[Intl-tobacco] Eyes on the prize: transnational tobacco companies in China 1976-1997 (fwd)

[Robert Weissman]

Eyes on the prize: transnational tobacco companies in China 1976-1997
Tob Control 2000;9:292-302 (=A0Autumn=A0)
by Belinda O'Sullivan, Simon Chapman
Source: Tobacco Control, Monday, 9/11/00
Department of Public Health and Community Medicine, University of Sydney, N=
ew=20
South Wales, Australia

Correspondence to: Simon Chapman, Department of Public Health and Community=
=20
Medicine, University of Sydney, Bldg A27, NSW 2006,=A0Australia;=20
simonc@health.usyd.edu.au=20

Received 25 November 1999; Revision received 11 April 2000; Accepted 20 Apr=
il=20
2000

=09=A0=A0Abstract

Internal tobacco industry documents relevant to China as published on
www.tobaccoarchives.com located between 31=A0May and 1=A0August 1999=A0were
searched.  Documents describing the ambitions and conduct of transnational
tobacco companies (TTCs) in China between 1976=A0and 1997=A0were located an=
d
reviewed in three sections: part=A0A -- early identification of market
potential and attempts to enter the market, and improve trade and
technology; part=A0B -- marketing and promotion efforts; part=A0C -- effort=
s
to pre-empt legislation, control the smoking and health debate, and
undermine the anti-tobacco lobby.

(Tobacco Control 2000;9:292-302)

Keywords: China;=A0 transnational tobacco companies;=A0 marketing

=09=A0=A0Notes on methods

The documents discussed in this paper were located from
www.tobaccoarchives.com from the company sites of Philip Morris (PM), RJ
Reynolds (RJR), Lorillard, Brown and Williamson (B&W), the Tobacco
Institute Inc. and the Council for Tobacco Research, USA. They were found
in searches undertaken between May 1=A0and August 31=A01999.=A0A purposive
search using 54=A0search terms was undertaken using the simple and advanced
searching functions on each site to identify documentation pertaining to
China including references to the People's Republic of China (PRC), Hong
Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. Documents were excluded that were illegible; in
languages other than English; shipping documents; duplicates;  newspaper
articles; and other documents judged to have little interest to policy
analysts in tobacco control.

Documents of relevance to the research aims were included and printed. =20
Seemingly important text was highlighted. This text was transcribed and
reviewed by the two authors and then sorted into major themes and
sub-themes in chronological order in an attempt to construct an historical
narrative.

We acknowledge the search for documentation is incomplete. The number of
documents on the industry internet sites is continually expanding, meaning
that the number of documents found on each occasion subsequent to an
original search will increase each time. We believe that our search
strategy was comprehensive for the given period, but expect that since we
"drew the line" many extra relevant documents will have been posted on the
sites.

=09=A0=A0Historical background

The first words uttered by James B Duke (1865-1925), the tobacco tycoon
who established the empire now known as British American Tobacco, on
hearing of the invention of the cigarette machine, were "Bring me the
atlas". When they brought it he turned over the pages. He stopped at the
figure "Pop.:  430,000,000". "That," he said, "is where we are going to
sell cigarettes." And "that" was China.1 By 1915=A0BAT had established a
foundation for a "monopoly that seemed unshakeable".2 At the turn of the
century the BAT advertising system "left no region of China untouched".2

China's annual consumption of cigarettes rose from a negligible number in
the 1890s to about 100=A0billion in the early 1930s, a rise ascribed to the
business practices of the cigarette industry.3 BAT was forced to leave
China in 1952,=A0after half a century in which its total profits there had
amounted to more than US$380 million.2 As BAT departed, leaving behind an
established cigarette smoking habit, it reportedly forecast "We will be
back". And so they are.

The Chinese population is approximately 1.3=A0billion people,4 constituting
23% of the world's population. Some 63% of adult males and 4% of females
smoke, with 75% of males starting before the age of 24.5 Adult per capita
consumption of tobacco increased from 890=A0to 1990=A0between 1965=A0and
1999.6=A07 The smoking epidemic in China is now seeing some 50% of male
smokers dying from smoking related disease, and causing around a third of
all deaths in the 35-69 year age group.8

The government owned Tobacco Corporation (CNTC) dominates the Chinese
cigarette market. However, the idea of even a small share in such a huge
market has long mesmerised the world's transnational tobacco companies
(TTCs) Philip Morris (PM), RJ Reynolds (RJR), Lorillard and British
American Tobacco (BAT), and its American subsidiary Brown &=A0Williamson
(B&W).

Accounts of the activities of TTCs in China have until recently been
limited to the observations of tobacco control activists and the
industry's own public reports in the trade and financial press. With the
publication of millions of pages of tobacco industry documents on the
internet in 1998,=A0unprecedented prime source material became available
that provides hitherto unreported insights into the involvement of TTCs in
China. This paper aims to examine the involvement of the TTCs in China
between 1976-1997.

Part A examines evidence about the TTC's hopes and plans for gaining entry
to the Chinese market. It traces early interactions with the CNTC, action
on trade, import licensing and taxation. It includes information on the
development of joint ventures and the use of political pressure to lever
China open to foreign competition.

Part B examines evidence about TTC efforts to advertise and promote their
products in China, and how they sought to publicly argue (as in the West)
that this advertising is only intended to secure market share from current
smokers.  It also details industry responses to marketing restrictions and
the use of philanthropic activities and other tactics to counter claims
against the industry.

Part C considers examples of TTC efforts to obfuscate the issue of tobacco
caused disease from both active and passive smoking, as well as their
appraisal of counteracting forces promoting tobacco control in China.

