[Upd-discuss] SCOTUS: Abstract Code a Blueprint, not Component of a Patent

[Seth Johnson]

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
--------------116B7ED2EC5AC404A2DFD7EF
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit


(This finding proceeds from recognizing the crucial distinction of the
abstraction of code.  -- Seth)

> http://news.zdnet.com/2102-3513_22-6180188.html
> http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/06pdf/05-1056.pdf

---

Supreme Court sides with Microsoft in patent spat

04/30/07

In what could be a broader victory for American software companies,
the U.S. Supreme Court on Monday ruled that Microsoft cannot be forced
to pay up for patent infringement that occurs when copies of Windows
are made and installed on computers abroad.

Generally, U.S. patent protection does not transcend American borders.
At issue in this case is a complex exception in patent law that bars
American companies from shipping "components" to foreign
manufacturers, which could then combine them to make a machine that
infringes on U.S. patents. The law does not, however, restrict sending
blueprints that could theoretically prompt a foreign company to build
an identical product.

Scarcely two months after they heard oral arguments in a patent
dispute that pitted the Windows maker against AT&T, the justices ruled
7-1 (PDF) that "abstract software code" shipped by Microsoft to
foreign manufacturers in the form of "golden master discs" amounts to
such a blueprint, not a "component" of the invention.

"The master disc or electronic transmission Microsoft sends from the
United States is never installed on any of the foreign-made computers
in question," the justices said in a majority opinion penned by
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. "Instead, copies made abroad are used for
installation."

That means under existing federal law, the company cannot be held
liable for infringement that occurs as a result of those foreign
installations, the justices concluded, although they seemed to invite
Congress to take another look at what AT&T argued are loopholes in the
law.

If AT&T wants to prevent its inventions from being copied abroad, the
justices added, its "remedy lies in obtaining and enforcing foreign
patents."

Andrew Leibnitz, an intellectual property lawyer for Farella Braun and
Martel in San Francisco, said in making the ruling the court
determined that U.S. patent law governs only the U.S. and not the
world. Leibnitz said that is "recognition of a deference that the U.S.
has not previously evinced in world affairs."

It's also, he said, a sign that the high court is leery of expanding
patent law.
Related story
High court ruling could curb 'obvious' patents
Unanimous Supreme Court opinion calls for a more flexible standard to
decide whether combinations of existing elements deserve protection.

"I think it shows, if not hostility, a reluctance to see patent law
applied more broadly than absolutely necessary," Leibnitz said, adding
that the ruling will impact the whole software sector as well as other
industries. "The Supreme Court is talking about not just software, but
prototypes that are sent abroad...templates or blueprints or any other
idea that gets sent abroad that needs to be combined with something
physical in order to potentially infringe."

The decision could save Microsoft and other global software companies
billions of dollars. When a jury earlier this year ordered Redmond to
pay Alcatel-Lucent Technologies $1.5 billion in a patent dispute over
MP3 audio technology used in Windows, the company noted that about
half of the damages were calculated based on overseas sales of Windows
PCs.

Microsoft general counsel Brad Smith called the decision "important
for the entire information technology industry, adding clarity and
balance to our patent system." He said he believed the damage awards
in the Alcatel-Lucent case and an earlier case against the University
of California's Eolas spinoff would be revisited, and the company
welcomed that result.

"More generally, because Microsoft is such a large, rich company and
competes in so many business areas, it's increasingly been the target
of patent litigation," said Matt Rosoff, a lead analyst with the firm
Directions on Microsoft. "So any ruling that decreases the amount of
potential liability is a good thing for Microsoft."

AT&T Knowledge Ventures CEO Scott Frank said the company was
disappointed in the court's ruling. "All U.S.-based sources of
innovation--including the software development community--could
benefit from patent laws that enable fair, appropriate protection and
valuation of new technologies and inventions domestically and
overseas," he said in a statement.

The ruling marks the latest in a string of patent-focused cases heard
in the past year by the high court that have been hailed by technology
companies. Separately on Monday, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous
ruling designed to make it easier to weed out patents covering obvious
combinations of elements.

The Supreme Court agreed to review the Microsoft-AT&T matter after a
federal district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit both found Microsoft liable not only for violating an AT&T
patent covering a "digital speech coder" in U.S.-assembled computers
but also in those abroad. AT&T first sued Microsoft over the patent in
2001.
--------------116B7ED2EC5AC404A2DFD7EF
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1;
 name="MS_vs_ATT.txt"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Disposition: inline;
 filename="MS_vs_ATT.txt"


> http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/06pdf/05-1056.pdf


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 05=961056

MICROSOFT CORPORATION, PETITIONER v.
AT&T CORP.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[April 30, 2007]

JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to footnot=
e 14.

It is the general rule under United States patent law that no infringemen=
t occurs when a patented product is made and sold in another country. The=
re is an exception.Section 271(f) of the Patent Act, adopted in 1984, pro=
videsthat infringement does occur when one "supplies . . . from the Unite=
d States," for "combination" abroad, a patented invention's "components."=
 35 U. S. C. =A7271(f)(1). This case concerns the applicability of =A7271=
(f) to computer softwarefirst sent from the United States to a foreign ma=
nufac-turer on a master disk, or by electronic transmission, then copied =
by the foreign recipient for installation on computers made and sold abro=
ad.

AT&T holds a patent on an apparatus for digitally encoding and compressin=
g recorded speech. Microsoft's Windows operating system, it is conceded, =
has the potential to infringe AT&T's patent, because Windows incorpo-rate=
s software code that, when installed, enables a com-puter to process spee=
ch in the manner claimed by that patent. It bears emphasis, however, that=
 uninstalled Windows software does not infringe AT&T's patent any more th=
an a computer standing alone does; instead, thepatent is infringed only w=
hen a computer is loaded withWindows and is thereby rendered capable of p=
erforming asthe patented speech processor. The question before us: Does M=
icrosoft's liability extend to computers made inanother country when load=
ed with Windows softwarecopied abroad from a master disk or electronic tr=
ansmis-sion dispatched by Microsoft from the United States? Our answer is=
 "No."

