[Upd-discuss] CPSR comment concerning technological measures on copyrighted works

Andy Oram andyo@oreilly.com
Fri, 31 Mar 2000 09:18:56 -0500 (EST)


Technological prohibitions desired by movie, music, and software
vendors appear in a number of laws and official documents, including
an international WIPO treaty on copyright. Congress, however, inserted
a regular review of such prohibitions in its 1998 copyright act. The
EFF has been encouraging people to submit comments, so I wrote one
with the help of many CPSR people. The key points are these four
suggestions, which the comment expands on:

    1. Section 1201's ban on the circumvention of technological measures
       should not be used to suppress the production of a competing or
       alternative compatible device.

    2. The Section should not prevent users who have lawfully purchased or
       licensed the product from choosing a device or medium to view a
       work other than ones approved by the copyrighted work's vendor.

    3. The Section should not prevent users who have lawfully purchased or
       licensed the product from accessing that product in new ways for
       their own innovative purposes.

    4. The Section should not be used to suppress the use of material for
       criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or
       research.

This piece can be freely circulated so long as it is intact.

Andy

---

http://www.cpsr.org/cpsr/nii/cyber-rights/web/copyright_section_1201.html

   [1]Andrew Oram
   Member, Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
   Address:

     [2]Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
     P.O. Box 717
     Palo Alto, CA 94302-0717

   fax (national office): 650-322-4748
   telephone (Andrew Oram): 617-499-7479
   email: [3]andyo@cpsr.org

                                 Reply comment

Concerning the Copyright Office's Rulemaking on Exemptions from Prohibition on
Circumvention of Technological Measures that Control Access to Copyrighted
Works.

   March 31, 2000

   [4]Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility is pleased to have
   the opportunity to submit this reply comment concerning the Copyright
   Office's [5]Rulemaking on Exemptions from [6]Prohibition on
   Circumvention of Technological Measures that Control Access to
   Copyrighted Works.

Four suggestions for clarifying Section 1201

   We support and affirm the comments of the [7]Electronic Frontier
   Foundation, the [8]American Library Association and related
   organizations, the [9]Association for Computing Machinery, the
   [10]Media Laboratory at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the
   [11]National Association of Independent Schools. We will respond to
   several other [12]comments in this reply. In addition, we offer three
   additional suggestions for Copyright Office rulings, which could be
   positioned as clarifications of the law:

    1. Section 1201's ban on the circumvention of technological measures
       should not be used to suppress the production of a competing or
       alternative compatible device.

    2. The Section should not prevent users who have lawfully purchased or
       licensed the product from choosing a device or medium to view a
       work other than ones approved by the copyrighted work's vendor.

    3. The Section should not prevent users who have lawfully purchased or
       licensed the product from accessing that product in new ways for
       their own innovative purposes.

    4. The Section should not be used to suppress the use of material for
       criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or
       research.

   CPSR is a public-interest, non-profit, grassroots organization that was
   founded in 1983 and currently has over 1300 members among the computing
   and other professions in the United States. Our mission is to educate
   the public and policy-makers concerning the appropriate use and scope
   of computers and related technologies.

   Our comments are relevant to question 12 of your [13]inquiry concerning
   the impact of technological measures "on the ability of interested
   persons to engage in criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching,
   scholarship, or research," and question 13 concerning the impact of
   technological measures "on the ability of interested persons to engage
   in noninfringing uses" of copyright works. The comments are also
   relevant in a more general sense to the questions in section D of your
   request, Impact on Criticism, Comment, News Reporting, Teaching,
   Scholarship, or Research, and particularly question 17 that asks how
   works "are being used in ways that do not constitute copyright
   infringement."

Section 1201 cited by filmmakers and recording device manufacturers to suppress
competition

   In December 1999, programmers reverse-engineered the DVD (Digital Video
   Disk or Digital Versatile Disk) format and posted to the Internet some
   code called DeCSS that would allow developers to build devices that
   could retrieve DVD content. Since this case was discussed in detail by
   many comments submitted on the first round (notably the [14]M.I.T.
   Media Lab and the [15]Computer & Communications Industry Association),
   we will not repeat its whole history but only point out certain aspects
   that illustrate the dangers of misusing Section 1201.