=09=A0=A0Part A: China's potential and early pursuit of the Chinese
market

China was largely closed to foreign trade from around 1949=A0until
1979.=A0However, the documents indicate that the Chinese were evidently
collaborating with the TTCs over trade issues as early as 1977,=A0after the
Cultural Revolution (1975)  and two years before foreign investment was
formerly legalised in 1979.=A0In 1977=A0two officials from the Commercial
Office of China, visited PM's offices in Bern, Switzerland. A PM memo
records the officials' "express[ing] again their readiness to promote
trade between Philip Morris and China".9

The first reports of TTCs visiting China date from 1979.=A0PM's William
Campbell, executive vice president for PM Asia, reported to his colleague
Helmut Wakeham:  "I feel that commencing with our visit to Peking we have
shown Philip Morris to be a first class organization of professionals that
will truly benefit the Chinese in any trading relationship. I think this
most recent visit has allowed the Chinese to really see what Philip Morris
is all about and put us that much closer to establishing a meaningful
business relationship."10 Approximately 10=A0joint ventures were signed wit=
h
the CNTC in 1979=A0when China legalised foreign investment.11

As might be expected, the sheer immensity of the Chinese market for
tobacco bedazzled the TTCs. Developing nations, and China in particular,
were seen as essential to the companies' global ambitions and overall
profitability. The young demographic profile of populations in the region
presented particular interest. A PM marketing plan for 1981-85=A0noted that=
:
"major markets such as Japan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Hong Kong all
have over 50% of their populations below 35=A0years of age while the 20-35
age group constitutes the primary cigarette consumer group."12

Philip Morris were acutely aware that: "The Chinese cigarette market is
already three times the size of the US market, and accounts for over 30%
of the world's 5.4=A0trillion units. Since the total international segment
amounts to less than 1% of this huge market, we have plenty of room for
dramatic growth."13 A PM PRC marketing briefing stated: "The Chinese
domestic tobacco industry is a major frontier for international tobacco
companies."14 With the growth in spending power in developing nations PM
estimated the potential for an "international quality cigarette" market in
China of "between 55=A0and 70=A0billion units" in 1994,=A0adding: "As China=
 is
making rapid economic progress at this time, especially in coastal areas,
this potential market could exceed 100=A0billion units within ten years."13

In 1993=A0PM's Geoffrey Bible reassured colleagues at a plan presentation
that "early development markets" like China were considered "critical for
PM to sustain its growth into the next millennium and we are taking steps
now to ensure our place in their future."15 Bible expressed his vision
thus: "Put another way, 10=A0years ago, one out of every 16=A0cigarettes
smoked outside the US was one of our brands. Today it is one out of 12.=A0I=
n
10=A0years it will be one out of eight--with potential given the current US
level of one out of two and a half." International sales by PM increased
80% between 1990=A0and 1998=A0whereas domestic US growth has been only 5%.1=
6

Constrained by a lack of foreign exchange, around 198417 the Chinese
pursued joint ventures as a way to obtain technical assistance from the
TTCs,18 shopping around the TTCs for various joint venture possibilities
for specific technologies: "A delegation from CNTC and the Shanghai
Factory plan to visit the US during the second week of May to see PM's
DIET plant and RJR's G-13 facilities for comparison of the two
processes.19 In 1985=A0RJR's Dr Cliff Mansfield reiterated the importance o=
f
the Asian market after the world tobacco exhibition and conference stating
that the "CNT is willing to establish trade on two conditions: (1)
transfer of technology with trade; (2) combination of import with export.
Joint ventures are welcome."20

In 1985=A0the occurrence of "goodwill" gestures from PM to China served to
indirectly improve tobacco quality.21 The PM International Business Plan
1989-1993=A0stated: "We will concentrate our efforts on fostering good
relations with the .=A0.=A0.(CNTC) .=A0.=A0.=A0through technical assistance
projects, and will consider investing in a joint venture if CNTC is
willing to pursue one."22 Inter-office correspondence dated 1989=A0describe=
d
a scheduled visit by the vice president of the CNTC, Jin Maoxian, to PM's
New York Headquarters to give: "an overview of PM's participation in China
(referencing Diet, Dragon and FML), and the introduction of the
cooperative production idea."23

During these overtures, the CNTC sought to safeguard the golden prize of
the Chinese cigarette market by restricting TTCs to fixed revenues in the
joint venture arrangements. Total fixed capital of the PM-CNTC joint
venture Shenzhen factory was limited to $14 million. A frustrated PM
source commented that:  "Fourteen million dollars is clearly insufficient
for a high tech factory or a level of technology likely to satisfy Chinese
aspirations .=A0.=A0.The project is a hazard in terms of: quality-time-cost
satisfaction of the Chinese and PM partners."18 Clearly mindful of their
long range vision of the probable Chinese market "is it better to withdraw
than to commit to a possible business failure and a loss of face. If,
however, our long range goals in China are of significant importance, then
surely the project must be properly funded, conceived and executed."18

TAXATION

The TTCs were also frustrated in their export attempts to China by tax
barriers. Reducing taxation thus became vital to the TTCs' Chinese agenda
while opportunities for internal production capabilities remained frozen.
Efforts were made in 1992=A0to develop "an internal capability and expertis=
e
to address tax issues within the region."24 In 1991=A0Clive Turner, managin=
g
director of the Asian Tobacco Council, recommended a review of taxation
levels across the Asian region to show: "which countries were vulnerable
to pressure to raise those levelsand therefore what tactics should be
employed to maintain existing levels."25

The TTCs aimed to promote the concept of a flat excise tax so as to reduce
price differentials between imported and locally produced cigarettes.
Burrell commented: "we prefer a tax adjustment that eliminates or
substantially narrows the gap between monopoly and international
brands".26 In 1985,=A0Clive Turner sought to demonstrate to Asian
governments that taxation across the Asian region in general was "over the
top, and needlessly punitive"27 and that excessive taxation would "further
reduce the taxable base" for governments leading to "a revenue
reduction".28 They sought to "persuade them that, in order to optimise
their revenue derived from the cigarette industry" that they should
institute a "simple system, a flat excise tax based on per thousand
cigarettes".28

The correct interplay of taxation and marketing capabilities was critical
to maximising market penetration. In 1990=A0PM's John Dollisson stated: "We
need to actively pursue the defence of the value of advertisingby
ourselves and in coalitions. Without advertising, retail pricing becomes
more important."29 Projecting options for maximising business capacity, a
tax and marketing trade-off was discussed by Wendy Burrell of Philip
Morris Asia in 1992: "if .=A0.=A0.there is room to negotiate a tax gap
narrowing and preserve some marketing freedoms (especially point of sale),
that would be a satisfactory outcome."26

SMUGGLING

Throughout the protracted market penetration efforts, access to TTC brands
was being achieved through significant levels of smuggling. In 1989=A0in th=
e
context of discussion over a contracting import sector, the suboptimal
progress was considered a temporary setback by Bill Webb given that "the
widespread importation of consumer goods outside official channels is
allowing traders from Hong Kong to satisfy market demand for our products
and preserve our business base."30 Black market trading was mentioned
again in 1991: "Unofficial imports, competitively priced and available in
local currency, will continue to compete with duty-paid imports in the
Domestic sector."31 With "some 60% of all smuggles (sic) goods into China
[being] cigarettes" rampant smuggling was highlighted as the cause of the
Chinese government deciding to liberalise import rules and work to
establish a wholesale cigarette market in 1992.32 Evidently
smugglingwhether actively supported or passively condoned by the
TTCsproved to be a highly useful TTC weapon that precluded future trade
restrictions.

