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Public Citizen Advocates Potassium Iodide
On June 27th, Public Citizen's Critical Mass Energy Project participated
in a public meeting concerning the federal policy on the purchase and
stockpiling of potassium iodide for use by the general public in
radiological emergencies at commercial nuclear power plants. Potassium
Iodide is an inexpensive non prescription drug that would protect the
thyroid gland from radioactive Iodine 131 released during a meltdown.
There were a total of 14 individual or organizations that presented
comments to the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee.
Only 5 of the 14 presenters were in favor of providing potassium iodide to
the public in the event of a severe accident at a nuclear reactor. The
representatives of the nuclear industry and of state emergency planning
agencies all opposed stockpiling potassium iodide. The states are afraid
of liability problems involved with disbursing the drug. The Nuclear
Energy Institute and Duke Power, a nuclear utility, claimed their reactors
were safe and potassium iodide was not needed.
Public Citizen supports the stockpiling and pre-distribution of potassium
iodide to those within a 50 mile radius of a nuclear reactor. If you
would like more information on the meeting or on potassium iodide in
general you can e-mail Jim Riccio at jriccio@mindspring.com or call
770-451-7372. The docket of this meeting is open until July 12th so
groups and individuals can still submit comments. Citizens should also
contact their respective state emergency planning offices and demand that
they stockpile potassium iodide.
Comments of Public Citizen's Critical Mass Energy Project
Before the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee's
Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Potassium Iodide
June 27, 1996
Good Morning. My name is James Riccio. I am the staff attorney for Public
Citizen s Critical Mass Energy Project. Public Citizen is a consumer
advocacy organization founded by Ralph Nader in 1971, Critical Mass was
founded in 1974 to address the dangers posed by nuclear reactors and the
long lived radioactive wastes they produce.
Public Citizen has long advocated the stockpiling and distribution of
potassium iodide (KI) to populations living in a 50 mile radius of all
commercial nuclear reactors. The long standing failure of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) to require all commercial reactor licensees to
provide KI to surrounding populations is a disgrace. The nuclear industry
and its lobbyists have successfully quashed previous attempts to require
the stockpiling and distribution of KI. The NRC has acquiesced to
industry pressure much to the detriment of the public health and safety.
The industry's argument that stockpiling and distribution of KI would
unreasonably raise the fears of the public, is both specious and self
serving. The public is already well aware of the dangers posed by nuclear
reactors. Providing an additional level of radiation protection in the
event of an accidental release will not unduly raise the fears of those
who already live in the shadows of nuclear reactors.
In the aftermath of the partial core-melt accident at Three Mile Island,
the NRC acknowledged that safe siting and design-engineered features alone
do not optimize protection of the public health and safety. The NRC added
that although emergency planning had previously been considered a
secondary and additional means of protecting the public, its perspective
had been, "severely altered by the unexpected sequence of events that
occurred at Three Mile Island." (44 Fed. Reg. 75167) The Commission
concluded that, "the protection provided by safe siting and engineered
safety features must be bolstered by the ability to take protective
measures during the course of an accident." (44 Fed. Reg. 75169).
The President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, known as
the Kemeny Commission, was highly critical of the failure to stockpile KI.
Among the Kemeny Commission's major recommendations was that an adequate
supply of the radiation protective agent, potassium iodide, should be
available regionally for distribution to the general population and
workers affected by a radiological emergency. (60 Fed. Reg. 58257).
While the NRC endorsed the Kemeny Commission position in 1979 when it was
released, the Commission has taken no steps to ensure its implementation.
The Commission has already recognized that in the event of an accident,
potassium iodide could prove effective and useful under certain
conditions. Therefore, the NRC's unwillingness to implement the Kemeny
Commission recommendations regarding the stockpiling and distribution of
KI is an abrogation of the Commission's statutory responsibility to
protect the public health and safety. The decision by former Commissioners
DePlanque and Remick to block the stockpiling and distribution of KI can
not logically be supported.
