[Ecommerce] Proposed TACD statement on ICANN
Theresa Amato
amato@essential.org
Tue, 18 Jan 2000 19:56:33 -0600
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To Jamie and the lists:
A few comments on the proposed TACD statement on ICANN:
First, thank you Jamie for getting the discussion rolling on this issue
in TACD. TACD should have a role in this debate.
Overall, I think it is important for a multinational group like TACD to
begin its statement on ICANN by noting that it is wholly inappropriate
to have the functions of a worldwide resource such as the Internet
controlled by a PRIVATE, corporate-controlled nonprofit in the State of
California.
Specifically, I agree with Hans’ comments about ICANN being given power
by the U.S. Dept of Commerce as a result of ICANN’s formation to respond
to the request for a nonprofit to meet the White Paper’s mandates, and
that DNS management is not necessarily the “most” important area of
control, but one of them.
In response to the discussion about Internet surveillance, I think the
key point with respect to ICANN is that it is a relatively centralized
way of controlling the DNS. As such, it has been used to foster the
trademark/IP concerns for policing, rather than as a vehicle for other
arguably more relevant concerns – such as consumer protection issues.
In response to the discussion about the election of the Board of
Directors, it is not accurate to say that ICANN has created a system for
various stakeholder groups to elect members to the Board of Directors.
The three supporting organizations and the membership can all elect
councils (the Names Council and the “At-large Membership Council”) and
these council members, in turn, select Board members. The distinction
has ramifications. The lack of direct election to the Board of
Directors means that the privilege of “membership” under California
non-profit law – and all of the statutory rights that would accrue (such
as the power to bring a shareholder derivative suit, the right to amend
bylaws, call meetings, recall directors, etc.) – are not conferred upon
the so-called “members.” Accordingly, members of ICANN are not
“members” under the statutory definition of membership in California law
because the ICANN members do not directly elect the Board.
Atlhough ICANN proposes to put into place a mechanism for the buffer
“at-large council” to select – not elect—the nine additional members to
represent the general public, they have made slow progress to date, have
passed a variety of policies before doing so, and have already
disenfranchised the general public of any meaningful membership.
Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, there is no means yet
established to prevent the same people and organizations who dominate
the corporate-controlled three supporting organizations from also
dominating the “general public” portion of the organization.
At the ICANN meeting in Los Angeles, I directly asked the Board to
create some mechanism – such as an access to information policy -- by
which all people could access all ICANN records, not just those the
ICANN staff cares to put up on their website. I would hope that TACD
would also demand a formal access to information policy, and for not
just the “ICANN” Board meetings to be open to the public but to make
clear that all committee meetings, including but not limited to the
Government Advisory Committee and other standing committees, should be
open for public participation – both observation and comment at
appropriate times.
Thanks, Theresa
James Love wrote:
> This is a first draft. Comments are welcome. Jamie
>
> ---
> Proposed TACD statement on ICANN
> version .1
>
> The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)
> is a non-profit organization incorporated in the State of
> California that is seeking broad control over resources and
> functions that are essential for the operation of the Internet.
> According to ICANN, this includes "responsibility for the IP
> address space allocation, protocol parameter assignment, domain
> name system management, and root server system management.
>
> The most important area will concern the management of the domain
> name system (DNS). Everyone who uses the Internet has to use a
> domain name (names such as such as TACD.org or Amazon.com).
> Computer that are connected to the Internet use IP number (unique
> numeric internet addresses, such as 216.0.124.147). The DNS
> system is designed to be an authoritative way to map the
> easier-to-remember names to the IP numbers. (It is easier to
> remember CNN.com than 207.25.71.20, for example). The DNS
> management system provides a surprisingly highly centralized
> mechanism for influencing Internet navigation. (This is a fact
> readily apparently to anyone who fails to pay domain name
> registration fees and eliminated from the constantly updated
> databases of domain names, making a web page "disappear").
>
> For years DNS management was considered a largely technical
> issue, managed by Internet Pioneer Jon Postel or other government
> contractors, that most users simply took for granted. With the
> growth of the commercial value of the Internet and electronic
> commerce, and the untimely death of Jon Postel, there has been an
> astonishing flurry of activity surrounding management of domain
> names and allocation of IP numbers.
>
> Early efforts by the US government to privatize the management of
> certain generic top level domain (gTLD) names such as .com, .net
> and .org, led to concerns that private firms, like Network
> Solutions, would obtain monopoly power of registration of
> important aspects of domain names, charging excessive prices for
> the registration of domains, and possibly imposing inappropriate
> restrictions on the use of domain names.
>
> And as e-commerce has become big business, there are also
> disputes involving a number of content issues, and many groups
> are seeking to control what happens on the Internet. For
> example:
>
> businesses are seeking to take away domain names that they
> claim infringe on trademark rights.
>
> Pharmaceutical companies want to prevent online pharmacies
> from selling inexpensive pharmaceuticals across national
> borders.
>
> Music companies want to prevent web pages from providing
> copies of software that will defeat DVD anti-copying
> technologies, or the distribution of unauthorized MP3 music
> files.
>
> Some governments are seeking to block access to web sites
> that feature gambling, the sale of unregistered securities,
> pornography, or censored political views.