The master disk or electronic transmission Microsoft sends from the Unite=
d States is never installed on any ofthe foreign-made computers in questi=
on. Instead, copies made abroad are used for installation. Because Micros=
oft does not export from the United States the copies actually installed,=
 it does not "suppl[y] . . . from the United States" "components" of the =
relevant computers, and therefore is not liable under =A7271(f) as curren=
tly written.

Plausible arguments can be made for and against extending =A7271(f) to th=
e conduct charged in this case as infringing AT&T's patent. Recognizing t=
hat =A7271(f) is an exception to the general rule that our patent law doe=
s not apply extraterritorially, we resist giving the language in which Co=
ngress cast =A7271(f) an expansive interpretation. Our decision leaves to=
 Congress' informed judgment any adjustment of =A7271(f) it deems necessa=
ry or proper.

I

Our decision some 35 years ago in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.,=
 406 U. S. 518 (1972), a case about a shrimp deveining machine, led Congr=
ess to enact =A7271(f).In that case, Laitram, holder of a patent on the t=
ime-and-expense-saving machine, sued Deepsouth, manufacturer of an infrin=
ging deveiner. Deepsouth conceded that the Patent Act barred it from maki=
ng and selling its deveining machine in the United States, but sought to =
salvage a portion of its business: Nothing in United States patent law, D=
eepsouth urged, stopped it from making in the United States the parts of =
its deveiner, as opposed to themachine itself, and selling those parts to=
 foreign buyers for assembly and use abroad. Id., at 522=96524.1 We agree=
d.

=97=97=97=97=97=97
1 Deepsouth shipped its deveining equipment "to foreign customers in thre=
e separate boxes, each containing only parts of the 1=BE-ton machines, ye=
t the whole [was] assemblable in less than one hour." Deepsouth Packing C=
o. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U. S. 518, 524 (1972).
=97=97=97=97=97=97

Interpreting our patent law as then written, we reiter-ated in Deepsouth =
that it was "not an infringement to make or use a patented product outsid=
e of the United States." Id., at 527; see 35 U. S. C. =A7271(a) (1970 ed.=
) ("[W]hoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented inventi=
on, within the United States during the term of the patent therefor, infr=
inges the patent."). Deep-south's foreign buyers did not infringe Laitram=
's patent, we held, because they assembled and used the deveining machine=
s outside the United States. Deepsouth, we there-fore concluded, could no=
t be charged with inducing orcontributing to an infringement. 406 U. S., =
at 526=96527.2 Nor could Deepsouth be held liable as a direct infringer, =
for it did not make, sell, or use the patented invention=97the fully asse=
mbled deveining machine=97within the United States. The parts of the mach=
ine were not themselves patented, we noted, hence export of those parts, =
unassembled, did not rank as an infringement of Laitram's patent. Id., at=
 527=96529.

=97=97=97=97=97=97
2 See 35 U. S. C. =A7271(b) (1970 ed.) ("Whoever actively induces in-frin=
gement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer."); =A7271(c) (renderi=
ng liable as a contributory infringer anyone who sells or imports a"compo=
nent" of a patented invention, "knowing the same to be especially made or=
 especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a =
staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non-infr=
inging use").
=97=97=97=97=97=97

Laitram had argued in Deepsouth that resistance to extension of the paten=
t privilege to cover exported parts "derived from too narrow and technica=
l an interpretation of the [Patent Act]." Id., at 529. Rejecting that arg=
ument, we referred to prior decisions holding that "a combination patent =
protects only against the operable assembly of the whole and not the manu=
facture of its parts." Id., at 528. Congress' codification of patent law,=
 we said, signaled nointention to broaden the scope of the privilege. Id.=
, at 530 ("When, as here, the Constitution is permissive, the sign ofhow =
far Congress has chosen to go can come only fromCongress."). And we again=
 emphasized that

   "[o]ur patent system makes no claim to extraterritorial =

   effect; these acts of Congress do not, and were not intended =

   to, operate beyond the limits of the United States; and we =

   correspondingly reject the claims of others to such control =

   over our markets." Id., at 531 (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 19 =

   How. 183, 195 (1857)).

Absent "a clear congressional indication of intent," we stated, courts ha=
d no warrant to stop the manufacture and sale of the parts of patented in=
ventions for assembly and use abroad. 406 U. S., at 532.

Focusing its attention on Deepsouth, Congress enacted =A7271(f). See Pate=
nt Law Amendments Act of 1984, =A7101, 98 Stat. 3383; Fisch & Allen, The =
Application of Domestic Patent Law to Exported Software: 35 U. S. C. =A72=
71(f), 25 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 557, 565 (2004) ("Congress specificall=
y intended =A7271(f) as a response to the Supreme Court's decision in Dee=
psouth").3 The provision expands the definition of infringement to includ=
e supplying from the United States a patented invention's components:

   "(1) Whoever without authority supplies or causesto be =

   supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial =

   portion of the components of a patented invention, where such =

   components are uncombined inwhole or in part, in such manner =

   as to actively induce the combination of such components =

   outside of theUnited States in a manner that would infringe =

   thepatent if such combination occurred within the United =

   States, shall be liable as an infringer.

   "(2) Whoever without authority supplies or causesto be =

   supplied in or from the United States any com-ponent of a =

   patented invention that is especially madeor especially =

   adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or =

   commodity of commerce suitable forsubstantial noninfringing =

   use, where such componentis uncombined in whole or in part, =

   knowing that such component is so made or adapted and =

   intending that such component will be combined outside of the =

   United States in a manner that would infringe thepatent if =

   such combination occurred within the United States, shall be =

   liable as an infringer." 35 U. S. C. =A7271(f).

