[stop-imf] Camdessus's final DC news conference (fwd)
Robert Weissman
rob@essential.org
Wed, 9 Feb 2000 12:32:07 -0500 (EST)
PRESS CONFERENCE
REMARKS BY
MICHEL CAMDESSUS
IMF Managing Director
Tuesday, February 8,
2000
Washington, D.C.
[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE
RECORDING.]
MR. DAWSON: Today is
another one of our regular
press briefings; however, Michel Camdessus, who's the
Managing Director of the Fund for the last 13 years, is
joining us today for his last official press event in
Washington.
As I think you all know, Mr. Camdessus, the seventh and
longest-serving Managing Director of the Fund, will be
leaving us on February 14th. His career has been
distinguished and memorable and he's done much to
promote a more open, transparent and effective Fund. On
behalf of the staff and management of the External
Relations Department, we'd like to thank him for his help
and support in this effort, and of course we wish him well.
I'm sure that the Managing Director now has a few
remarks before we open the floor to questions.
Again, as is standard, when the questioning begins, please identify
yourself and your affiliation, and the briefing is
embargoed until 15 minutes after its conclusion, and we'll set a specific
time when we conclude.
Mr. Managing Director.
MR. CAMDESSUS: Thank you, sir. You see how nice they are, and you see how
nostalgic I can be in leaving this
institution.
But my only purpose this morning is to bid farewell to all of you and to
tell you my thanks for your attitude toward the
Fund, and myself, during my long stay here.
You have been very fair, you have been very professional, and you have
been very courteous, and I tell you that because I
believe that. It's exactly that. I'll give you, immediately, a scoop.
On Tuesday morning, the 15th of February, I will be a nonentity. You will
hear no more about me. So, today, I can really
speak my mind.
This morning, I had a few minutes to think about this occasion, and I was
reviewing what has been my experience with you,
from the first day.
Well, I remember I was a little bit uneasy the first time I came. After
that, you have certainly perceived that I was enjoying
each experience with you, and excited, each time, that I had certainly not
a very tense face in coming to see you. On the
contrary, each time I came with an expectation of some kind of a debate,
some kind of fun, as always, in a debate among
honest people.
At the beginning I was a little bit uneasy, I must confess. First, I had a
terrible problem of language. My English was even
worse than my English now. Those who are recent in their job of covering
the Fund must imagine what it could have been.
So this was a problem. But I saw, rapidly, that asking you how do you put
that in English was a good way of having a few
seconds to think more, and of course all of you have identified that, at
times, it could have been a trick of mine.
If my successor uses the same trick, please show the same forbearance with
him as you had with me when I used that trick.
I had another one. I was split between two things. One, my hereditary
gene--the son of a journalist, who likes the press, has
an understanding of the press and has only positive feelings about the
press and media. I had that in one part of my heart,
and certainly very deep. It was genetic.
But I also had a recent experience of three years as a central banker.
Thirteen years ago, in central banking, the virtue was
not transparency but secrecy, and if you had been a "fly on the wall" of
our secret meetings--central bankers like very much
secret meetings--you would have heard that the challenge among ourselves
was who would be the most secretive of all of us,
and of course there was always somebody who had been more secretive than
you. So I was split between these two things in
my mind. But you convinced me, promptly, that I would have to go back to
my genes, and my inclination to speak as much
as possible, and you have given me, generously, the benefit of the doubt,
and I have tried of course never to abuse it.
Well, now, at the end of this experience, I have a feeling of success, and
another one of failure, and of course I see at the
word "failure" you start taking notes. No? I have observed this
inclination of yours.
[Laughter.]
MR. CAMDESSUS: A sense of success. I believe you will recognize that we
have made this institution distinctly more
transparent. I have been preaching the golden rule of transparency to the
world since the Mexican crisis at least, and we have
tried to give as much as allowed by our membership to make this
institution totally transparent.
We have tried that, and I think further steps are certainly needed, but we
are truly moving in the direction of success and a
positive change in the Fund.
