[Intl-tobacco] Bush admin: intl implications of domestic tobacco issues

Robert Weissman rob@milan.essential.org
Tue, 1 May 2001 18:11:05 -0400 (EDT)


The Fight Against Big Tobacco: Domestic Battles, Global Implications

                           By Robert Weissman
                           Special to CorpWatch
                           April 26, 2001

                           As a new round of negotiations on an
international treaty controlling the spread of tobacco use opens in
Geneva, it
                           is still unclear what the Bush
administration's position will be. What is clear, however, is that
international tobacco
                           control will almost certainly not be a
priority for the Bush administration. Few people in the United States
have even
                           heard of the Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control (FCTC), as the treaty spearheaded by the World Health
                           Organization is known. But the White House
will face a series of high-profile domestic tobacco policy battles that
will
                           have significant implications for reining in
global tobacco.

                           First, the administration will have to decide
whether to continue the federal lawsuit seeking reimbursement for
                           healthcare costs from tobacco companies and
alleging a conspiracy to defraud the government. During the
                           campaign, Bush suggested that the country had
seen "enough" tobacco lawsuits, but he did not take a clear stand
                           on the case. Attorney General John Ashcroft
also refused to take a firm position on the suit during his confirmation

                           hearings. Dismissal of the suit, or an
administration commitment not to prosecute it seriously, is high on the
industry's
                           political wish list.

                           If the U.S. government does drop the suit, it
could break the momentum of the growing efforts by other countries to
                           sue tobacco companies for healthcare costs,
either in U.S. courts or in their home country courts.

                           Advocates of tobacco control in Congress also
intend to force the administration to take a stand on the Food and
                           Drug Administration's (FDA) regulation of
tobacco. Last year, the Supreme Court struck down proposed tobacco
                           marketing regulations issued by the FDA,
holding that the FDA does not have authority to regulate tobacco.
                           Representatives Henry Waxman, D-California,
Greg Gasket, R-Iowa, and John Dingell, D-Michigan have already
                           introduced legislation that would grant FDA
authority over tobacco. With Philip Morris recently agreeing that it
will
                           accept FDA regulation, the dispute may soon
evolve into how, not whether, the FDA will regulate.

                           While no one expects the FDA to take bold
steps to regulate Philip Morris' overseas operations, whether and how
                           the FDA regulates tobacco at the national
level may significantly affect the U.S. posture in the tobacco Framework

                           negotiations. So far, the U.S. position has
been that it cannot agree to provisions that force the United States to
                           implement domestic measures more stringent
than those now in place, according to Judith Wakened of
                           Tobacco-Free Kids.


                           Local Battles, Global Impacts

                           Meanwhile, the most aggressive tobacco
campaigning in the United States, and the most bitter policy disputes,
are
                           occurring at the state and local level. These
conflicts primarily revolve around local efforts to adopt smoke-free
                           ordinances, which ban smoking in workplaces,
restaurants and occasionally in bars. The passage of smoke-free
                           regulations has been the leading
accomplishment of the U.S. tobacco control movement (along with
litigation) -- the
                           United States badly trails much of the world
in regulations on everything from advertising to cigarette labeling.

                           Smoke-free ordinances have long ranked atop
the industry list of concern. The tobacco industry worries that these
                           ordinances stigmatize smoking, reduce smoking
opportunities, thereby cutting back the amount of tobacco smokers
                           consume and making it more likely that they
will quit. Tobacco control advocates like smoke-free ordinances for all
of
                           these reasons, plus the fact that they
protect nonsmokers from highly carcinogenic second-hand smoke.

                           The industry's response to smoke-free
ordinances has been implacable. It seeks state preemption -- state rules
that
                           bar localities from adopting more stringent
regulations. When preemption efforts fail, it fights city by city,
opposing
                           the regulations and proposing "ventilation
requirements" instead of smoke-free rules.

                           For local organizers, the "new" Philip Morris
displayed in the company's seemingly more flexible public posture on
                           issues like the Framework Convention or FDA
regulation, is the same as the old Philip Morris. It fights health
                           regulations, and it fights hard.