=97=97=97=97=97=97
3 See also, e.g., Patent Law Amendments of 1984, S. Rep. No. 98=96663,pp.=
 2=963 (1984) (describing =A7271(f) as "a response to the Supreme Court's=
1972 Deepsouth decision which interpreted the patent law not to makeit in=
fringement where the final assembly and sale is abroad"); Section-by-Sect=
ion Analysis of H. R. 6286, 130 Cong. Rec. 28069 (1984) ("Thisproposal re=
sponds to the United States Supreme Court decision in Deepsouth . . . con=
cerning the need for a legislative solution to close a loophole in [the] =
patent law.").
=97=97=97=97=97=97

II

Windows is designed, authored, and tested at Microsoft's Redmond, Washing=
ton, headquarters. Microsoft sells Windows to end users and computer manu=
facturers, both foreign and domestic. Purchasing manufacturersinstall the=
 software onto the computers they sell. Microsoft sends to each of the fo=
reign manufacturers a master version of Windows, either on a disk or via =
encrypted electronic transmission. The manufacturer uses the master versi=
on to generate copies. Those copies, not the master sent by Microsoft, ar=
e installed on the foreign manufacturer's computers. Once assembly is com=
plete, the foreign-made computers are sold to users abroad. App. to Pet. =
for Cert. 45a=9646a.4

=97=97=97=97=97=97
4 Microsoft also distributes Windows to foreign manufacturers indirectly,=
 by sending a master version to an authorized foreign "replicator"; the r=
eplicator then makes copies and ships them to the manufacturers. App. to =
Pet. for Cert. 45a=9646a.
=97=97=97=97=97=97

AT&T's patent ('580 patent) is for an apparatus (asrelevant here, a compu=
ter) capable of digitally encodingand compressing recorded speech. Window=
s, the partiesagree, contains software that enables a computer to proc-es=
s speech in the manner claimed by the '580 patent. In 2001, AT&T filed an=
 infringement suit in the United States District Court for the Southern D=
istrict of New York, charging Microsoft with liability for domestic and f=
oreign installations of Windows.

Neither Windows software (e.g., in a box on the shelf) nor a computer sta=
nding alone (i.e., without Windows installed) infringes AT&T's patent. In=
fringement occursonly when Windows is installed on a computer, thereby re=
ndering it capable of performing as the patented speech processor. Micros=
oft stipulated that by installing Win-dows on its own computers during th=
e software develop-ment process, it directly infringed the '580 patent.5 =
Micro-soft further acknowledged that by licensing copies ofWindows to man=
ufacturers of computers sold in theUnited States, it induced infringement=
 of AT&T's patent.6 Id., at 42a; Brief for Petitioner 3=964; Brief for Re=
spondent9, 19.

=97=97=97=97=97=97
5 See 35 U. S. C. =A7271(a) ("[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, of=
fers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States o=
r imports into the United States any patented invention during the term o=
f the patent therefor, infringes the patent.").

6 See =A7271(b) ("Whoever actively induces infringement of a patentshall =
be liable as an infringer.").
=97=97=97=97=97=97


Microsoft denied, however, any liability based on the master disks and el=
ectronic transmissions it dispatched to foreign manufacturers, thus joini=
ng issue with AT&T. Bysending Windows to foreign manufacturers, AT&T con-=
tended, Microsoft "supplie[d] . . . from the United States,"for "combinat=
ion" abroad, "components" of AT&T's pat-ented speech processor; according=
ly, AT&T urged, Micro-soft was liable under =A7271(f). See supra, at 5 (r=
eproducing text of =A7271(f)). Microsoft responded that unincorporatedsof=
tware, because it is intangible information, cannot betyped a "component"=
 of an invention under =A7271(f). In anyevent, Microsoft urged, the forei=
gn-generated copies of Windows actually installed abroad were not "suppli=
e[d] . . . from the United States." Rejecting these responses, the Distri=
ct Court held Microsoft liable under =A7271(f). 71 USPQ 2d 1118 (SDNY 200=
4). On appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Ci=
rcuit affirmed.414 F. 3d 1366 (2005). We granted certiorari, 549 U. S.___=
 (2006), and now reverse.

III

A

This case poses two questions: First, when, or in whatform, does software=
 qualify as a "component" under=A7271(f)? Second, were "components" of th=
e foreign-made computers involved in this case "supplie[d]" by Microsoft"=
from the United States"?7

=97=97=97=97=97=97
7 The record leaves unclear which paragraph of =A7271(f) AT&T's claim inv=
okes. While there are differences between =A7271(f)(1) and (f)(2), see, e=
=2Eg., infra, at 18, n. 18, the parties do not suggest that those differe=
nces are outcome determinative. Cf. infra, at 14=9615, n. 16 (explaining =
whyboth paragraphs yield the same result). For clarity's sake, we focus o=
ur analysis on the text of =A7271(f)(1).
=97=97=97=97=97=97

As to the first question, no one in this litigation argues that software =
can never rank as a "component" under =A7271(f). The parties disagree, ho=
wever, over the stage at which software becomes a component. Software, th=
e "set of instructions, known as code, that directs a computer to perform=
 specified functions or operations," Fantasy Sports Properties, Inc. v. S=
portsline.com, Inc., 287 F. 3d 1108, 1118 (CA Fed. 2002), can be conceptu=
alized in (at least) two ways. One can speak of software in the abstract:=
 the instructions themselves detached from any medium. (An analogy: The n=
otes of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony.) One can alternatively envision a tan=
gible "copy" of software,the instructions encoded on a medium such as a C=
D-ROM. (Sheet music for Beethoven's Ninth.) AT&T argues thatsoftware in t=
he abstract, not simply a particular copy ofsoftware, qualifies as a "com=
ponent" under =A7271(f). Micro-soft and the United States argue that only=
 a copy of soft-ware, not software in the abstract, can be a component.8

=97=97=97=97=97=97
8 Microsoft and the United States stress that to count as a component, th=
e copy of software must be expressed as "object code." "Software in the f=
orm in which it is written and understood by humans is called 'source cod=
e.' To be functional, however, software must be converted (or 'compiled')=
 into its machine-usable version," a sequence of binary number instructio=
ns typed "object code." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4, n. 1;=
 71 USPQ 2d 1118, 1119, n. 5 (SDNY 2004)(recounting Microsoft's descripti=
on of the software development proc-ess). It is stipulated that object co=
de was on the master disks andelectronic transmissions Microsoft dispatch=
ed from the United States.
=97=97=97=97=97=97

The significance of these diverse views becomes appar-ent when we turn to=
 the second question: Were compo-nents of the foreign-made computers invo=
lved in this case "supplie[d]" by Microsoft "from the United States"? If =
the relevant components are the copies of Windows actually installed on t=
he foreign computers, AT&T could not per-suasively argue that those compo=
nents, though generated abroad, were "supplie[d] . . . from the United St=
ates" as =A7271(f) requires for liability to attach.9 If, on the other ha=
nd, Windows in the abstract qualifies as a component within =A7271(f)'s c=
ompass, it would not matter that the master copies of Windows software di=
spatched from theUnited States were not themselves installed abroad as wo=
rking parts of the foreign computers.10 With this explanation of the rela=
tionship between the two questions in view, we further consider the twin =
inquiries.