   We will argue that the suppression of reverse-engineered code is more
   likely to harm competition and innovation than the rights of copyright
   holders. We note especially that this invocation of Section 1201 is
   unfair not only to competitors, but to lawful users, whose right of
   fair use should allow them to play the DVD on any device. In place of a
   special exemption for playing DVDs on Linux, as requested by the
   Computer & Communications Industry Association, we offer more generally
   the first and second suggestions at the beginning of this comment.

   Devices for making unauthorized videos from DVDs existed long before
   DeCSS, undermining the argument that its "primary purpose" was to
   facilitate unauthorized copying. Rather, the people who showed interest
   in the software were those developing new software to play DVDs on the
   Linux operating system, which is currently unsupported by any licensed
   DVD manufacturer.

   Thus, reverse engineering, a classic technique of software development
   which is generally protected by law, was used in this case for exactly
   the purpose that is protected under Section 1201(f) of the DMCA: "to
   achieve interoperability of an independently developed computer
   program." The courts unfortunately did not honor this exemption when
   upholding the claim in the DVD Copy Control Association's complaint
   that the program "enables users to illegally pirate DVD videos." The
   DVDCCA and other organizations representing filmmakers and recording
   device manufacturers have carried on a broad campaign since then to
   expunge the software from Internet sites worldwide.

   Because the decryption program was implemented purely in software, it
   raises a basic conceptual problem with Section 1201. The "primary
   purpose" language has some meaning in relation to physical devices,
   because their application is usually fairly fixed. Software, however,
   is far more malleable; a technique defined for one application may
   prove equally useful in a completely different application. If
   manufacturers start to apply the "primary purpose" argument to
   software, the clause's scope becomes arbitrarily large and a huge range
   of useful technologies can be prosecuted under it. While we have no
   particular language to recommend to the Copyright Office, given that
   the "primary purpose" clause is in the law, we hope both the Copyright
   Office and the courts seek solutions to this problem. We will take up
   the problem again in the next section of our comment.

   Without public debate, manufacturers of new media and devices have
   decided to undermine the rights of first sale and fair use. For
   instance, Sony Computer Entertainment America's [16]comments claim that
   "Access to copyrighted Playstation(R) games is permitted only through use
   of the access control coding in the PlayStation(R) console and the CD-ROM
   that embodies the videogame." Along the same lines, the Motion Picture
   Association of America's [17]comments state, "Access controls embodied
   in the work itself also commonly function in tandem with the hardware
   used to access the work, so that a work may be made accessible on a
   specific machine, or a specified category of machines." Aside from some
   unsubstantial claims that technological control measures serve
   customers (such as by preventing the sale of games in a country where
   the language used is not widely spoken) Sony claims to need these
   measures to prevent games from being copied. In other words, they wish
   to avoid the burden of finding and bringing violators to court as
   regular publishers in traditional media must do.

   We believe that the convenience of the Sony Corporation and motion
   picture studios--who have ample resources for tracking down and
   prosecuting copyright infringers the traditional way--should not be
   allowed to outweigh the damage caused by the effective abrogation of
   customers' traditional rights, including the effects of such abrogation
   on innovative uses of artistic and information materials and on the
   availability of competing or compatible products.

   Time Warner's [18]comments compare the circumvention of technological
   measures to stealing a book from a store. Leaving aside the difference
   between making a copy of a book and stealing a book, overcoming
   technological measures in the cases presented in this comment is more
   like choosing to underline passages in a book with a pencil. The law
   should not back up the insertion of digital techniques whose effect is
   equivalent to making it impossible for the customer to use a pencil on
   a work, or techniques whose effect is equivalent to forcing a customer
   to buy a particular stylus for the task, perhaps one that uses only a
   special ink that vanishes after a few hours. Historically, while strict
   licenses have been upheld for multiple site licenses purchased by large
   organizations, courts in cases involving mass-market software have
   ruled that users still maintain traditional rights such as first sale
   and fair use.

Emerging dangers that may involve Section 1201

   Some recent legal cases, while they do not directly involve Section
   1201, raise dangers that the Copyright Office may find it timely to
   address. It is all too likely that Section 1201 will be involved in
   such cases in the future, with the effects of suppressing comment and
   criticism of consumer products, or of punishing customers for
   exercising the traditional rights of fair use and first sale.

   Several incidents involving legal threats (not all of which were
   actually pursued in court) involve a fairly frequent practice among
   advocates of free speech wishing to document arbitrariness and
   incompetence in software filters that claim to block computers from
   accessing Web sites inappropriate for children. Though software filters
   have been installed by numerous institutions such as public libraries
   and public schools, in addition to individual consumers, the actual
   sites being blocked are rarely known to any customers. The activities
   of the free speech advocates remedy that situation by publishing lists
   of blocked sites. A perusal of these lists demonstrate the value of the
   critics' activity, due to the high incidence of incorrect and biased
   decisions found in software filtering products.