In 1998,=A0Jerry Liu of BAT was sentenced to jail for conspiring to accept
HK$23 million in bribes and a corrupt HK$10 million loan from cigarette
distributors in exchange for huge quantities of duty-free cigarettes to be
smuggled onto the Chinese market. Mr Justice Wally Yeung Chun-kuen
commented that such crime targeted youngsters by providing them with cheap
black market cigarettes.33

IMPROVING TRADE CAPACITY

The TTCs actively pursued better trading capacity for their cigarettes in
China. Activities included negotiating with the US Trade Office,
establishing a United States Cigarette Exporter's Association (USCEA)
incorporating domestic and Asian representation, and finally, lobbying of
foreign and US friendly politicians and media executives. Letters to the
US Trade Office frequently critiqued any proposed limitations on trade and
defended cigarette exports. In 1990,=A0PM's public relations company,
Burson-Marsteller, recommended the creation of a Joint Enterprise for
Trade (JET) organisation in an attempt to create a more effective voice on
international tobacco issues.

In a global tobacco trade document from the USCEA, trade was dissociated
from health policy, and premised on the legality of cigarettes, the demand
for international quality cigarettes in developing countries, and by
embracing notions of unfettered global free trade. A reference was made to
former US Trade Representative Clayton Yeutter who suggested that: "trade
policy, not morals or health policy, is the fundamental issue involved in
the exportation of cigarettes."34 An example of the strategy framing the
trade debate away from health was a 1990=A0document: "Huddleston [seemingly
part of a contingent of elected officials appointed for Kennedy export
hearings] was unflappable and did very well. He never got bogged down in
discussions of health or advertising excesses. He successfully linked
301=A0cases with the need to allow for advertising (i.e. competition)."35
Other documents included statements like:  "The USTR has respected
legitimate, health related measures involving cigarettes and other
commodities, but has challenged those that are phony (sic)  and designed
to afford protection to government monopolies."36

Documents were careful to frame TTC tobacco exports as simply meeting
existing demand by smokers. In USCEA tobacco export policy documents PM
insisted:  "Essential to an understanding of United States cigarette
exports is the fact that what is being exported is cigarettes, not
smoking."37 RJR stated in another USCEA document on global tobacco trade:
"In short, American manufacturers are trying to sell cigarettes to people
who already smoke and who will continue to smoke whether or not American
cigarettes are available."34 The USCEA framed arguments supporting trade,
indicating there was no coercive marketing in the cigarette trade and
appealing to the US government to see it as benign: "In trade
negotiations, the United States has not insisted, or even requested, that
other countries purchase American cigarettes. It should be noted, in any
event, that governments do not use cigarettes--smokers do."37

In 1990=A0the JET commented on current Congressional efforts which
threatened to preclude future government agency assistance for tobacco
exports, arguing:  "Without this assistance the industry would not have
gained access to the cigarette markets in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea,
or made any progress on access to the Thailand market. Lacking a strong,
consistent advocate in government, US cigarette exporters have been
painted as villains."38

Around 1993=A0with the advent of the Clinton administration and Mickey
Kantor as Clinton's first Trade Representative, the USTR (United States
Trade Relations)  decreasingly placed cigarettes on the trade negotiating
table.39=A040 "Our principal political leverage in gaining access to market=
s
in the region is the backing of US trade negotiators. But the Clinton
administration has indicated it is not willing to campaign on behalf of
the tobacco industry. This means our power base is weakening."41

The popularity of American cigarettes was assumed to be largely based on
the fact that "American cigarettes are a competitively priced product of
extremely high quality"34 and to support their claims "even anti-smoking
advocates, such as Gregory Connolly, admit that foreign cigarette
monopolies produce a darker, less flavourful cigarette than US brands."34

In 1994,=A0Bill Webb of PM mentioned the courting of the Chinese Minister o=
f
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation over export rights at a goodwill
luncheon: "We hope to impress Minister Wu with our commitment to China
=2E=A0.=A0.offering the best quality products, state-of-the-art technology =
and
world class business expertise."42 Broad objectives were articulated in
the briefing materials: "We do not view this as an appropriate time to
discuss specific business problems we face. Rather, we want to establish
cordial relations and express our enthusiasm for our business interests in
China."42 Minister Wu was reminded that: "Philip Morris is a staunch
supporter of free trade and is actively working to gain support for MFN
[most favoured nation] status for China on a permanent and unconditional
basis". Webb cited a letter recently written to President Clinton, and
said that the TTCs had contacted "at least 20=A0members of Congress to
underscore the importance of this issue."43

IMPACT OF TTCS ON CHINESE TOBACCO INDUSTRY

Efforts were made to incorporate China into transnational tobacco circles
as a collaborator. Dollisson of PM believed that trade effectiveness may
be enhanced by meetings of trade associations and ongoing technological
exchanges that may improve the capacity for the industry to influence
national policies.44 In 1992,=A0a special Chinese language section of the
Tobacco Reporter was sent to some 450=A0CNTC senior officials and factory
managers "to raise issues of general concern to the industry and help CNTC
officials better understand the broader issues faced by the industry
worldwide."24 PM decided to: "Encourage and assist China to take part in
CORESTA. Being the largest tobacco producing country in the world, China
should not only be interested in sitting on the board, but should actively
participate in all basic functions through contributions in work groups,
task forces, surveys, and in cooperative studies."45 CORESTA, a
cooperative tobacco research network, started in 1955=A0with 24=A0members. =
By
1982=A0it had 140=A0members in 57=A0countries.46

The TTC involvement was inspiring to the Chinese tobacco industry which
appeared to see it as a chance to develop higher quality blending, casing,
and flavouring techniques needed for western style cigarettes, and learn
transnational tobacco trade principles, as well as make international
contacts.47 In 1990,=A0cooperation with foreign specialists resulted in
cigarettes of international flavours being produced by the CNTC.47 The
CNTC stated: "We need to learn from our foreign friends the advanced and
suitable science and technology as well as management experiences and we
are also willing to take part in the competition and development of
international markets."47 Domestic and international business
opportunities were related to foreign friends by the CNTC at the same
symposium: "the huge domestic market gives the tobacco industry the
potential and possibility to pursue steady development .=A0.=A0.there is st=
ill
a big potential for further expansion in the Chinese tobacco market."47
Further: "In recent years the Chinese tobacco export business has been
growing. The Chinese tobacco has been exported to more than 20=A0countries
and regions around the world. The country's cigarette export is
expanding."47 Since TTC involvement in China, tobacco is increasingly
consumed in the form of manufactured cigarettes (87%).6