=97=97=97=97=97=97
9 On this view of "component," the copies of Windows on the masterdisks a=
nd electronic transmissions that Microsoft sent from the United States co=
uld not themselves serve as a basis for liability, because thosecopies we=
re not installed on the foreign manufacturers' computers. See =A7271(f)(1=
) (encompassing only those components "combin[ed] . . . outside of the Un=
ited States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combinatio=
n occurred within the United States").

10 The Federal Circuit panel in this case, relying on that court's prior =
decision in Eolas Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F. 3d 1325 (2=
005), held that software qualifies as a component under =A7271(f). We are=
 unable to determine, however, whether the Federal Circuit panelsregarded=
 as a component software in the abstract, or a copy of software.
=97=97=97=97=97=97

B

First, when, or in what form, does software become a "component" under =A7=
271(f)? We construe =A7271(f)'s terms "in accordance with [their] ordinar=
y or natural meaning." FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U. S. 471, 476 (1994). Section =
271(f) applies to the supply abroad of the "components of a pat-ented inv=
ention, where such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such=
 manner as to actively induce the combination of such components." =A7271=
(f)(1) (emphasisadded). The provision thus applies only to "such compo-ne=
nts"11 as are combined to form the "patented invention"at issue. The pate=
nted invention here is AT&T's speech-processing computer.

=97=97=97=97=97=97
11 "Component" is commonly defined as "a constituent part," "element," or=
 "ingredient." Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the Englis=
h Language 466 (1981).
=97=97=97=97=97=97

Until it is expressed as a computer-readable "copy," e.g., on a CD-ROM, W=
indows software=97indeed any software detached from an activating medium=97=
remains uncombinable. It cannot be inserted into a CD-ROM drive or downlo=
aded from the Internet; it cannot be installed or executed on a computer.=
 Abstract software code is an idea without physical embodiment, and as su=
ch, it does not match =A7271(f)'s categorization: "components" amenable t=
o "combination." Windows abstracted from a tangible copy no doubt is info=
rmation =97- a detailed set of instructions =97- and thus might be compar=
ed to a blueprint (or anything containing design information, e.g., a sch=
ematic, template, or prototype). A blueprint may contain precise instruct=
ions for the construction and combination of the components of a patented=
 device, but it is not itself a combinablecomponent of that device. AT&T =
and its amici do not suggest otherwise. Cf. Pellegrini v. Analog Devices,=
 Inc., 375 F. 3d 1113, 1117=961119 (CA Fed. 2004) (transmission abroad of=
 instructions for production of patented computerchips not covered by =A7=
271(f)).

AT&T urges that software, at least when expressed as machine-readable obj=
ect code, is distinguishable from design information presented in a bluep=
rint. Software, unlike a blueprint, is "modular"; it is a stand-alone pro=
duct developed and marketed "for use on many different types of computer =
hardware and in conjunction with many other types of software." Brief for=
 Respondent 5; Tr. of Oral Arg. 46. Software's modularity persists even a=
fter installation; it can be updated or removed (deleted) without affecti=
ng the hardware on which it is installed. Ibid. Software, unlike a bluepr=
int, is also "dynamic." Tr. of Oral Arg. 46. After a device has been buil=
t according to a blueprint's instructions, the blueprint's work is done (=
as AT&T puts it, the blueprint's instructions have been "exhausted," ibid=
=2E). Software's instructions, in contrast, are contained in and continuo=
usly performed by a computer. Brief for Respondent 27=9628; Tr. of Oral A=
rg. 46. See also Eolas Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F. 3d 13=
25, 1339 (CA Fed. 2005) ("[S]oftware code . . . drives the functional nuc=
leus of the finished computer product." (quoting Im-agexpo, L. L. C. v. M=
icrosoft Corp., 299 F. Supp. 2d 550, 553 (ED Va. 2003))).

The distinctions advanced by AT&T do not persuade us to characterize soft=
ware, uncoupled from a medium, as a combinable component. Blueprints too,=
 or any design information for that matter, can be independently develope=
d, bought, and sold. If the point of AT&T's argument is that we do not se=
e blueprints lining stores' shelves, the same observation may be made abo=
ut software in the abstract: What retailers sell, and consumers buy, are =
copies of software. Likewise, before software can be contained in and con=
tinuously performed by a computer, before it can be updated or deleted, a=
n actual,physical copy of the software must be delivered by CD-ROM or som=
e other means capable of interfacing with the computer.12
	=

=97=97=97=97=97=97
12 The dissent, embracing AT&T's argument, contends that, "unlike a bluep=
rint that merely instructs a user how to do something, software actually =
causes infringing conduct to occur." Post, at 3 (STEVENS, J., dissenting)=
=2E We have emphasized, however, that Windows can "caus[e] infringing con=
duct to occur"=97i.e., function as part of AT&T's speech-processing compu=
ter=97only when expressed as a computer-readable copy. Abstracted from a =
usable copy, Windows code is intangible, uncombinable information, more l=
ike notes of music in the head of a composer than "a roller that causes a=
 player piano to produce sound." Ibid.
=97=97=97=97=97=97