The failure is that in spite of that, we have not been able to change
attitudes toward the image of this institution. There are
still people around the world who can, without provoking an outcry, say
that the IMF kills babies. You have old
demagoguery of the world pretending that we don't serve the common good.
You have vested interests in the world trying to destroy us because of
course they know that we destroy them. You cannot
go and confront the family monopolies in Indonesia, or the chaebols in
Korea, and so on, without, well, provoking some
adverse, negative campaigns.
And of course we suffer a lot. It's possibly the price of a very strong
contribution to the international common good, and of
course there are crosses you are proud to carry from time to time on your
shoulders, because it is the price of the common
good.
But, indeed, we will have to continue working hard to explain that what is
being done here, together with the efforts of our
friends at the World Bank, to explain that all these necessarily tough
programs serve a common good.
And if we see today--and of course I am happy to leave in such a
context--the world economy exceeding all forecasts for
growth in an extremely widespread way, be it in Asia, be it in Latin
America, be it in Africa, be it in former Soviet Union,
and be it in Eastern Europe, it is, I presume the effect of our efforts
and of the actions of the very valiant, courageous,
professional staff of this institution, and I am proud to say that.
Well, this institution is challenged every day, and it must be. This is
why I attach such importance to maintaining with all of
you a tradition of mutual trust. You have been very generous in giving me
your trust. I thank you for that.
Now, in terms of media, I am very happy to leave the Fund, not only at a
time that the world situation is good, but at a time
when there is not so much talk about the Fund around the world--be it in
Asia, where we were so bitterly criticized, be it in
Latin America, or be it even in Africa. This, to me, is a confirmation of
what my eminent friend, Stan Fisher, used to say,
and he has already told you that, I presume--namely, that when you have a
crisis, and when difficult measures are
announced, these are the IMF's policies.
But when success starts emerging, and developing, and the skies are better
and more sunny, then the policies are the policies
of the country, and you don't hear any more about the IMF.
It's what we call our ultimate objective, which is ownership. The
countries then own their policies and their success, and we
are happy to see that, and people forget about us.
This being said, I don't forget 100 percent, and I must tell you that I
had two extremely rewarding occasions this last month.
One was the Libreville meeting with 20 African heads of state, and 45
countries, in reality, at the highest level, meeting about
how to do the best out of the new set of instruments we have put in place
for debt reduction and growth in the poorest
countries. It was their meeting, and you heard about the Libreville
declaration, which was their declaration. I urge you to
reread it and to compare it with what the Ministers of Finance of Latin
America have said in Cancun. There, also, it was
"their communiqu," not the communiqu of the Interim Committee or of the
Executive Board of the Fund. Read that, and
you will see that there is a silent revolution going on in the world.
That what we have tried to promote is a kind of second generation of
reform based on stronger institutions, better
governance, fights against corruption, more transparency, economic policy
focused on poverty alleviation, and the reduction
of inequalities around the world. All of that is starting to take shape
and it's owned by these countries.
Three years ago, you wouldn't have had many African heads of state
launching a powerful fight against corruption. Now
they do that together. Now Latin American countries join forces, including
with the Caribbean countries, to fight corruption
and money laundering, and promote good governance. All of that I think is
good and positive for the world.
But of course industrial countries and our institutions must play their
part, corresponding to the effort of these developing
countries, and I'm happy, today, to leave you the very day when I am able
to tell you the three first cases of implementation
of HIPC No. 2--Uganda, Bolivia, and Mauritania--have just been decided by
our Executive Board.
It's not the end of the fight, and a lot, for 15 years, at least, will
have to be done, for this difference to be discernable by the
man in the street, possibly, and I say 15 years, because this is 2015, and
you know my fight, together with all my colleagues
of the Fund, for at least having the world delivering on its pledges. We
shouldn't allow the world to be cynical about the
pledges of the big UN conferences of the last 10 years.