CHOOSING HONG KONG AS A MARKET BASE

The TTCs debated several market expansion options pending the
decentralisation of Chinese tobacco trade. Timely market entry to Hong
Kong was imperative with the changing political powers over Hong Kong in
1997.=A0Because of the monopoly's tight control over trade in China, Hong
Kong was viewed as an accessible market base and observation point for
TTCs wanting to penetrate China. A 1991=A0document People's Republic of
China stated: "Local production seems to be the only means through which
we can gain broad access to the total Chinese market. An additional
consideration is that we need to establish a manufacturing base in China
prior to the Hong Kong market's coming under the jurisdiction of CNTC
Bejing (sic) in 1997."31 By 1993,=A0PRC market access was considered to be =
a
matter of capitalising on opportunities that might arise with changes in
government policy: "Under the tight control from the monopoly, it is very
difficult to gain access to the PRC market. However, China is changing and
the changes can be sudden and unpredictable .=A0.=A0.we must prepare oursel=
ves
to capitalise on any relaxation of rules and regulation."39

MANUFACTURING ARRANGEMENTS

With 10=A0years investment in equipping factories with modern technology
between 1983=A0and 1993,=A0seizing a significant portion of the PRC market
through innovative manufacturing arrangements was on the agenda. In a
1993=A0document China Vision 2000+, various production arrangements were
contemplated ranging from a joint venture cut tobacco factory with brand
licensing, a wholly foreign owned licensed PM brand factory or direct
licensing.39 "Our recommendation is to lobby for a joint venture cut
tobacco factory with a 10=A0billion units capacity as our first try .=A0.=
=A0.we
may have to settle for a JV cigarette factory with a production ceiling of
2.5=A0billion units, just like RJR and Rothmans."39 Further: "buying out an
existing factory with large production capacity" was optional whereby
"major reforms .=A0.=A0.may allow us to buy and operate inefficient
factories."39 Any variation on the ideal situation was contemplated
carefully. The CNTC continued to hold tight import quotas for foreign
exchange, favouring foreign manufacturers with local production to equip
their factories:  "Direct licensing demands minimal investment and is
relatively easier to get approval."39 However, profitability to PM was the
main concern. Continuing:  "once CNTC is granted the license, the other
options would be put on the shelf as CNTC has already got what it
wants."39

TTC tactics to improve manufacturing arrangements paid off. In 1988=A0RJR
established a $21 million plant at Xiamen producing more than 2.5=A0billion
cigarettes per year. In 1991=A0the first successful completion of PM's DIET
plan came to fruition. In 1992=A0the CNTC promised to keep the
transnationals on a short leash. However, after the TTCs instigated a year
long investigation under section 301=A0of the US Trade Act combined with
formally threatened retaliatory tariffs ($3.9 billion US Chinese exports),
all import licensing arrangements for China were dropped. China signed a
Memorandum of Understanding with the US in 1992.48 In August 1992=A0the
second PM plant was established in Ningbo15 and in the same year Rothmans
established themselves at Jinan. Local joint PM-CNTC Marlboro production
for the domestic market commenced in 1994=A0and a new export brand Red and
White was initiated in 199449

In 1993=A0PM engaged an experienced Chinese consultant Mr Cheung Ching,
previously used by Coca-Cola, to lobby for the Project Hope joint venture
cut tobacco factory. "Mr Cheung has an impressive track record .=A0.=A0.[he=
]
does not come cheap. The deal will include $40,000 monthly expenses and a
success fee of $4 million. He will be given two years to get the job
done."39

As such expenditure indicates, PM was prepared to spend billions of
dollars to realise their prize. In 1993=A0Michael Miles stated: "On the
theory that part of our ability to attract attention/support will depend
on how much we're willing to spend, we need to decide how much are we
willing to spend. We need to look at some numbers before we decide, but we
should be willing to at least think big. For example, Bill Webb mentioned
while we were there that some thought had been given at some point to
offering something in the billions for all or part of the CNTC"50
indicating the pursuit of direct buy-out. Paul Lohr from RJR predicted
that the CNTC would roll over in 1996-98: "James Kong envisions the local
market loosening over the next 3=A0to 5=A0years with the eventual break up =
of
CNTC." At the thought of this, RJR talked of a new China business
strategy: "to pick up 2-3 billion units from several factories in a number
of provinces."51

Other non-tobacco transnationals with their eyes on China inspired the
TTCs. In 1993=A0PM's Michael Miles cautioned: "That [News Corporation chief
and PM board member Rupert] Murdoch and [General Electric's Jack] Welch
both see huge potential in China doesn't "prove" it's there for us, but it
certainly indicates that our sense of a truly huge opportunity is shared
by some other very savvy international businessmen".50

=09=A0=A0Part B: tobacco advertising in China

"We believe that the universal appeal of the Marlboro Man and Marlboro
Country transcends all flavor types."52

PM's Bill Webb rehearsed the industry's public position on its motivations
regarding advertising, reiterating core statements of earlier documents
like The Activities of Philip Morris in the Third World53: "Advertising is
critical to our ability to expand the geographical presence of our brands
and sustain their premium image."54 Overall, the momentum of "aggressive
promotional and merchandising activities"55 were thoroughly contemplated
and used to maximise market share. Although publicly PM claimed these
"early" markets were unaffected by advertising it was considered essential
"to be delivering outstanding, well targeted advertising, primarily to
build brand and advertising awareness and to provide the brand with an
aspirational value that allows it to command a higher price."56

As in the West, the TTCs ran a public line on their declared position of
not targeting non-smokers, particularly women and children: "Although some
advertisements appeal to young adults who smoke, American tobacco
manufacturers do not target any advertisements towards children
=2E=A0.=A0.Moreover, research reveals that smoking initiation is a complex
process, and advertising plays only a "miniscule" role"if any"in that
process."34 In 1982=A0the TTCs suggested that available evidence showed tha=
t
their advertising was "not designed to attract new smokers of any age"57
and that they were not seeking "to entice the non-smoking segment of Asian
women to initiate smoking".34 It was argued that advertising served to:
"introduce smokers to new tobacco products in the market, to encourage
smokers to try the advertised product."34