The cost-benefit analysis upon which the current policy is based relies on
unrealistic assumptions about the probability of severe accidents. The
probabilistic risk assessment which underlies the cost-benefit assumptions
concludes that a severe accident could occur only once in 1000 years.
However, the NRC has acknowledged that severe accidents might be 100 times
more likely. Shortly after the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, NRC Commissioner
James Asselstine testified to Congress that there was a 45% chance of a
severe core meltdown at a commercial nuclear reactor within twenty years.
(James K. Asselstine, Testimony before the Energy Conservation and Power
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, May 22, 1986.)
However, we need not rely on probabilistic analysis. The history of
severe accidents at U.S. reactors reveals that the NRC's PRAs are overly
optimistic. Rather than one severe accident in 1000 years, America's
nuclear experience includes five partial core melt accidents in 40 years.
Reactors which have experienced partial core melts include: EBR-1 on Nov.
29, 1955; WTR on April 3, 1960; SL-1 on Jan. 3, 1961; Fermi 1 on Oct. 5,
1966 and Three Mile Island 2 on March 28, 1979. In light of this fact,
the Commission's reliance upon PRAs to obviate the need for stockpiling
and predistribution of KI is at best specious and at worst constitutes an
abrogation of NRC's statutory responsibility to protect the public health
and safety. The intransigence of former NRC Commissioners, in light of
the staff's support for rewriting NRC's policy on KI, is incomprehensible.
It reveals that the NRC and the nuclear industry have learned little from
the costly accidents at TMI and Chernobyl. A decade and a half after
Three Mile Island, the findings of NRC's own Special Inquiry Group still
hold true.
The NRC...treats radiation protection as secondary in importance to
production (of electricity).... The NRC safety reviews have been hardware
oriented. The focus of those reviews has been on equipment and
engineering safeguard features to mitigate and safeguard against
accidents. As a result, the belief that "accidents can't happen" has
colored the agency's approach to radiation protection....We find that the
attitude that radiation protection was of secondary importance was held by
the NRC.
(J. Rogovin et al., Three Mile Island: A Report to the Commissioners and
the Public, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January 1980.)
Although many licensees have KI on site to protect their workers, we know
of only one state that has actually stockpiled and pre-distributed KI for
public use in the event of an accident. The State of Tennessee stores KI
at strategic locations and will distribute upon request to people within a
five mile radius of a reactor site. Tennessee also issues KI to those
residents within the 10 mile EPZ who volunteer to come and get it.(U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Safety Evaluation Report related to the
operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, Dockets 50-390 and
50-391, SSER 13, April 1994, p. 13-13).
While several other states (Alabama, Arizona, California, Kentucky,
Michigan and Vermont) have "plans" to distribute KI to the general public,
the efficacy of these plans is questionable. Potassium Iodide is most
effective if administered prior to radiation exposure. Seemingly, this
would make pre-distribution of KI imperative. The tragic comedy of errors
surrounding the attempts to distribute KI in the wake of the Three Mile
Island accident only serves to highlight the need for pre-distribution.
Stockpiling and pre-distribution of potassium iodide would bring U.S.
policy into line with what has become an accepted practice among many
nuclear nations since the Chernobyl accident. Furthermore, it would help
provide an equal level of radiation protection to all U.S. citizens
residing in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant.
The Commission has already concluded that siting and design are not enough
to protect the public in the event of a nuclear accident. The Commission
and almost all experts acknowledge that potassium iodide can be an
effective ancillary protective action if taken during a nuclear power
plant accident. However, the NRC does not require stockpiling or
predistribution of KI so that it could be made available to provide
protection to members of the public. This logical inconsistency can no
longer be tolerated.
The NRC's obfuscation and delay in implementing the Kemeny Commission
recommendations to stockpile and distribute potassium iodide constitutes
an abrogation of the Commission's statutory responsibility to protect the
public health and safety. I hope that this committee will act
expeditiously to remedy this unacceptable situation. I thank you for your
time and consideration.
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