800 service], etc.)? And what is the
effect on innovation by venture companies and their products (e.g.,
ISDN equipment and even advanced private services such as off-site
receptionist/answering service implementations)?
For ISDN to reach critical mass in California, the price should not
belatedly be increased on the theory of allowing faster installation
cost recovery by the carrier. Instead, in my view, the carrier should
recoup its costs with a fair return by striving for economies of scale
with affordable, geographically universal ISDN service as presently
tariffed.
An analogy to fax service is instructive: if carriers had argued that
fax lines should be segregated and pay a higher rate (e.g., to help pay
for costs of increased line density and area code requirements), the
market for fax machines and lines might have been stymied before it
reached critical (price driven) mass. By the same token, if ISDN
rates are set higher to help pay for short term unforeseen
deployment costs to deliver ISDN, the ISDN market in California--
after a roaring, price-driven rush toward critical mass--may falter.
Carriers in this regulated utility market should have long term focus
on new and better services developed in partnership with the public,
not just on how to squeeze more short term revenue (or to avoid
cross-tariff competition) from incremental investment. In any case,
the unforeseen costs claimed to underlie this application are likely
more a function of demographics of the roll-out than a fundamental
misapprehension the costs of universal service.
Finally, I believe the proposal is generally contrary to public interest
and trends in our telecommunications infrastructure. Among those
trends are digitization, competition and decreasing prices--prices
that are less sensitive to usage and distance, and that are market-
based rather than cost-based. The subject proposal is against all
these trends, and I submit that the Commission should take a dim
view of this trend-defying proposal. It disfavors progress in
California digital network access, increases prices unfairly after
consumer equipment purchase decisions, and risks appropriating
consumer surplus from competitive markets and stifling competition
amongst different carrier services.
Accordingly, I urge the Commission not to approve the proposed
increases. Thank you for your consideration.
Very truly yours,
John R. Sylla