Other comments suggest a different perspective. The IRRC (Investor
Responsibility Research Center Inc) report, 1982=A0suggested: "Little is
known about the amounts spent by Philip Morris on cigarette ad campaigns
or on the target groups these campaigns seek to influence".57 Claims that
advertising only targeted existing smokers were weakened by a PM statement
alluding to targeting young adult "starters".58 In PM inter-office
correspondence, Cathy Leiber mentioned targeting young women with Virginia
Slims in 1989=A0at a Pan Asia brand strategy meeting for Hong Kong and Asia=
=2E
She argued: "we are naturally more interested to learn how you plan to
target the emerging young adult female smokers rather than the older
female smokers."59 In a five year marketing plan for 1981-85=A0involving
China, Tso mentioned targeting segments "which are currently small but
which may have long term development potential such as a female brand like
Virginia Slims."60 Plainly, the TTCs were well aware of the huge potential
to be gained by enticing the largely non-smoking segment of Chinese women
into becoming smokers. Their principal tool in this endeavour was
advertising: "Demographically, the population explosion in many
underdeveloped countries ensures a large potential market for cigarettes. =
=20
Culturally, demand may increase with the continuing emancipation of women
and the linkage in the minds of many consumers of smoking manufactured
cigarettes with modernisation, sophistication, wealth, and successa
connection encouraged by much of the advertising of cigarettes throughout
the world."58

The targeting of young males and young adult starters was mentioned more
frequently. A 1991=A0PM meeting regarding the potential of the brand
Parliament in the PRC submitted: "The potential consumers we are targeting
at are male within the age bracket of 18=A0to 35,=A0white collar, slightly
more intellectual with at least secondary education, and in urban areas.
Shanghai is chosen as a marketing base because Shanghainese consumers
=2E=A0.=A0.are relatively more sophisticated by Chinese standards."61
"Parliament's imagery appeals to consumers' aspirations for upscale
western life styles."31 Finally, developing brands to attract more
subgroups, including the health conscious, was evidenced: "position a low
numbers brand with appeal to smokers influenced by the smoking and health
issue."55

Significantly, in a 1989=A0brand awareness study conducted for PM by
Walmsley Limited, 15-60 year olds in 1000=A0households were contacted to
evaluate awareness of imported brands (43% named an imported brand first)
prompted awareness (85% named Marlboro first), and 85% reported smoking
imported brands in the last three months. The receipt of imported
cigarettes as gifts was likewise evaluated (53% had received these as
gifts in the last three months).62 By including 15-18 year olds in this
research, we have explicit evidence of PM's interest in Chinese youth
under 18=A0years old.

Different Chinese locations were clearly targeted. Depending on an initial
manufacturing tie-up with a Chinese factory, in 1991=A0the aim was to
position PM geographically in a way that would maximise market coverage
and production capacity. "By establishing production facilities in
northern, central, southern and western China, we would be positioned to
serve the huge Chinese market effectively across all geographic
regions."32 In PM's 1994=A0three year plan, six key markets were identified
by urban population and income. These included Tianjin and Shanghai as
fast growing and prosperous cities. Other potential markets included
coastline cities and the industrial city of Chongoing in Sizhuan
province.63

KEY MARKETING MESSAGES

Documents reveal aims to stimulate aspiration for an upmarket western or
international lifestyle. Tailoring the Marlboro brand to fit the key Asian
markets, questions were asked about the relevance of "Marlboro's
communication"  to Asian consumers and the ability of the brand to
position itself: "consistent with user attitudes/lifestyles?"64 In
1990=A0younger, clean shaven cowboys were recommended where: "the older,
gritty look does not have universal aspirational appeal."52 Marlboro was
strongly marketed to Chinese consumers during a specific advertising and
promotion strategy to "strengthen the young and modern image of the brand"
and "add aspirational value by promoting its international image".64 In
Hong Kong in 1983,=A0the Americanisation of Winston television advertising
was achieved by dropping the "Men of Hong Kong" campaign for a new
campaign emphasising the "positively American" concept of the brand.65

In 1990=A0documents explicitly targeting Asian smokers proposed the use of =
a
promotion technique called the "targeted group meeting point" (TGMP) by
which promotional teams were dispatched to local hot spots with tobacco
related samples and games in a brand awareness raising exercise. "TGMP is
also an inexpensive way of collecting targeted smoker names for our
database."52 In the Philip Morris Super Lights plan "special nightlife
activities and shopping mall promotion" were mentioned. Such activities
were used to "add fun and entertainment in the form of computer games for
our consumers",66 including "touch-screen puzzles".

ADVERTISING BANNED

After the banning of direct product advertising in the print and
electronic media in the PRC in 1992=A0the documents provide evidence of
attempts to find loopholes to maintain product exposure. In 1993,=A0PM
cunningly employed indirect advertising for exposure using trademark
advertising without product connotations "subject to approval governed by
respective local rules and regulations of different provinces/cities."67
Exposure was also maintained by "program sponsorships on TV (with
entitlements such as program titling, opening/closing sequence, etc)". The
TTC abuse of poorly scrutinised advertising restrictions in China has been
a longstanding problem with a rise in TV infomercials, billboards, and
sponsorship post 1992.6 The diversion of million dollar advertising
budgets into loophole practices is a common TTC practice around the world
and is particularly exploited in developing countries.

SPONSORSHIP

Sponsorship and promotional events were generally arranged to enhance the
"heroic and import image" of international brands around "the key target
group"52 of YAMS (young adult male smokers).68 The Marlboro Superbike Show
in Taiwan in 1990=A0had a stated objective: "to strengthen Marlboro's brand
image in relation with excitement, vitality and masculinity, especially
among young adult consumers."69 In 1990: "The inaugural Marlboro dynasty
cup are excellent examples of how we associate Marlboro with Asia's
favourite sport and position Marlboro as the principal contributor to
football development in Asia."52 A further PM concern was as to move away
from "so-called "elitist sports" such as golf and tennis" to choose sports
like soccer "supported by most Asian governments".69 Other than political
motivations, sponsorship deals included targeted smoker sampling made
explicit in 1990: "While sport is by far the best avenue to attract,
sample, and influence our core target smokers, it's not the only way.
International movies and videos also have tremendous appeal to our young
adult consumers in Asia."52