We must have extreme poverty reduced by half by the year 2015. You have,
all of you, in your book these seven pledges.
Let's go for that. It is possible. We have committed that. If we don't
respect them, we will have a really big threat to the very
fabric of international cooperation and the conditions for the world.
But I believe it is still feasible. I will go with this message next
Sunday to Bangkok, where I will have to speak for a last
time to the UN family of institutions and members on the occasion of
UNCTAD X. There is, indeed, the possibility of doing
that, and in doing that, enacting all of these pledges, you can trigger a
new dynamism in the world, and this new paradigm of
development we have tried to develop during all this last year.
How to make the fight against poverty and inequality in the world serving
more high-quality growth in these countries. This
is a fight of every day. You will have always against these strategies all
the demagogues of the world, all the arms traders in
the world, all the populist, charismatic leaders of the world, but our
institutions must go that way, knowing that at the end of
the day, it is for them the only way in delivering on their purposes.
So I am going for a big sermon, finally. Thank you very much.
A QUESTIONER: I was interested in your response to a letter that you may
have seen by now, it went out to members of the
formerly Interim Committee and of the International Finance and Monetary
Committee as well as Executive Directors of the
IMF. It called on the IMF to have a more open and transparent process for
choosing a new Managing Director, and one of
the points they made is that they believe that the Executive Board
decisions should have recorded votes, both for the selection
of the next Managing Director, and going forward in all votes.
MR. CAMDESSUS: I have not seen the letter you are talking about, but I
hope that the next IMFC will want to review this,
to my judgment, too-protective process of selection of a Managing
Director, and, well, draw appropriate lessons from that.
But you will certainly understand that as we are now at a critical moment
of this process, it wouldn't be proper for me, even
if I have very precise ideas about that, to make the process even more
complicated, by introducing my personal views in this
discussion. You know pretty well that the MD of the Fund has very broad
prerogative and powers in selecting all the staff of
the Fund, and I have done that to the best of my ability. But the only
person he does not appoint is his successor. So on that,
I must remain discrete.
A QUESTIONER: Can you address the idea of recorded votes by the Executive
Board?
MR. CAMDESSUS: No, I will not comment on that for obvious reasons.
A QUESTIONER: Seattle seemed to bring home to a lot of people, if remarks
at the Davos conference are any indication, the
fact that there is a lot more attention being paid to the global
institutions--such as the WTO and, now, some of the protest
groups are thinking of the meetings in April of the IMF. What should the
IMF do, in a proactive sense, to get its message
across, that it is doing the right thing, or what it considers to be the
right thing? Is it actually doing that? Is it thinking ahead
to these sort of concerns? Is it taking any heed out of what happened in
Seattle?
MR. CAMDESSUS: Thank you very much. First of all, what the IMF must do
every day is more transparency and I would
like to express my thanks to the External Relations Department, which
during the past 13 years, has done with the modest
means put at its disposal by our budget, done everything it could to do
the job and to communicate and disseminate the
realities of the Fund. I wouldn't say the messages of the Fund. The
realities of the Fund.
And I must, in particular, pay tribute to what Tom Dawson has done in the
few months since he has been here. I don't need
to tell you that. You have perceived a remarkable new impulse given, and I
am immensely grateful to him for having
presided over that.
Now we will never have the means to match, dollar by dollar, if I may say
so, all the campaigns around, which are not, all
of them, as you know, those of generous, disinterested, idealistic NGOs.
Behind many clamors, there are also vested
interests, and we shouldn't be naive about that.
It's part of life. It's our universe. It must be known. But we should take
seriously what Seattle told us, and you will do me
this justice to recognize that I have not waited for Seattle to tell us
that the world, the people of the world, want to see the
Fund seen as more accountable.
You remember that for years, I have been pressing, for instance, the
Interim Committee at that time, to establish the so-called
council for the responsibility to be seen where effectively it is. We are
accountable. We are accountable to 182 countries of
the world, and they take every day, interestingly enough, frequently by
consensus, all the decisions of this institution.