   Sometimes the critics obtain the lists of blocked sites through reverse
   engineering. The endeavor of the free speech advocates is squarely in
   the public interest and fails cleanly into categories of news
   reporting, product reviews, and criticism.

   (We will not comment any further on the clause concerning reverse
   engineering in Section 1201, because in this section of the comment we
   are not discussing the development of compatible works. Similarly, we
   will not comment on the part of Section 1201 dealing with encryption,
   because that section was drawn up to protect computer science research
   in the field of encryption rather than the use of encryption for other
   ends.)

   Rather than deal with questions by customers and external critics, some
   companies making software filters resort to various legal actions,
   often invoking copyright, to punish whistle-blowers and suppress
   further distribution of the uncovered materials. We are concerned that
   copyright is being invoked on material that is not distributed for
   public view, but exists only as an internal database, and we are
   worried that Section 1201 may be used in the future as a weapon for
   suppressing information and debate on issues affecting consumers and
   the general public. In relation to the Copyright Office request's
   question 23 ("what criteria should be used in determining what is a
   `class' of copyright works") we offer the brief reminder that
   publishing selected facts from a database, without copying the form or
   expression, is not subject to copyright.

   Imagine that a company loses a lawsuit for a faulty product that caused
   deaths or severe damage, but manages to have the court records sealed
   as part of the settlement. Imagine further that they have to report
   some details about the case in an annual report. When the report is
   distributed through standard channels, an enraged shareholder can
   legally pass it to a reporter and the reporter can quote it. But in the
   future, a company may choose to email the report, lightly encrypted,
   and claim a violation of its "technological self-help protection
   measures" when the truth hits the newsstands. The Copyright Office can
   do a great deal to restore copyright law to its intent--that of
   protecting copyrights--by making the third and fourth rulings we asked
   for at the beginning of this comment.

   The widely-publicized [19]lawsuit by the Recording Industry Association
   of America against [20]Napster does not involve Section 1201. But since
   the case involves technology used for infringement rather than the act
   of infringement, its implications are worth considering in relation to
   Section 1201.

   Napster is simply a combination of a directory service (a kind of
   software distributed by such major corporations as Microsoft, Netscape,
   and Novell) and a file transfer protocol (a kind of software that was
   the first application ever invented on the Internet; even the World
   Wide Web is based on a HTTP, a file transfer protocol of moderate
   sophistication). A challenge to Napster, based simply on the proclivity
   of its users to breach copyright, is a challenge to the basic
   technologies on which the Internet is based. Almost any Internet
   protocol and product, new or old, could be used for copyright
   violations; here again the "primary purpose" language of Section 1201
   presents dangers to innovation.

   We do not challenge the doctrine that copyright should apply to online
   works, just as it has applied to works in traditional media. Nor do we
   deny that widespread copying takes place, online as elsewhere. But we
   object to the misuse of copyright law to remove traditional consumer
   and research rights. If not reigned in by the Copyright Office and
   other branches of government, the cases discussed in this comment could
   lead to a safe haven for exploitative hoarders of information and
   culture.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [21]Back to Cyber Rights home page.

References

   1. http://www.oreilly.com/~andyo/
   2. http://www.cpsr.org/
   3. mailto:andyo@cpsr.org
   4. http://www.cpsr.org/
   5. http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/1201/anticirc.html
   6. http://www.loc.gov/copyright/1201/1201a1text.html
   7. http://www.eff.org/ip/DMCA/20000217_eff_dmca_comments.html
   8. http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/1201/comments/162.pdf
   9. http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/1201/comments/171.pdf
  10. http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/1201/comments/185.pdf
  11. http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/1201/comments/032.pdf
  12. http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/1201/comments/
  13. http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/fedreg/64fr66139.pdf
  14. http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/1201/comments/185.pdf
  15. http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/1201/comments/224.pdf
  16. http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/1201/comments/190.pdf
  17. http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/1201/comments/209.pdf
  18. http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/1201/comments/043.pdf
  19. http://www.riaa.com/piracy/press/031300.htm
  20. http://www.napster.com/
  21. http://www.cpsr.org/cpsr/nii/cyber-rights/index.html