PHILANTHROPIC ACTIVITIES

Philanthropic activities in China were well documented as opportunities
for PM corporate affairs to link the company with issues of social
responsibility. In 1988=A0the development of a paramedical training program
to service the handicapped was part of "a contribution to the China
Welfare Fund for the Handicapped in the People's Republic of China."53 The
explicit motivation behind such programmes was: "to counter attacks on
tobacco sponsorship, we will continue to develop a comprehensive regional
program of arts and sports sponsorship."70 Particular attention was to be
paid to: "cultural projects and community service projects of national
significance." Further: "We will utilise third parties .=A0.=A0.to identify
and develop sponsorship opportunities and build ties with the sporting and
cultural communities."70 It could be suggested that associations with
sports and the health industry including ties with the Special Olympics in
Hong Kong49 served dually to counter sponsorship attacks as well as form
cliques with these groups, enabling a backdoor push for cooperation from
health bodies. One document explicitly mentioned gaining access to the
Ministry of Health to get a fair hearing "through our continuous support
for the paramedical training program".70

VOLUNTARY CODES FAVOURED

As in the West, self regulating the marketing of cigarettes was used to
avoid legislation as well as to portray industry responsibility. "If done
honestly and with the concurrence of government authoritiesand in advance
of restrictive government proposalsindustry codes can be accepted instead
of legislation."25 RJR considered the utility of a voluntary code, to
demonstrate that: "American tobacco manufacturers adhere to the
advertising laws and regulations of the countries in which they
operate."36 John Dollisson alluded to the perverse motives of the TTCs in
Asia: "A code may be beneficial but we must remember that we work in a
competitive business environment and we are judged on our ability to
increase volume and share. How do we combine/reconcile these two
issues?"29 However, Dollisson noted that the codes were useful to
"effectively defend ourselves against criticisms based on lies or
misconstruals", continuing: "If we could state a PM marketing policy
indicating voluntary guidelines, it would be very beneficial. It could
include: a clear policy stating we don't market to "minors" or
non-smokers."29 The use of the code was again referenced by Matthew
Winokur 1993: "The code puts PMI [Philip Morris International] on high
ground regarding our marketing practices overseas, especially on the youth
issue." The other USCEA members (B&W and RJR) were subsequently encouraged
to adopt such a document under the concern that:  "Unless all three
companies can be held to the same high standard, PMI's image will likely
be reduced to that of the lowest common denominator."71

FLAWS IN TTC MARKETING

Other counter attacking strategies described in the documents reveal flaws
in public statements endorsing the integrity of TTC cooperation and
marketing. In anticipation of "a possible onslaught of coverage" at the
7th World Conference on Smoking or Health in Perth in April 1990,=A0PM's
Patrick Rekart warned:  "please be aware of the following: .=A0.=A0.what is
PM's sampling procedure in each market; and what kinds of activities do we
do that could filter our products down to adolescents. Alternatively, what
do we not do."72 Rekart referenced the "Jump Boy" principle, not
applicable to Indonesia, since single stick sales are not allowed.
Commenting in 1991=A0on PM's public relations efforts in regard to minors,
Clive Turner admitted "Much of what we have done around the world has been
desultory and patchy" with the real benefit in "being seen to cooperate on
this particular issue" as "positive public relations and public affairs
benefits". PM's work in relation to minors was evidently undertaken
because it was "inexpensive to mount, and usually very difficult for the
opposition effectively to counter without appearing sour and
overcritical."25

=09=A0=A0Part C: smoking and health

Here, the TTCs' objectives were plain: "Our objective is to limit the
introduction and spread of smoking restrictions and maintain the
widespread social acceptability of smoking in Asia."70 In a 1989=A0Hong Kon=
g
Tobacco Institute document it was stated: "Strengthen relations with China
National Tobacco Corporation (CNTC)to alert CNTC of the repercussions of
anti-smoking sentiments generated under the influence of [Judith] Mackay
and WHO" in order "to help the CNTC deal with allegations on smoking and
health".73 As PM saw it, strengthening cooperation with the CNTC was a
resource and expertise sharing exercise "to counter anti-smoking
initiatives".24

The TTC's actions in China on the health debate were similar to those
adopted in the West, including contracting Chinese health specialists for
health research. In 1989=A0Patrick Rekart wrote of the need for: "A list of
information/research needs so that we can "Asianize" our positions on the
issues."72 In the same year PM's John Dollisson noted: "On the health
issue, we are assessing the literature on Asian populations looking for
potential specialists. The comparisons between Asian and Caucasian
populations present interesting positive evidence on the smoking and
health controversy."44

USE OF INDEPENDENT SCIENTISTS

One example of efforts to heighten controversy was the ETS (environmental
tobacco smoke) Consultants Project in Hong Kong. Hong Kong was one of the
industry's four initial target markets for recruiting, educating, and
orientating scientists in Asia. With the TTC promise in 1989=A0"To address
the science of ETS and build a foundation of local data which can be used
to put ETS in perspective",72 a network of "independent" Asian consultants
was formed by US lawyer John Rupp based on an international trend of
recruiting scientists who would run the industry line. The consultants
were not tobacco experts74 but rather people who the TTCs had
predetermined would actively criticise the health lobby, undermine the
smoking and health debate in China, and seek to bury ETS as an
insignificant element in the wider context of indoor air pollution. Their
political connections and personality attributes were paramount. Dr Linda
C Koo from the department of community medicine, University of Hong Kong,
described as having "an extremely attractive and sparkling personality"
and being "utterly Americanized" was an attractive prospect. With her
research focus being on oxides of nitrogen and respiratory disease, Dr
Koo's expertise was of less importance than her comments on lung cancer in
Chinese women: "Dr Koo believes [lung cancer] is principally caused by
dietary factor (sic). .=A0.=A0.Dr Koo talked of the "victimization" practis=
ed
by the health lobby. In this environment, no one wants to stick their neck
out, and no scientist will accept money from the tobacco industry."
Speaking on the health lobby "Dr Koo informed us that Judith Mackay is now
calling passive smoking "respiratory rape". What scientist wants to aid
and abet rape?"74

Dr Sarah Liao from EHS Consultants Ltd, a close personal friend of Dr
Linda Koo's and a specialist in asbestos, was another promising candidate: =
=20
"Interestingly she is married to the postmaster general in Hong Kong and
is presumably well connected politically .=A0.=A0.She appears to have great
integrity and objectivity as a scientist and criticises the health lobby
for its inquisitorial tactics and scientific basis. Judith Mackay is not
objective and not credible, according to Dr Liao. She also stated that TH
Lam, who co-authored the COSH [Council on Smoking and Health] survey with
Stuart Donnan is a "jerk".74

The same document shows that two ETS consultants were also recruited from
China: Dr Fengsheng He, director of occupational medicine, Chinese Academy
of Preventative Medicine, Beijing, and Dr Guangguan Liu, chairman,
department of air pollution control, Institute of Environmental Health and
Engineering, Beijing.