Because it is so easy to encode software's instructionsonto a medium that=
 can be read by a computer, AT&T intimates, that extra step should not pl=
ay a decisive role under =A7271(f). But the extra step is what renders th=
e software a usable, combinable part of a computer; easy ornot, the copy-=
producing step is essential. Moreover, many tools may be used easily and =
inexpensively to generate theparts of a device. A machine for making spro=
ckets mightbe used by a manufacturer to produce tens of thousands ofsproc=
kets an hour. That does not make the machine a "component" of the tens of=
 thousands of devices in whichthe sprockets are incorporated, at least no=
t under any ordinary understanding of the term "component." Congress, of =
course, might have included within =A7271(f)'s compass, for example, not =
only combinable "components" of a patented invention, but also "informati=
on, instruc-tions, or tools from which those components readily may be ge=
nerated." It did not. In sum, a copy of Windows, not Windows in the abstr=
act, qualifies as a "component" under =A7271(f).13

=97=97=97=97=97=97
13 We need not address whether software in the abstract, or any other int=
angible, can ever be a component under =A7271(f). If an intangible method=
 or process, for instance, qualifies as a "patented invention" under =A72=
71(f) (a question as to which we express no opinion), the combinable comp=
onents of that invention might be intangible as well. The invention befor=
e us, however, AT&T's speech-processing computer, is a tangible thing.
=97=97=97=97=97=97

C

The next question, has Microsoft "supplie[d] . . . from the United States=
" components of the computers here involved? Under a conventional reading=
 of =A7271(f)'s text,the answer would be "No," for the foreign-made copie=
s of Windows actually installed on the computers were "sup-plie[d]" from =
places outside the United States. The Fed-eral Circuit majority concluded=
, however, that "for soft-ware 'components,' the act of copying is subsum=
ed in the act of 'supplying.'" 414 F. 3d, at 1370. A master sent abroad, =
the majority observed, differs not at all from theexact copies, easily, i=
nexpensively, and swiftly generated from the master; hence "sending a sin=
gle copy abroad with the intent that it be replicated invokes =A7271(f) l=
iability for th[e] foreign-made copies." Ibid.; cf. post, at 2 (STEVENS, =
J., dissenting) ("[A] master disk is the functional equiva-lent of a ware=
house of components . . . that Microsoft fully expects to be incorporated=
 into foreign-manufactured computers.").

Judge Rader, dissenting, noted that "supplying" is ordinarily understood =
to mean an activity separate and distinct from any subsequent "copying, r=
eplicating, or reproducing=97in effect manufacturing." 414 F. 3d, at 1372=
=961373 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id., at 1373 ("[C]opying =
and supplying are separate acts with different consequences=97particularl=
y when the 'supplying' occurs inthe United States and the copying occurs =
in Dusseldorf or Tokyo. As a matter of logic, one cannot supply one hundr=
ed components of a patented invention without first making one hundred co=
pies of the component . . . ."). He further observed: "The only true diff=
erence between mak-ing and supplying software components and physical com=
ponents [of other patented inventions] is that copies ofsoftware componen=
ts are easier to make and transport." Id., at 1374. But nothing in =A7271=
(f)'s text, Judge Rader maintained, renders ease of copying a relevant, n=
o lessdecisive, factor in triggering liability for infringement. See ibid=
=2E We agree.

Section 271(f) prohibits the supply of components "from the United States=
 . . . in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such compo=
nents." =A7271(f)(1) (emphasis added). Under this formulation, the very c=
omponents supplied from the United States, and not copies thereof, trigge=
r =A7271(f) liability when combined abroad to form the patented invention=
 at issue. Here, as we have repeatedly noted, see supra, at 1=962, 5=966,=
 the copies of Windows actually installed on the foreign computers were n=
ot themselves supplied from the United States.14 Indeed, those copies did=
 not exist until they were generated by third parties outside the United =
States.15 Copying software abroad, all might agree, is indeed easy and in=
expensive. But the same could be said of other items: "Keys or machine pa=
rts might be copied from a master; chemical or biological substances migh=
t be created by reproduction; and paper products might be made by electro=
nic copying and printing." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24. S=
ee also supra, at 11=9612 (rejecting argument similarly based on ease of =
copying in construing "component").Section 271(f) contains no instruction=
 to gauge when du-plication is easy and cheap enough to deem a copy in fa=
ctmade abroad nevertheless "supplie[d] . . . from the UnitedStates." The =
absence of anything addressing copying inthe statutory text weighs agains=
t a judicial determination that replication abroad of a master dispatched=
 from the United States "supplies" the foreign-made copies from the Unite=
d States within the intendment of =A7271(f).16

=97=97=97=97=97=97
14 In a footnote, Microsoft suggests that even a disk shipped from the Un=
ited States, and used to install Windows directly on a foreign com-puter,=
 would not give rise to liability under =A7271(f) if the disk were remove=
d after installation. See Brief for Petitioner 37, n. 11; cf. post, at 2=96=
4 (ALITO, J., concurring). We need not and do not reach that issue here.

15 The dissent analogizes Microsoft's supply of master versions of Window=
s abroad to "the export of an inventory of . . . knives to be warehoused =
until used to complete the assembly of an infringing machine." Post, at 2=
=2E But as we have underscored, foreign-made copiesof Windows, not the ma=
sters Microsoft dispatched from the United States, were installed on the =
computers here involved. A more aptanalogy, therefore, would be the expor=
t of knives for copying abroad, with the foreign-made copies "warehoused =
until used to complete the assembly of an infringing machine." Ibid. With=
out stretching =A7271(f) beyond the text Congress composed, a copy made e=
ntirely abroad does not fit the description "supplie[d] . . . from the Un=
ited States."