But it happens that, well, because it's difficult and because politicians
are politicians, they don't always take responsibility
for what is being done here. I cannot ask them to stand up and to say how
great the IMF is, when the IMF is fighting the
monopolies in Indonesia or the chaebols in Korea, and trying to promote
more openness, a level playing field in countries
which, for so long, have developed an incestuous relationship between
government, banks, and enterprises.
This is life. Nevertheless, we must continue pressing for that. I do
believe that Seattle tells us something about the need for
establishing clearer rules of the game, on where are the responsibilities
for the economic governance of the world. You have
read my speeches, you know what I think about that. I think if the world
were to go in that direction, not instantly, but,
nevertheless, then things would be clearer. We will always have the
extremely difficult problem of listening, and taking in
proper consideration--in our process of reflection and decision
making--both the views of governments that are sitting on our
boards, and the elected bodies behind them, and the views of the civil
society.
It's an extremely complicated thing. We shouldn't allow the demonstrators
in the street to intimidate those who are
democratically elected and responsible to their people, but, nevertheless,
we must be very sensitive and attentive to what all
these NGOs, academia, and all those tell us, because there you have
certainly questions for the future to take seriously into
consideration, and I believe the world must find a response to this
extremely difficult, underlying, reconciliation problem.
This being said, we shouldn't be naive, and when talking about Seattle, I
must say that I spoke only three minutes in Seattle,
but said something very simple. That to paralyze the body which has just
been created to introduce a little bit more fairness
and regulation in the international trade, to paralyze it, or to kill it,
just five years after its creation--it's certainly not the good
response.
Second, to paralyze it to the extent of not allowing an immediate decision
on opening the major industrial countries' markets
to the products of the poorest countries, a decision which we pressed for
having in the agenda of Seattle, is totally
inconsistent with the decision we have taken a few months before, to
reduce the debt of the poorest.
It's a mockery of the reduction of the debt, to simultaneously not to take
the decision on the trade domain, because it is the
opening of the trade which finally will make the difference, if they can't
sell their products.
So you have this contradiction there. These things must be handled. I hope
that Bangkok, in the near future, plus the good
sense of the people around the world, will allow us to overcome this
problem. I trust that the WTO will be able to restart the
millennium round, soon. It is necessary. But there is also a contradiction
in trying to promote good governance and growth
in Africa, and not acting more efficiently to promote peace in Africa.
Development and peace are the two faces of the same coin. You cannot have
the one without the other. Peace is the other
name of development in the same way as development is the other name of
peace. We must go for that.
A QUESTIONER: Secretary Summers, a month ago or so, proposed some rather
fundamental changes in how the Fund
might operate, and as you know he is not the only one who's proposing
that. Can you tell us where you stand on that at the
end of your tenure here?
MR. CAMDESSUS: As you said, Secretary Summers made very interesting
proposals. He is not the only one, and I
thought, at the very end of my stay here, that I had also to say what I
see as indispensable to do, and you have probably
observed that I coincide, in many respects, with the views, offered by
Secretary Summers.
There are things I perceive differently, because he is in charge of the
Treasury of a country, the most important country of
the world, by its wealth, and a shareholder of the Fund; but here, my
perception is one of 182 countries together, with a
need of optimizing the synergies among them. So the angles are different,
and all of that must be thought out and taken into
consideration.
My views are now there. I have expressed them at least on two occasions,
recently. In the last week in front of the Council
of Foreign Relations in New York. Later in the week, in a speech, a little
bit more philosophical, at Georgetown University.
I know that in putting my views so clearly, I have defined for my
successor the labors of Hercules--no? But you will
observe that I put only ten Herculean tasks on his shoulder, while,
normally, I should have put twelve.
I want you, and all of us in the world to define the two which are
missing. I have a few ideas about that.