ASIAN STUDIES TO REFUTE THE WEST

The TTCs held high hopes that in the large populations of Asia they would
find anomalous data that could be used to cast doubt on claims about
smoking causing disease. This was part of a global search for such data
that had so far proved futile: PM's Jetson Lincoln, vice president of PM
Planning, expressed his disappointment in one document discussing Chinese
cancer clusters: "There is a great coincidence of smoking and longevity in
a place in Ecuador but it turned out they didn't inhale."75

Lincoln's memo discusses how to best obtain results required to disprove
the causality theory: "the first essential is to learn the location of the
lung cancer hot spot and the minimum distance one must go away from it to
reach areas of average or below average lung cancer incidence."75 He
continues:  "Neither the Chinese tobacco people or ourselves should be
dismayed if the prevalence of cigarette smoking in the high lung cancer
areas should turn out to be above average. As a matter of fact I would
expect it to be above average.  As long as the disparity in lung cancer is
greater than the disparity in cigarette consumption, we have a favourable
result. An intermediate disparity in smoking rates in the high lung cancer
area will merely testify that lung problems "cause" smoking."75

By 1994,=A0the researchers had produced results suggesting other hypotheses
about the cause of lung cancer: "Hong Kong researchers say the food
Chinese people eat, rather than the cigarette smoke they inhale, is the
main cause of lung cancer. Dr Linda Koo and Professor John Ho have spent
14=A0years studying the cause of lung cancer among Chinese, say more vitami=
n
C in the diet will dramatically reduce the rate of lung cancer."76

Hargrave of RJR gloated that: "The opponents of smoking in developing
countries cannot produce anything like as sensational figures as those in
developed countries relating to diseases and mortality rates which they
allege to be causally connected with smoking. To date, therefore, the
industry in developing countries has not been so severely indicted as the
major factor in this threat to public health."77

In 1991=A0Clive Turner threw out a further decoy to counter the causal
hypothesis and redirect political attention away from children smoking.
"The visible dust and generally disgusting airborne pollution must
unquestionably be THE prime culprit." Turner continued "It is THIS
widespread and real problem to which the government should direct its
attention and forget the utterly minor matter of smoking by very young
children in Hong Kong."78

By 1993-95=A0there was talk of the great benefit of the growing number of
studies conducted in developing and Asian countries, that rebut
conclusions from western countries, as well as from Asian scientists
citing these findings at conferences and in the media.24 Symposia were
held to disseminate these results in Asian countries.24 Further workshops
were encouraged by Walk as late as 1996: "to bring together the key
epidemiologists on environmental issues in China to discuss quality
criteria for research to be used in risk assessment of potential hazards
and in particular so-called "weak associations" in China."79

THE OPIUM WAR

The TTCs were outraged over tobacco control advocates relating the
historical Chinese Opium War with the spread of tobacco in China:
"attempts to link cigarette market opening to the Opium War are strained
and without historical foundation. The Opium War originated because the
British had introduced opium from their colonies into China and continued
to force-feed it into China despite the objections of the Chinese imperial
government." Charging the Chinese with responsibility: "Over 100=A0years
before the Opium War, China was already exporting tobacco to Macao and the
Philippines for shipment to Spain, Portugal, and other parts of Europe."34
They also objected to talk of tobacco being a drug: "The equating of
tobacco and narcotics trivialises the serious drug problem that society
now faces."34

COUNTERACTING THE ANTI-TOBACCO MOVEMENT

To ensure that TTC views prevailed in Hong Kong government decision making
it was considered vital to develop negotiation points with government,
"monitor all aspects of government's legislative programme".80 Such
monitoring included development of a "war book" on future and present
decision makers. Methods to best direct political messages to the press
and electronic media were also recommended.80 After watering down COSH
proposals, the Tobacco Institute stated in 1989,=A0that: "PM will develop
and implement a legislative "early warning"  system throughout the region
to provide the earliest possible notice of government action to restrict
our business."72 A broad two point TTC strategy was outlined as: "(1) To
defend the industry as vigorously as possible. This would include opposing
and resisting the government's activity on both principle and for
practical purposes. (2) To negotiate and remain available to consult with
the government to achieve compromises wherever possible".81

In 1991=A0Ray Donnner (RJR for Asia Pacific office Hong Kong), Clive Turner=
,
(managing director of the Asian Tobacco Council), and Bob Fletcher
(Rothmans), presumably all representing the Asian Tobacco Council, met
with CNTC vice president, Mr Jin Maoxian and three of his staff about
smoking and health and tobacco control activists in China. The TTCs showed
Mr Jin news clippings, largely quoting Dr Judith Mackay, to show "what the
anti-smoking activists are saying about China outside China".82 Likewise
Mr Jin conveyed the CNTC's opinion on smoking and health to the TTCs: "(1)
Smoking is an accepted custom, and although it can have certain effects on
health of smokers, it is not agreed that smoking definitely causes lung
cancer. According to the HM [Health Ministry], 50% of lung cancer deaths
are caused by smoking, but, of 100=A0000 people who smoke, how many actuall=
y
die from lung cancer? (2) The smoking rate among CNTC employees is quite
high, but the percentage of people working in the Shanghai cigarette
factory who develop lung cancer is smaller than the percentage who do of
Shanghai's total population .=A0.=A0.Smoking is not like taking drugs in te=
rms
of danger."82

Mr Jin continued: "China is a socialist country .=A0.=A0.there is a certain
amount of cooperation between the CNTC and the HM .=A0.=A0.They commented t=
hat
only in China could tobacco and health people sit down together in harmony
and discuss issues."82 "It is CNTC's position to cooperate with the HM and
"produce less harmful products". CNTC regards the HM people as doing their
duty, but also does not wish them to be excessive or unscientific."82
Evidently, the CNTC, as the world's largest tobacco producer, had an
approach to the smoking and health debate that was far more frank than the
TTCs', admitting causality and working with the health ministry to
minimise harmful components of cigarettes.