16 Our analysis, while focusing on =A7271(f)(1), is equally applicable to=
 =A7271(f)(2). But cf. post, at 1 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (asserting "p=
ara-graph (2) . . . best supports AT&T's position here"). While the two p=
aragraphs differ, among other things, on the quantity of components that =
must be "supplie[d] . . . from the United States" for liability to attach=
, see infra, at 18, n. 18, that distinction does not affect our analysis.=
 Paragraph (2), like (1), covers only a "component" amenableto "combinati=
on." =A7271(f)(2); see supra, at 9=9612 (explaining why Windows in the ab=
stract is not a combinable component). Paragraph (2), like (1), encompass=
es only the "[s]uppl[y] . . . from the United States" of"such [a] compone=
nt" as will itself "be combined outside of the United States." =A7271(f)(=
2); see supra, at 12=9613 and this page (observing that foreign-made copi=
es of Windows installed on computers abroad were not "supplie[d] . . . fr=
om the United States"). It is thus unsurprising that AT&T does not join t=
he dissent in suggesting that the outcome might turn on whether we view t=
he case under paragraph (1) or (2).
=97=97=97=97=97=97

D

Any doubt that Microsoft's conduct falls outside =A7271(f)'scompass would=
 be resolved by the presumption against extraterritoriality, on which we =
have already touched. See supra, at 2, 4. The presumption that United Sta=
tes lawgoverns domestically but does not rule the world applieswith parti=
cular force in patent law. The traditional un-derstanding that our patent=
 law "operate[s] only domesti-cally and d[oes] not extend to foreign acti=
vities," Fisch & Allen, supra, at 559, is embedded in the Patent Act itse=
lf, which provides that a patent confers exclusive rights in aninvention =
within the United States. 35 U. S. C. =A7154(a)(1) (patentee's rights ove=
r invention apply to manufacture, use, or sale "throughout the United Sta=
tes" and to impor-tation "into the United States"). See Deepsouth, 406 U.=
 S., at 531 ("Our patent system makes no claim to extraterri-torial effec=
t"; our legislation "d[oes] not, and [was] notintended to, operate beyond=
 the limits of the United States, and we correspondingly reject the claim=
s of others to such control over our markets." (quoting Brown, 19 How., a=
t 195)).

As a principle of general application, moreover, we have stated that cour=
ts should "assume that legislators takeaccount of the legitimate sovereig=
n interests of othernations when they write American laws." F. Hoffmann-L=
a Roche Ltd v. Empagran S. A., 542 U. S. 155, 164 (2004); see EEOC v. Ara=
bian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 248 (1991). Thus, the United States=
 accurately conveyed inthis case: "Foreign conduct is [generally] the dom=
ain of foreign law," and in the area here involved, in particular,foreign=
 law "may embody different policy judgments aboutthe relative rights of i=
nventors, competitors, and the public in patented inventions." Brief for =
United States as Amicus Curiae 28. Applied to this case, the presumptiont=
ugs strongly against construction of =A7271(f) to encompass as a "compone=
nt" not only a physical copy of software, but also software's intangible =
code, and to render "supplie[d]. . . from the United States" not only exp=
orted copies of software, but also duplicates made abroad.

AT&T argues that the presumption is inapplicable because Congress enacted=
 =A7271(f) specifically to extend the reach of United States patent law t=
o cover certain activityabroad. But as this Court has explained, "the pre=
sump-tion is not defeated . . . just because [a statute] specificallyaddr=
esses [an] issue of extraterritorial application," Smith v. United States=
, 507 U. S. 197, 204 (1993); it remains instructive in determining the ex=
tent of the statutoryexception. See Empagran, 542 U. S., at 161=96162, 16=
4=96165; Smith, 507 U. S., at 204.

AT&T alternately contends that the presumption holds no sway here given t=
hat =A7271(f), by its terms, applies only to domestic conduct, i.e., to t=
he supply of a patented invention's components "from the United States." =
=A7271(f)(1). AT&T's reading, however, "converts a single act of supply f=
rom the United States into a springboard for liability each time a copy o=
f the software is subsequently made [abroad] and combined with computer h=
ardware [abroad] for sale [abroad.]" Brief for United States as Amicus Cu=
riae 29; see 414 F. 3d, at 1373, 1375 (Rader, J., dissenting). In short, =
foreign law alone, not United States law, currently governs the manufactu=
re and sale of componentsof patented inventions in foreign countries. If =
AT&T desires to prevent copying in foreign countries, its remedytoday lie=
s in obtaining and enforcing foreign patents. See Deepsouth, 406 U. S., a=
t 531. 17

IV

AT&T urges that reading =A7271(f) to cover only those copies of software =
actually dispatched from the United States creates a "loophole" for softw=
are makers. Liabilityfor infringing a United States patent could be avoid=
ed, asMicrosoft's practice shows, by an easily arranged circum-vention: I=
nstead of making installation copies of software in the United States, th=
e copies can be made abroad, swiftly and at small cost, by generating the=
m from a mas-ter supplied from the United States. The Federal Circuit maj=
ority found AT&T's plea compelling:

   "Were we to hold that Microsoft's supply by exportation of the =

   master versions of the Windows=AE software =97- specifically for =

   the purpose of foreign replication =97- avoids infringement, we =

   would be subverting the remedial nature of =A7271(f), permitting =

   a technical avoidance of the statute by ignoring the advances =

   in a field of technology -=97 and its associated industry =

   practices -=97 that developed after the enactment of =A7271(f). . =

   . . Section =A7271(f), if it is to remain effective, must =

   therefore be interpreted in a manner that is appropriate to =

   the nature of the technology at issue."414 F. 3d, at 1371.

While the majority's concern is understandable, we are not persuaded that=
 dynamic judicial interpretation of =A7271(f) is in order. The "loophole,=
" in our judgment, is properly left for Congress to consider, and to clos=
e if it finds suchaction warranted.

There is no dispute, we note again, that =A7271(f) is inapplicable to the=
 export of design tools=97blueprints, schematics, templates, and prototyp=
es -=97 all of which may provide the information required to construct an=
d combine overseas the components of inventions patented under United Sta=
tes law. See supra, at 10=9612. We have no license to attribute to Congre=
ss an unstated intention to place the information Microsoft dispatched fr=
om the United Statesin a separate category.