A QUESTIONER: Please allow me to ask a rather parochial question. You have
been a kind of symbolic figure to the
Korean people during these years, and Korea's sudden collapse, and sudden
resurgence. Korea is now experiencing rapid
growth and rapid recovery, the stock market is booming, and many people
are now saying that Korea actually [inaudible]
from the IMF. But I wonder whether the Korean crisis is really over and if
now is the time to forget about the IMF. So I'd
like to know the terminology of "graduation." Is there that kind of
terminology in the IMF?
MR. CAMDESSUS: It's an academic term, as you know, and this is not
academia. I will tell you a few things. First of all, I
am delighted for the Korean people, to see what I see in Korea, and this
is due, let me put that on record, in some part,
perhaps, to the good perception by the staff of the IMF and its Executive
Board, of what were the problems and where action
had to be put, urgently.
But it is chiefly due to the courage, the sense of sacrifice, of the
people of Korea, and to the leadership of President Kim Dae
Jung, and his government. You were fortunate, in Korea, to have such a man
to take the helm just at that very moment.
History will remember that.
Now, yes, the resurgence is there, with stability, and all the prospects
for higher quality growth in Korea. This being said,
the effort in economic life is never over. Economies change. Environments
change. Always vigilance is in order.
I believe that Korea can forget about the IMF. I believe you can forget
about the IMF. But please, don't forget the policies
you have adopted, the reforms you have launched. There are still things to
do, particularly for corporate restructuring, for
consolidating the financial sector, for maintaining the proper budgetary
and financial discipline, for continuing, strengthening
your social policies.
But knowing President Kim Dae Jung, knowing your government, knowing the
good sense of the Korean people, I have no
doubt that these things will be well-taken and the effort maintained.
This is my definition of graduating. Graduation of a country, a country
renouncing IMF financing at the end of the program,
is for the IMF the most splendid victory. Normally, at the end of a
program we expect countries to graduate. In general, they
ask us to stay a little bit more because they are intimidated by the risk
of the world, because they feel, they perceive their
remaining weaknesses, and then, from time to time, frequently, we accept
to prolong the programs or to go for another
program. But when a country asks us to graduate, we say hallelujah, and we
are delighted, a little bit, with the traditional
discretion of the IMF to cry victory with the country, provided graduation
is about forgetting the IMF, but not forgetting its
policies.
MR. CAMDESSUS: And of course what I say about Korea will apply soon, I
presume, to Thailand, and I will cry the same
hallelujah that very day, and I hope it will apply to many other
countries, and we will be able to develop, as suggested, in
some way, by Secretary Summers--I say that in passing--a kind of
relationship which is basic in the structure of the IMF,
namely, a relationship based on continuous, mutually trustful dialogue on
the policies, on the environment, on what should
be done, without necessarily implying IMF resources, disbursements.
A QUESTIONER: I'd like to ask you something about the Japanese economy
because of the [inaudible] policy and a series
of fiscal stimulants [inaudible] Japanese economy has just begun
improving. Do you have any advice to the Japanese
government to make sure [inaudible] recovery?
MR. CAMDESSUS: As Mr. Dawson asked you at the beginning of our meeting, I
am not coming here for the world
economic outlook. I am here for bidding farewell and reflecting a little
bit on my experience with all of you. I have answered
this issue in Tokyo, recently, after the G7 meeting, and you can imagine,
two weeks after I have not changed my mind.
Thank you.
A QUESTIONER: The relations between the IMF and Russia in the last decade
were very dramatic. There were a lot of ups
and downs, bombs and hurdles on the road, and as we see the results are
not too positive.
MR. CAMDESSUS: Are not too positive?
A QUESTIONER: Not too positive.
MR. CAMDESSUS: Are they that negative?
A QUESTIONER: Yes, I think that, in general, they are more negative than
positive. What are the main lessons for the IMF
and for Russia over these relations during your tenure? And do you think
that there were any mistakes on the side of the IMF
in dealing with Russia during this period, and what are the main mistakes
you think there were? Thank you.