>
> Owners of software, films, music and other materials are
> seeking methods of monitoring the private movements of
> copyrighted materials on the Internet, to police possible
> infringements.
>
> Groups with various agendas are seeking ways to block access to
> websites that engage in a variety of activities, or to impose new
> Internet surveillance systems that can be used to impose
> liability on certain actions. There is now growing attention to
> the role of the DNS system and Internet protocol development as a
> system of control over Internet usage. For example, by
> controlling the allocation and mapping of domain names and IP
> numbers, it is possible to render a web page invisible and
> unfindable to most Internet addresses. There are also proposals
> for various Internet protocols that would enable new mechanisms
> for surveillance of Internet transmissions.
>
> Because of their strategic importance, there are profound
> concerns over the future control over the resources to control
> DNS management. A number of groups with diverse interests and
> views are seeking mechanisms to limit the use of DNS management
> to narrow technical issues necessary for the operation of the
> Internet, and to prevent the system of DNS management from being
> used as an enforcement mechanism for government or private policy
> making.
>
> The Clinton Administration has proposed the creation of a private
> non-profit organization to control the DNS management system,
> under a system of "self governance." ICANN was created and
> selected by the US government to assume the ownership and control
> of the DNS system. Among the early acts by ICANN was the
> adoption of a set of policies regarding the use of well known
> trademarks, that critics say have substantially reduced the
> public's rights to use certain domain names. ICANN has also
> imposed fees on organizations that register domains, and
> announced a budget of approximately $6 million per year, with a
> President that will earn a salary of $300,000, plus benefits.
> The organization will have a nineteen member board of directors,
> who will fly business class to quarterly meetings in locations
> such as Cario, Santiago, Berlin and Singapore. ICANN can
> effective "tax" internet domain registrations, to fund any
> activity it desires, including the funding of litigation,
> lobbying, public relations, public policy research, conferences
> and other items.
>
> ICANN is now considering making policy for the Internet on topics
> such as the use of real organization names in navigation systems,
> the rights of national governments to the two digit top level
> domain space (such as .fr, .au, .de, etc), the addition of new
> top level domains such as . .firm, .store, .law, and .arts., and
> other issues, including issues relating to protocol development.
>
> ICANN is controlled by its board of directors, who have broad
> powers, including the power to amend ICANN's articles of
> incorporation and bylaws. The initial board was self selected.
> ICANN has created a system for various stakeholder groups to
> elected members to the board of Directors. These include the
> "Address supporting Organization," the "Domain Name Supporting
> Organization" and the "Protocol Supporting Organization," each of
> which elects three members of the board of directors. These
> groups are dominated by electronic commerce businesses. There
> will be a mechanism to elect nine additional board members from
> the general public.
>
> The lobbying for the ICANN board of directors has been
> surprisingly intense -- including, for example, an aggressive but
> failed campaign by AT&T and other firms on behalf of a former
> member of US Congress. Groups like the Motion Picture
> Association of America have been active in ICANN deliberations ,
> as have many other business interests, particularly those
> representing trademark interests or firms engaged in the domain
> registration business. There is a concern that ICANN will be
> asked by various business interests to expand its present mission
> to address issues such as the enforcement of copyrights. Some
> ICANN supporters say it should be a model for developing self
> regulatory rules for privacy and consumer protection.
>
> It is the view of TACD that ICANN structure is not balanced, with
> nearly half of the board sets presently allocated by business
> interests through the various supporting organizations, and that
> ICANN's mission should be limited so that it does not become a
> general purpose internet governance organization.
>
> One mechanism to limit ICANN's authority would be the creation of
> a sui generis multilateral government charter, that would define
> and limit ICANN's authority.
>
> Such a could be based upon a limited purpose sui generis
> agreement among countries that express interest in working
> together, and that agree that ICANN's role should be limited to
> tasks essential to maintaining an efficient and reliable DNS
> management, and that ICANN will not be used as an instrument to
> promote policies relating to conduct or content on the Internet.
> While additional multilateral institutions may be desired to
> address electronic commerce issues, ICANN itself should not
> become the foundation for a vast Internet governance institution.
>
> ICANN should not use its power over domain registration policy to
> exclude persons from the use of a domain on issues that are not
> germane to managing the DNS system of mapping IP addresses into
> domain names. The right to have a domain on the Internet should
> be considered the same as the right to have a street address, a
> telephone number or a person's name.
>
> Accountability and transparency
>
> The records of ICANN should be open to the public, including
> financial records, and all ICANN contracts. The meetings of
> ICANN should be open to the public. The public should be given
> an annual opportunity to review and comment on the ICANN budget.
> The Budget of ICANN should be subject to review by the countries
> that provide the ICANN charter. Fees associated with domain
> registration should only be spent on activities essential to the
> management of the DNS system.
>
> -------------------------------
> James Love
> Center for Study of Responsive Law | Consumer Project on Technology
> P.O. Box 19367, Washington, DC 20036 | http://www.cptech.org
> Voice 202/387-8030 | Fax 202/234-5176 | love@cptech.org
>
> _______________________________________________
> Ecommerce mailing list
> Ecommerce@lists.essential.org
> http://lists.essential.org/mailman/listinfo/ecommerce
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