[Intl-tobacco] UK: Diagnosing Success in Smokefree Campaign

[robert weissman]

Smoke and mirrors - The Guardian
The law banning smoking in public places is the culmination of one of the m=
ost
successful social change campaigns in recent years

Deborah Arnott and Ian Willmore
Wednesday July 19, 2006
The Guardian


When Action on Smoking and Health (Ash) started campaigning for smoke-free
legislation in 2003, we were told by politicians, civil servants and commen=
tators
that there was no chance. So how does a controversial social change go from=
 being
"an extreme solution" (Labour party official) to a "historic piece of legis=
lation"
(Labour minister) in under three years?
The health bill, which bans smoking in public places, was due to complete i=
ts
parliamentary passage in the Commons yesterday. It marks the culmination of=
 one of
the most successful social change lobbying campaigns of recent times. The c=
ampaign
showed the importance of sound strategy, sharp tactics and a lot of luck, a=
nd holds
lessons for future campaigners.

First, frame the argument. For years, action on smoking in public places wa=
s mired
in discussion about the claimed "freedom" and "rights" of smokers, and the =
need for
"voluntary" shifts towards compromise solutions, particularly in pubs, rest=
aurants
and clubs. We changed the terms of the debate to health and safety at work.=
 We
argued that secondhand smoke is a killer - making a smoke-free workplace a =
right for
everyone, and that there is no "compromise" solution that does not leave pu=
b workers
exposed to more risk than others - making attempts to find a policy short o=
f
comprehensive smoke-free legislation a failure.

Swarm effect

We created a coalition around our key messages. A smoke-free steering group=
 was set
up involving major health and medical organisations in alliance with the Tr=
ades
Union Congress, individual politicians, local government officers and the C=
hartered
Institute of Environmental Health. They ran their own effective campaigns, =
but
remained committed to an agreed strategy originally drafted by Ash. Network=
s of
campaigners can be provided with key resources and a sense of direction wit=
hout ever
being told what to do. It's called the "swarm effect".

The next step is to split the opposition. In every country where smoke-free
legislation has been mooted, the most vocal opponents are the tobacco trade=
 and the
hospitality industry. But the preferences of these allies are subtly differ=
ent.
While both agree that doing nothing would be best, the hospitality trade's =
worst
nightmare was that communities in the UK would introduce their own local re=
gulations
- uniform national legislation would be preferable. But the tobacco barons =
preferred
local action to national law every time, because they could fight a long, d=
elaying
action. The spectre of local action, therefore, was always likely to split =
opponents
apart.

Before the last general election, Labour started a public consultation on t=
he
contents of its manifesto. Initially, the party leadership had no intention=
 of
including radical action on smoking, and refused to meet public health lobb=
yists
without the Tobacco Manufacturers Association in attendance. The resulting =
meeting
was fairly unpleasant, but the party did jump with relief at the suggestion=
 that it
should "compromise" by considering giving local councils powers to go smoke=
-free.

We then went to the hospitality trade reporting this prospect until some of=
 the
larger players started publicly supporting national legislation. Meanwhile,
Liverpool and London councils added credibility to the threat by promoting =
their own
bills in the House of Lords.

It is crucial to exploit opportunities that come your way. Our campaign was=
 often
lucky, and our opponents often foolish. We were blessed by the brave decisi=
on of the
government of the Irish Republic to adopt its own smoke-free legislation, p=
roving
that it could work. Scotland's first minister, Jack McConnell, changed his =
mind
after talking to Irish politicians and backed comprehensive legislation in =
the
Scottish parliament.

England and Wales were not so lucky. The then secretary of state for health=
, John
Reid (an ex-smoker), publicly stated that banning smoking in public places =
was not
on his agenda. "Show us the votes," said his political adviser, when we tri=
ed to
convince him of the public health arguments. But Reid overreached himself. =
His
description of smoking as a "working-class pleasure" created a media firest=
orm that
we could exploit, pushing him further than he wanted to go on the road to
comprehensive legislation. His compromise on the issue - exempting non-food=
 pubs and
clubs from smoke-free legislation - made its way into the manifesto and sim=
ply made
his long-term position worse.

After the 2005 election, Reid became the defence secretary but remained wed=
ded to
his compromise and fought for it in the cabinet. Every part of the subseque=
nt
ministerial row became public knowledge - provoked, in part, by Ash's well-=
informed
political briefings. These divisions helped the coalition persuade the Cons=
ervatives
to allow a free vote on the issue, a vital step to forcing the government d=
own the
same path.

Political champions are essential. Our coalition owes a sincere gratitude t=
o
numerous politicians and officials. The chief medical officer, Sir Liam Don=
aldson,
risked his own position to argue the case for comprehensive smoke-free legi=
slation.
Kevin Barron MP, chair of the health select committee, guided committee mem=
bers to a
unanimous report from his committee on the issue, and persuaded them to bac=
k an
all-party amendment (framed by our coalition) that forced the government to=
 concede
a free vote. John Grogan MP, chair of the all-party beer group, aligned sul=
king pub
trade leaders with the health lobby to demand comprehensive legislation wit=
hout
exemptions for clubs. Lord (Richard) Faulkner helped ensure that opinion in=
 the
House of Lords was as favourable to us as in the Commons.

Confidence trick

It is essential that campaigners create the impression of inevitable succes=
s.
Campaigning of this kind is literally a confidence trick: the appearance of
confidence both creates confidence and demoralises the opposition. The week=
 before
the free vote we made sure the government got the message that we "knew" we=
 were
going to win and it would be better for them to be on the winning side. But=
 it was
only five minutes before the vote that the political adviser to the health =
secretary
phoned us to let us know Patricia Hewitt was supporting our position, and w=
e only
found out after the vote that the prime minister and Gordon Brown had follo=
wed her
through the lobby.

The struggle for smoke-free legislation went from nowhere to victory in a s=
hort
time. It routed powerful opponents and exposed many of them as incompetent =
or
insubstantial. It shifted public opinion from indifference to overwhelming =
support.
Some ideas reach a point at which their time has come. But some will also o=
ften need
a vigorous campaign before politicians notice the obvious.

=B7 Deborah Arnott is the director of Action on Smoking and Health. Ian Wil=
lmore is
public affairs manager of Ash.

http://society.guardian.co.uk/health/story/0,,1823348,00.html