MR. CAMDESSUS: Well, let me tell you that it showed that the glass is, at
most, half full. The first obvious lesson is that
when you try to help a country out of 70 years of a Marxist-Leninist
regime, under all its guises, including the decrepitude of
the Brezhnevian era, you are not in a business as usual operation. If I
regret something, it's possibly to have shared,
somewhat, the illusion of everybody in the world, including Russia, that
this could be done rapidly. Possibly it could have
been done rapidly if everybody had felt as mobilized for change as the IMF
was. If everybody had taken as many risks for
change in Russia as we did. But this was not the case.
We were frustrated, many times, by half-hearted implementation of the
agreed programs of the Russian authorities. We were
disappointed by the lack of support, of sufficient support by the state
Duma for these policies. By the delays in adopting the
indispensable legislation for establishing a level playing field. Was that
a reason for us to say [foreign phrase], to say, well,
they don't deliver, let them go their way.
MR. DAWSON: The translation is "Enough already."
[Laughter.]
MR. CAMDESSUS: No, the role of this institution is to continue working,
and working hard, whatever the frustration, to
create the conditions, one way or another, of a resurgence, of a
renaissance, and I feel proud to have done that.
Of course you will have the impression that it is not that much of a
change. But Russia is a country where the democratic
rules for elections of a president are not challenged.
Russia is a country where the basic principles of a market economy are not
challenged, and where the government now, and
all political forces now recognize that the only route for the future is
reform, further integration in the world economy.
That by continued support, well, with discontinuities in many occasions as
you know, and at this time, still, we are in a
episode of discontinuity in the financing, but not in the dialogue. But I
believe the price we have paid, this price of continued
support, and, at times, the blame for supporting you is a little price
compared to what is achieved. After all, your country
needs democracy, your country needs a market economy, your country needs a
conception of the economy with demand at
the center. This is the thing to which you have given some chances.
So I wait with great tranquility the judgment of history, which must come
in due time, and I will remind you of my favorite
quote of Chou En-lai. You know that, the comment of Chou En-lai about the
French Revolution, a little bit before he passed
away, saying, well, 200 years after the French Revolution, it is possibly
a little bit premature to pass a final judgment on it.
MR. DAWSON: One last question.
A QUESTIONER: If you'll permit me, Mr. Camdessus, I would like to return,
very briefly, to the world economic outlook,
because last week, in Cancun, you were very upbeat in saying the Fund is
revising its forecast up, and, today, also, you said
the world is doing better. How concerned are you that a wild card factor
such as the oil price, the rise in the oil price, could
derail this scenario, because it's been going up, inexorably. It's got to
be inflationary, globally. Are you concerned about it?
Do you think something should be done?
MR. CAMDESSUS: Well, I can tell you that this is one of the question marks
of this very moment--no doubt. I am
comforted when I see the future markets' pricing, what I see the consensus
of all market specialists about the evolutions
which are most probable for the future. Nevertheless, no one can be sure,
and this is why, on one side, I understand, and
approve the prudence of the central banks in the world, which wanted to
take any necessary step to keep inflation in check,
and on the other side, I salute the efforts of many oil-producing
countries in the world--not all--but several of them, who are
taking steps to diversify their economies, and to be in a better shape the
day when the price of oil could go down again.
And here, I can tell you that we have engaged in a regional dialogue with
the Gulf oil-producing countries for some time, and
I am delighted to see that all of them go to a medium-term strategy,
trying to protect themselves against new misfortunes in
that market. So we must prepare for the two alternatives and then the
world could avoid major problems in the future.
MR. DAWSON: Thank you very much. If I could just make one brief
announcement. For those of you who may have
missed anything or would like to see this again, in keeping with new
technology the press conference will be transmitted on
our Web site, Webcast on our Web site at about 3:30 or so this afternoon,
and if any of you don't know how to reach our
Web site, we have our standard advertisement for the Web site back here.
The embargo will be lifted at 11:15. Thank you
very much.
[End of Press Conference.]
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