[Intl-tobacco] BAT Documents Outline Strategy to Derail Global Tobacco Treaty

[Robert Weissman]

Center for Public Integrity Special Report
Cigarette Company Documents Outline Strategy to Derail Global Tobacco Treat=
y
(The story, with links to some of the BAT documents, is avaiable at:
http://www.publicintegrity.org/dtaweb/home.asp)

By Ben Coates

WASHINGTON, May 16, 2003 -- With the first global treaty to regulate
tobacco set to
be debated next week, newly released internal company records reveal a
key tobacco
industry player=92s sophisticated campaign against the proposed accord. Bri=
tish
American Tobacco, the world's second largest tobacco company with 2002
revenue of
about $40 billion, considered a two-pronged strategy: projecting a
public image of
corporate social responsibility while simultaneously working to prevent the
enactment of a tough worldwide treaty, the documents show.

The several hundred pages of documents, which came from the Minnesota Tobac=
co
Document Depository, a collection of company records established as a
result of the
state of Minnesota=92s lawsuit against tobacco companies, were sent to the =
depository
in February and April 2003 and are dated between 1999 and 2001.

During this period, BAT was developing and implementing a strategy to
confront a
treaty sponsored by the World Health Organization. Work on the proposed Fra=
mework
Convention on Tobacco Control began four years ago. The World Health Assemb=
ly,
which oversees WHO, is set to consider the final draft during its
meeting beginning
May 19.

The convention=97or treaty=97 aims to reduce smoking worldwide. It requires=
 countries
to ban all tobacco advertising (where constitutionally possible), demand la=
rge
health advisory warnings that cover at least 30 percent of principal
display areas,
and prohibit deceptive product descriptions, possibly including such
terms as
=93light=94 or =93low tar.=94 The convention, which is the first negotiated
under the
auspices of the WHO, also sets forth a series of recommendations, including
measures to limit second-hand smoke exposure, raise tobacco taxes, eliminat=
e
tobacco smuggling and prohibit underage smoking. If adopted by the World He=
alth
Assembly, the treaty would enter into force once 40 nations have
ratified it.

The United States has indicated that it will not sign the treaty unless
a clause is
added allowing it to take =91reservations=92 (which would allow individual
countries to
opt out of clauses they found objectionable), angering critics who claim
that such
an action would benefit big tobacco companies.

The Center=92s review of BAT emails, memos, meeting notes, and policy propo=
sals
indicates that the company envisioned a serious threat from the proposed tr=
eaty.
=93The WHO=92s proposed Framework Convention on Tobacco Control represents =
an
unprecedented challenge to the tobacco industry=92s freedom to continue doi=
ng
business,=94 concluded a document BAT proposing a broad strategy to
confront the WHO.

Others within the company saw adoption of a convention as inevitable,
but didn=92t
think it was necessarily a bad thing, as long as it did not include specifi=
c
enforcement measures harmful to the industry. =93We are not necessarily
against a
convention,=94 wrote Simon Millson, international government affairs
manager and head
of BAT=92s WHO task force, =93but the potential form and content of the pro=
posed
convention as is being proposed by the WHO could contain some serious
threats and
concerns for the long term viability of the industry=85.We must therefore
ensure that
the convention and associated protocols are broad based.=94

Some strategies alluded to in the documents include:

A long range plan to rehabilitate the image of the company and the
tobacco industry
as a whole. Consulting firm KPMG discussed a proposal with senior staff
to help the
company reinvent itself as a more =93socially responsible=94 enterprise by
drafting a
code of conduct, working to assuage the doubts of key officials and NGOs
and making
a conspicuous =93commitment to social accountability.=94 Shabanji Opukah,
head of
international development issues for the company , found the plan
promising: =93Time
comes when organizations have to be shocked out of their comfort zones
and shells
and some of this unfortunately may come from externally driven rather than
internally inspired and value driven sources.=94 For BAT, Opukah
continued, the
treaty =93presents the best opportunity to take forward the big agenda on C=
ORPORATE
REPUTATION Management.=94

A proposal to create an independent, international organization to
regulate the
tobacco industry, in the hope that taking a proactive stance could
preempt WHO
efforts for a global treaty and =93increase public confidence in the regula=
tory
process, and thereby decrease political support for anti-tobacco
pressure groups.=94

While these proposals for image reinvention were being circulated, more dir=
ect
lobbying against WHO=92s initiative was planned. Among the aspects
proposed for this
campaign:

=93Propose a solution to fast track =91sensible regulation=92 at a national
level with
the tobacco industry=92s support that is consistent with our own corporate
objectives.=94 This would help to =93stiffen the growing resistance to
adopting a
legally binding global convention.=94

Provide funding, along with other large tobacco companies, for a global inf=
ormation
campaign conducted by the International Tobacco Growers=92 Association, a U=
K-based
organization representing tobacco growers from 22 countries. An email
from Dr. Tom
Watson of Hallmark PR, a firm funded by BAT and other tobacco
manufacturers that
directed ITGA=92s marketing efforts, suggested one aspect of the group=92s
value to the
tobacco industry: the growers=92 association could serve as =93the credible=
 (i.e.
non-manufacturer) front end for the battle over [the tobacco free
initiative] and
the Tobacco Control Convention.=94 In other words, ITGA initiatives,
supported with
tobacco company money but untarred by the industry=92s reputation, could mo=
re
effectively lobby against the WHO=92s convention.

Argue that AIDS and other diseases pose greater health threats than tobacco=
,
thereby undermining WHO=92s credibility. =93Then idea is to use the forum t=
o challenge
and ridicule the WHO convention,=94 wrote Shabanji Opukah regarding an upco=
ming
pan-African AIDS conference.

Undertake a sophisticated and targeted global lobbying effort aimed at conv=
incing
government officials of selected countries to oppose the WHO initiative. Th=
rough
its global network of Corporate and Regulatory Affairs (CORA) personnel, BA=
T
planned to target key countries for more intensive lobbying. As one
document noted
of BAT=92s activities to date: =93Materials containing the key arguments
they need to
challenge the legal, economic and political foundations of the [tobacco fre=
e
initiative] have been circulated to all CORA managers. As a result,
there has been
some success at a government level. Brazil, China, Germany, Argentina
and Zimbabwe
have all agreed to make submissions to the drafting process.=94 Lists of ke=
y
countries and summaries of WHO activity were distributed to company lobbyis=
ts.

The documents do not make clear if all of these strategies were in fact
implemented. However, expenditure reports and billing sheets from
outside law and
consulting firms illustrate that at minimum hundreds of thousands of
dollars were
spent on the overall effort.

Ross Hammond, consultant to the international program for the Campaign
for Tobacco
Free Kids, an organization supporting WHO=92s proposed treaty, charged
that the
documents =93show a concerted industry effort to undermine the Framework Co=
nvention,
which [the tobacco companies] rightly see as a threat to their ability
to do
business, particularly in developing countries.=94

Jeannie Cameron, International Regulatory Affairs Manager for BAT,
agreed that the
FCTC =93affects the future of our industry,=94 but insists that the company
has not
engaged in any underhanded activity. =93We have provided our views openly a=
nd
transparently,=94 she says, adding that =93we accept that tobacco should be=
 regulated
but are in favor of sensible regulation, and feel that FCTC is a one-size-f=
its-all
approach and needs to be looked at more nationally. What may work in one co=
untry
may not work in another country,=94 she said.