In seeking to unify the tobacco frontier against the antis and get the
CNTC on side through the meeting, Ray Donner and Clive Turner did not want
to push too far: "They should be given some time to digest what has
already been given them so as not to be given the impression they are
being rushed or pressured."82

HONG KONG'S POLITICAL POWER

Clive Turner was evidently frustrated in having to deal with the Hong Kong
government: "They do have enormous political power in Hong Kong, and can
virtually do as they pleaseand they often do .=A0.=A0.There is a degree of
arrogance and no small amount of patronising apparent, and I for one find
it disagreeable to observe."27 Turner suggested that with 1997=A0approachin=
g
"the truly heavyweight work with China is done in London by [Douglas] Hurd
and his men"27 and called for PM: "to come forth with ideas about how the
Tobacco Institute (Hong Kong) could usefully bring some back door pressure
to bear through London."27

In 1989=A0the Asian Tobacco Council Charter called for strategic regional
collaboration between the TTCs to "monitor regional anti-smoking groups"
and "develop and coordinate regional action plans to address anti-smoking
initiatives".83 Such collaborative networks enabled the prompt
communication of anti-tobacco information for pre-empting or counteracting
their action. Focused questioning of the opposition's priorities, targets,
and thinking was undertaken to redirect and strengthen the TTC's
pro-activity in Asia and "to balance the unremitting and emotionally
geared anti-tobacco crusading".25 From there, garnering support for the
industry position80 included marketing decided messages "with an intensity
and level of emotion that equals that of the other side".84 "We are making
every effort to get our story told."85

The TTCs carefully considered tobacco control proposals by the industry
regulation they imposed. In Hong Kong in 1976,=A0John Thompson of RJR
recommended "a T&N [tar and nicotine] numbers league" which "would upset
the government and involve them in setting up controls, laboratories,
standards, etc" was contemplated against "a concerted no smoking campaign"
possibly causing a "damping down consumption" and "restructuring towards
milds".86 In 1980=A0in Hong Kong, Blackmear was discussing how: "local
government might be dissuaded from undertaking a T&N reporting program if
they are made aware of all the administrative and technical requirements
of such a program." RJR then enlisted assistance for: "the development of
a comprehensive listing of all these requirements, eg, test equipment
requirements, scientific controls, printing costs, etc."87

Ten years later in 1991=A0they were still singing a familiar tune: "Given
the difficulties of today's challenges to Customs and Excise for
controlling contraband cigarettes which can be identified with a glance,
how can the government hope to control excessive "tar" cigarettes which
require a sophisticated laboratory to identify?"88

Tobacco control advocates were painted as a highly irrational, emotionally
motivated group aiming at easy targets: "tobacco export industry as a
whole, and cigarette exporting in particular, is under attack by
anti-smoking groups that use their time in public forums to denounce what
they call "export of death"."84 In 1989=A0proposals from Hong Kong's COSH
were labelled "manipulative"  to society, guilty of "over-stressing of
government's role in society" and lacking in "balance and accuracy".89

Clive Turner of the Hong Kong Tobacco Council made a particularly florid
speech in 1990=A0to colleagues at the sixth world tobacco exhibition and
symposium. "I have always hoped that such people, seized as they are with
their hatred of tobacco, are occasionally haunted by the fear that
somewhere in the world there may lurk a happy and unworried smoker raising
the proverbial and graphic two fingers at them."90 His speech argued that
tobacco control advocates were engaged in a "ritual of purification". "It
is almost as if they are conducting an evangelical crusade, and nothing
short of the end of the world will cause a shift in direction."90 He
continued: "I call them "shower adjusters". They would enjoy adjusting
your shower temperature for you if they could get access, just knowing
exactly what is right for youand for all mankind. Interestingly, they
seldom create employment or wealth."90 "They were not the sort of folk
with whom you would feel at ease having a chat over a drink! Tense, with
no sense of humour, wound up, and consumed by their passion."91 "Extremism
is part of their way of life, and runs rampant throughout the anti-tobacco
movement."90 And to finish: "Our detractors will not allow the use of the
word "debate"'.  They claim the debate is all over, and that all which
remains to be done is to eliminate tobacco across the world."90

=09=A0=A0Postscript

Recently, it was discovered that President Clinton's Trade Representatives
were secretly pressuring China into accepting American cigarettes and
tobacco as a condition of America's support for China's entry into the
World Trade Organisation. The agreement, awaiting a congressional vote
this summer, would bring millions of dollars to the US tobacco companies,
liberalising trade instead of a year by year renewal of trade concessions.
For cigarettes, the current tariff of 65% would fall in equal installments
to 25% by 2004.=A0Opening the Chinese market to investment would enable
Philip Morris to build manufacturing plants using mainly Asian tobacco.
The US Trade Representative's office said its mission was to level the
playing field, not promote health and social policy.91

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56.  Marlboro creative brief 1993=A0PM2504000588.

57.  IRRC proxy issues report tobacco sales in developing countries
7=A0April 1982=A0RJR503653426.

58.  To J.=A0Weekly meeting minutes of April 26,=A01993=A0inter-office
correspondence 3=A0May 1993=A0PM2504018515.

59.  Leiber C.=A0Philip Morris Asia inter-office correspondence 25=A0Octobe=
r
1989=A0PM2504034812 13.

60.  Tso D.=A01981-1985 five year planMarketing planning inter-office
correspondence 25=A0September 1980=A0PM2504011906.

61.  Parliament in the People's Republic of China (Tokyo meeting May 1991)
May 1991=A0PM2504053797.

62.  Walmsley Limited. China consumer series: 1989=A0cigarette section:
Shanghai September 1989=A0PM2504034565.

63.  Cheung G.=A0China 3YP 1994-1996 1994=A0PM2504033297.

64.  WPP Group Marlboro branding and positioning audit 1991=A0PM2504010284.

65.  Knouse P.=A0Winston advertising in Hong Kong 14=A0March
1983=A0RJR503405707.

66.  Philip Morris Super lightslooking ahead 1991=A0PM2504018360.

67.  Wilson W.=A0F-1 and GP bike evaluation inter-office correspondence
12=A0May 1993=A0PM2504052843.

68.  Soccer sponsorship 24=A0February 1994=A0PM2504051355A.

69.  da Roza E Inter-office correspondence Marlboro Superbike Show `90
18=A0September 1990=A0PM2504016566.

70.  PM Asia Phili

APOLOGIES: FINAL CITATIONS ARE MISSING