                           Consider the recent experience of Central
Point, in the Southwest corner of Oregon. There, the City Council voted
in
                           January 2000 to enact an ordinance which
prohibits open displays of tobacco products, penalizes retailers who
                           repeatedly sell to kids and prohibits smoking
in all enclosed indoor places, including workplaces, with the exception
                           of private homes, bars and tobacco stores.

                           "The response by Big Tobacco was immediate,"
says Dr. Dave Gilmore, a local activist. "A few hours prior to
                           passage of the ordinance, petitions were
taken out to both recall our mayor and two anti-tobacco council members
                           and to repeal the ordinance."

                           The National Smoker's Alliance (NSA), a proxy
for Phillip Morris, sent a team to Central Point to coordinate the
                           anti-ordinance campaign, Gilmore explains.
The anti-ordinance campaigners sought, unsuccessfully, to have
                           Gilmore's employer, Providence Hospital,
direct him to cease actively supporting the ordinance. When the hospital

                           refused, Gilmore says, his clinic was
picketed by pro-tobacco forces which included members of the Southern
                           Oregon Militia.

                           Both the recall and repeal efforts failed,
with the ordinance winning support of 62 percent of voters in a
September
                           election.

                           "The ordinance has exceeded expectations,"
Gilmore says. "Prior to the September vote, the manager of our local
                           Abby's Pizza was adamantly opposed to the
ordinance. He changed his stance afterward, when sales increased.
                           After reviewing the financial impact of the
smoking ordinance on their outlet in Central Point, Abby's went
smoke-free
                           statewide," he added.

                           While many local activists who have waged
Central Point-type campaigns have grown increasingly aware over the
                           last decade or so of the tobacco industry's
efforts to expand into overseas markets, most have not seen any way to
                           plug into international issues. That has
begun to change in recent years, as the San Francisco Tobacco-Free
                           Project and the Washington, D.C.-based
Essential Action have begun coordinating partnership programs between
                           local tobacco control advocates in the United
States and activists in developing countries and the former Eastern
                           bloc.

                           For example, Pat Hale, the training manager
for the tobacco prevention and education program in Oregon works
                           with a Bulgarian group, Women Against
Tobacco. Together, they are doing school surveys, collecting data on
                           students' smoking rates and exposure to
second-hand smoke. They hope the comparative data will help spur
                           stronger regulations in both places,
especially Bulgaria, where smoking restrictions are minimal.

                           Organizers believe the partnership system
helps activists in all countries. Developing country partners benefit
from
                           access to information and some resource
support. The buddy arrangements help U.S. groups' efforts to vilify the
                           tobacco companies -- an important goal for
reducing youth smoking -- and to reach out to ethnic minorities. The
                           partnerships should also serve to heighten
the U.S. groups' interest in U.S. government policy on international
                           tobacco issues.


                           First, Do No Harm

                           U.S. anti-tobacco advocates have made
important strides in recent years -- through successful litigation,
publication
                           of internal industry documents, exposés of
industry malfeasance and new, effective anti-smoking programs in states
                           like Massachusetts and Florida. Although
smoking rates have remained relatively flat, overall tobacco consumption

                           in the United States has declined in recent
years.

                           One consequence of the increasingly negative
image of the tobacco industry, as well as the Clinton administration's
                           belief that being anti-tobacco was a winning
national issue, was that the once bipartisan tobacco industry has
                           turned increasingly Republican. Most
Democrats no longer want to be saddled with a tobacco industry
affiliation.

                           In 1990, tobacco money split 53 to 47 percent
in favor of the Republicans. In 2000 tobacco money favored the
                           Republicans by a whopping 83-17 margin,
according to the Center for Responsive Politics.

                           Despite the numerous shortcomings of the
Clinton-Gore administration's domestic and international tobacco policy,

                           there is no question that tobacco represents
one of the areas of true difference between Al Gore and George W.
                           Bush.

                           The tobacco industry invested in the winning
candidate (or at least the candidate who took office) and the party that

                           controls both houses of Congress. And, like
all corporate donors, Big Tobacco expects a return on its investment.

                           Robert Weissman is editor of Multinational
Monitor magazine and co-director of Essential Action, a corporate
                           accountability group.