=97=97=97=97=97=97
17 AT&T has secured patents for its speech processor in Canada,France, Ge=
rmany, Great Britain, Japan, and Sweden. App. in No. 04=961285 (CA Fed.),=
 p. 1477. AT&T and its amici do not relate what protec-tions and remedies=
 are, or are not, available under these foreign re-gimes. Cf. Brief for R=
espondent 46 (observing that "foreign patentprotections are sometimes wea=
ker than their U. S. counterparts" (emphasis added)).
=97=97=97=97=97=97

Section 271(f) was a direct response to a gap in our patent law revealed =
by this Court's Deepsouth decision. See supra, at 4, and n. 3. The facts =
of that case were undeniably at the fore when =A7271(f) was in the congre=
ssional hopper. In Deepsouth, the items exported were kits containing all=
 the physical, readily assemblable parts of a shrimp deveining machine (n=
ot an intangible set of instructions), and those parts themselves (not fo=
reign-made copies of them) would be combined abroad by foreign buyers. Ha=
ving attended to the gap made evident in Deepsouth, Congress did not addr=
ess other arguable gaps: Section 271(f) does not identify as an infringin=
g act con-duct in the United States that facilitates making a compo-nent =
of a patented invention outside the United States; nor does the provision=
 check "suppl[ying] . . . from the United States" information, instructio=
ns, or other materi-als needed to make copies abroad.18 Given that Congre=
ssdid not home in on the loophole AT&T describes, and inview of the expan=
ded extraterritorial thrust AT&T's read-ing of =A7271(f) entails, our pre=
cedent leads us to leave in Congress' court the patent-protective determi=
nation AT&T seeks. Cf. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Stu-dios, =
Inc., 464 U. S. 417, 431 (1984) ("In a case like this, inwhich Congress h=
as not plainly marked our course, wemust be circumspect in construing the=
 scope of rights created by a legislative enactment which never contem-pl=
ated 	such a calculus of interests.").

=97=97=97=97=97=97
18 Section 271(f)'s text does, in one respect, reach past the facts of De=
epsouth. While Deepsouth exported kits containing all the parts of its de=
veining machines, =A7271(f)(1) applies to the supply abroad of "all or a =
substantial portion of" a patented invention's components. And =A7271(f)(=
2) applies to the export of even a single component if it is"especially m=
ade or especially adapted for use in the invention and nota staple articl=
e or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use."
=97=97=97=97=97=97

Congress is doubtless aware of the ease with which software (and other el=
ectronic media) can be copied, and has not left the matter untouched. In =
1998, Congress addressed "the ease with which pirates could copy and dist=
ribute a copyrightable work in digital form." Universal City Studios, Inc=
=2E v. Corley, 273 F. 3d 429, 435 (CA2 2001). The resulting measure, the =
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U. S. C. =A71201 et seq., "backed wi=
th legal sanctions the efforts of copyright owners to protect their works=
 from piracy behind digital walls such as encryption codes or password pr=
otections." Universal City Studios, 273 F. 3d, at 435. If the patent law =
is to be adjusted better "to ac-count for the realities of software distr=
ibution," 414 F. 3d, at 1370, the alteration should be made after focused=
 legis-lative consideration, and not by the Judiciary forecasting Congres=
s' likely disposition.

* * *

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court ofAppeals for the Feder=
al Circuit is Reversed.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the consideration or decision of this c=
ase.

_________________

_________________

ALITO, J., concurring in part

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 05=961056

MICROSOFT CORPORATION, PETITIONER v.
AT&T CORP.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[April 30, 2007]

JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS and JUSTICE BREYER join, concurri=
ng as to all but footnote 14.

I agree with the Court that no "component[s]" of theforeign-made computer=
s involved in this case were "sup-plie[d]" by Microsoft "from the United =
States." 35 U. S. C. =A7271(f)(1). I write separately because I reach thi=
s conclu-sion through somewhat different reasoning.

I

Computer programmers typically write programs in a "human readable" progr=
amming language. This "'source code'" is then generally converted by the =
computer into a "machine readable code" or "machine language" expressed i=
n a binary format. Brief for Respondent 5, n. 1 (citing R. White, How Com=
puters Work 87, 94 (8th ed. 2006)); E.Walters, Essential Guide to Computi=
ng 204=96205 (2001). During the Windows writing process, the program exis=
tsin the form of machine readable code on the magnetic tape fields of Mic=
rosoft's computers' hard drives. White, supra, at 144=96145; Walters, sup=
ra, at 54=9655.

When Microsoft finishes writing its Windows programin the United States, =
it encodes Windows onto CD-ROMs known as "'golden masters'" in the form o=
f machine read-able code. App. 31, =B64. This is done by engraving eachdi=
sk in a specific way such that another computer can read the engravings, =
understand what they mean, and writethe code onto the magnetic fields of =
its hard drive. Ibid.; Brief for Petitioner 4, n. 2.

Microsoft ships these disks (or sends the code via elec-tronic transmissi=
on) abroad, where the code is copied ontoother disks that are then placed=
 into foreign-made com-puters for purposes of installing the Windows prog=
ram. App. 31=9632, =B6=B65=968. No physical aspect of a Windows CD-ROM=97=
original disk or copy=97is ever incorporated into the computer itself. Se=
e Stenograph L. L. C. v. Bossard As-socs., Inc., 144 F. 3d 96, 100 (CADC =
1998) (noting that, within the context of the Copyright Act, "installatio=
n of software onto a computer results in 'copying'"); White, supra, at 14=
4=96145, 172=96173. The intact CD-ROM is then removed and may be discarde=
d without affecting the computer's implementation of the code.* The parti=
es agree for purposes of this litigation that a foreign-made computer con=
taining the Windows code would violate AT&T's patent if present in the Un=
ited States. Pet. for Cert. 42a, =B65.

II

A

I agree with the Court that a component of a machine,whether a shrimp dev=
einer or a personal computer, must be something physical. Ante, at 9=9611=
=2E This is because the word "component," when concerning a physical devi=
ce, is most naturally read to mean a physical part of the device. See Web=
ster's Third New International Dictionary 466 (1976) (component is a "con=
stituent part: INGREDIENT"); Random House Dictionary of the English Langu=
age 301 (1967) (component is "a component part; constituent"). Furthermor=
e, =A7271(f) requires that the component be "combined" with other compone=
nts to form the infringing device, meaning that the component must remain=
 a part of the device. Webster's, supra, at 452 (combine means "to join i=
n physical or chemical union"; "to become one"; "to unite into a chemical=
 compound"); Random House, supra,at 293 (combine means "to bring or join =
into a close union or whole"). For these reasons, I agree with the Court =
that a set of instructions on how to build an infringing device, or even =
a template of the device, does not qualify as a component. Ante, at 9=961=
0.

=97=97=97=97=97=97
* In a sense, the whole process is akin to an author living prior to the =
existence of the printing press, who created a story in his mind, wrote a=
 manuscript, and sent it to a scrivener, who in turn copied the story by =
hand into a blank book.
=97=97=97=97=97=97

B

As the parties agree, an inventor can patent a machine that carries out a=
 certain process, and a computer mayconstitute such a machine when it exe=
cutes commands=97 given to it by code=97that allow it to carry out that p=
rocess. Such a computer would not become an infringing device until enoug=
h of the code is installed on the computer to allow it to execute the pro=
cess in question. The computer would not be an infringing device prior to=
 the installation, or even during the installation. And the computer re-m=
ains an infringing device after the installation processbecause, even tho=
ugh the original installation device (such as a CD-ROM) has been removed =
from the computer, the code remains on the hard drive.

III

Here, Windows software originating in the United States was sent abroad, =
whether on a master disk or bymeans of an electronic transmission, and ev=
entually cop-ied onto the hard drives of the foreign-made computers.Once =
the copying process was completed, the Windows program was recorded in a =
physical form, i.e., in magneticfields on the computers' hard drives. See=
 Brief for Re-spondent 5. The physical form of the Windows program on the=
 master disk, i.e., the engravings on the CD-ROM,remained on the disk in =
a form unchanged by the copying process. See Brief for Petitioner 4, n. 2=
 (citing White, How Computers Work, at 144=96145, 172=96173). There is no=
thing in the record to suggest that any physical part of the diskbecame a=
 physical part of the foreign-made computer, and such an occurrence would=
 be contrary to the general work-ings of computers.Because no physical ob=
ject originating in the United States was combined with these computers, =
there was noviolation of =A7271(f). Accordingly, it is irrelevant that th=
eWindows software was not copied onto the foreign-made computers directly=
 from the master disk or from an elec-tronic transmission that originated=
 in the United States.To be sure, if these computers could not run Window=
swithout inserting and keeping a CD-ROM in the appropri-ate drive, then t=
he CD-ROMs might be components of the computer. But that is not the case =
here.

* * *

Because the physical incarnation of code on the Win-dows CD-ROM supplied =
from the United States is not a"component" of an infringing device under =
=A7271(f), it logi-cally follows that a copy of such a CD-ROM also is not=
 a component. For this reason, I join the Court's opinion,except for foot=
note 14.

_________________

_________________

JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 05=961056

MICROSOFT CORPORATION, PETITIONER v.
AT&T CORP.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[April 30, 2007]

JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.

As the Court acknowledges, "[p]lausible arguments canbe made for and agai=
nst extending =A7271(f) to the conduct charged in this case as infringing=
 AT&T's patent." Ante, at 2. Strong policy considerations, buttressed by =
the presumption against the application of domestic patentlaw in foreign =
markets, support Microsoft Corporation's position. I am, however, persuad=
ed that an affirmanceof the Court of Appeals' judgment is more faithful t=
othe intent of the Congress that enacted =A7271(f) than a reversal.

The provision was a response to our decision in Deep-south Packing Co. v.=
 Laitram Corp., 406 U. S. 518 (1972), holding that a patent on a shrimp d=
eveining machine had not been infringed by the export of components for a=
ssem-bly abroad. Paragraph (1) of =A7271(f) would have been sufficient on=
 its own to overrule Deepsouth,* but it is paragraph (2) that best suppor=
ts AT&T's position here. It provides:

   "Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied =

   in or from the United States any componentof a patented =

   invention that is especially made or es-pecially adapted for =

   use in the invention and not astaple article or commodity of =

   commerce suitable forsubstantial noninfringing use, where such =

   componentis uncombined in whole or in part, knowing that such =

   component is so made or adapted and intending that such =

   component will be combined outside of the United States in a =

   manner that would infringe thepatent if such combination =

   occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an =

   infringer." =A7271(f)(2).

=97=97=97=97=97=97
* "Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in orfrom =
the United States all or a substantial portion of the components ofa pate=
nted invention, where such components are uncombined in whole or in part,=
 in such manner as to actively induce the combination of suchcomponents o=
utside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if=
 such combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as a=
n infringer." 35 U. S. C. =A7271(f)(1).
=97=97=97=97=97=97

Under this provision, the export of a specially designed knife that has n=
o use other than as a part of a patented deveining machine would constitu=
te infringement. It follows that =A7271(f)(2) would cover the export of a=
n inven-tory of such knives to be warehoused until used to com-plete the =
assembly of an infringing machine.

The relevant component in this case is not a physicalitem like a knife. B=
oth Microsoft and the Court think that means it cannot be a "component." =
See ante, at 10. But if a disk with software inscribed on it is a "compon=
ent," I find it difficult to understand why the most importantingredient =
of that component is not also a component. Indeed, the master disk is the=
 functional equivalent of a warehouse of components=97components that Mic=
rosoftfully expects to be incorporated into foreign-manufactured computer=
s. Put somewhat differently: On the Court's view, Microsoft could be liab=
le under =A7271(f) only if it sends individual copies of its software dir=
ectly from the United States with the intent that each copy would be inco=
rporated into a separate infringing computer. But it seems to me that an =
indirect transmission via a master disk warehouse is likewise covered by =
=A7271(f).

I disagree with the Court's suggestion that because software is analogous=
 to an abstract set of instructions, itcannot be regarded as a "component=
" within the meaning of =A7271(f). See ante, at 9=9610. Whether attached =
or de-tached from any medium, software plainly satisfies the dictionary d=
efinition of that word. See ante, at 9, n. 11 (observing that "'[c]ompone=
nt' is commonly defined as 'aconstituent part,' 'element,' or 'ingredient=
'"). And unlike a blueprint that merely instructs a user how to do some-t=
hing, software actually causes infringing conduct to occur.It is more lik=
e a roller that causes a player piano to pro-duce sound than sheet music =
that tells a pianist what todo. Moreover, it is surely not "a staple arti=
cle or commod-ity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use"=
 as that term is used in =A7271(f)(2). On the contrary, its sole intended=
 use is an infringing use.

I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

--------------116B7ED2EC5AC404A2DFD7EF--