[corp-focus] Public Ownership -- But No Public Control
robert weissman
rob@essential.org
Tue, 14 Oct 2008 13:39:31 -0400
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Public Ownership -- But No Public Control
By Robert Weissman
October 14, 2008
It is an extraordinary time. On Friday, the Washington Post ran a
front-page story titled, "The End of American Capitalism?" Today, the
banner headline is, "U.S. Forces Nine Major Banks to Accept Partial
Nationalization."
There's no question that this morning's announcement from the Treasury
Department, Federal Reserve and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) is remarkable.
It was also necessary.
Over the next several months, we're going to see a lot more moves like
this. Government interventions in the economy that seemed unfathomable a
few months ago are going to become the norm, as it quickly becomes
apparent that, as Margaret Thatcher once said in a very different
context, there is no alternative.
That's because the U.S. and global economic problems are deep and
pervasive. The American worker may be strong, as John McCain would have
it, but the "fundamentals" of the U.S. and world economy are not. The
underlying problem is a deflating U.S. housing market that still has
much more to go. And underlying that problem are the intertwined
problems of U.S. consumer over-reliance on debt, national and global
wealth inequality of historic proportions, and massive global trade
imbalances.
Although it was enabled by deregulation, the financial meltdown merely
reflects these more profound underlying problems. It is, one might say,
"derivative."
Nonetheless, the financial crisis was -- and conceivably still might be
-- by itself enough to crash the global economy.
Today, following the lead of the Great Britain, the United States has
announced what has emerged as the consensus favored financial proposal
among economists of diverse political ideologies. The United States will
buy $250 billion in new shares in banks (the so-called "equity
injection"). This is aimed at boosting confidence in the banks, and
giving them new capital to loan. The new equity will enable them to loan
roughly 10 times more than would the Treasury's earlier (and still
developing) plan to buy up troubled assets. The FDIC will offer new
insurance programs for bank small business and other bank deposits, to
stem bank runs. The FDIC will provide new, temporary insurance for
interbank loans, intended to overcome the crisis of confidence between
banks. And, the Federal Reserve will if necessary purchase commercial
paper from business -- the 3-month loans they use to finance day-to-day
operations. This move is intended to overcome the unwillingness of money
market funds and others to extend credit.
But while aggressive by the standards of two months ago, the most
high-profile of these moves -- government acquisition of shares in the
private banking system -- is a strange kind of "partial
nationalization," if it should be called that at all.
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson effectively compelled the leading U.S.
banks to accept participation in the program. And, at first blush, he
may have done an OK job of protecting taxpayer monetary interests. The
U.S. government will buy preferred shares in the banks, paying a 5
percent dividend for the first three years, and 9 percent thereafter.
The government also obtains warrants, giving it the right to purchase
shares in the future, if the banks' share price increase.
But the Treasury proposal specifies that the government shares in the
banks will be non-voting. And there appear to be only the most minimal
requirements imposed on participating banks.
So, the government may be obtaining a modest ownership stake in the
banks, but no control over their operations.
In keeping with the terms of the $700 billion bailout legislation, under
which the bank share purchase plan is being carried out, the Treasury
Department has announced guidelines for executive compensation for
participating banks. These are laughable. The most important rule
prohibits incentive compensation arrangements that "encourage
unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the value of the financial
institution." Gosh, do we need to throw $250 billion at the banks to
persuade executives not to adopt incentive schemes that threaten their
own institutions?
The banks reportedly will not be able to increase dividends, but will be
able to maintain them at current levels. Really? The banks are bleeding
hundreds of billions of dollars -- with more to come -- and they are
taking money out to pay shareholders? The banks are not obligated to
lend with the money they are getting. The banks are not obligated to
re-negotiate mortgage terms with borrowers -- even though a staggering
one in six homeowners owe more than the value of their homes.
"The government's role will be limited and temporary," President Bush
said in announcing today's package. "These measures are not intended to
take over the free market, but to preserve it."
But it makes no sense to talk about the free market in such
circumstances. And these measures are almost certain to be followed by
more in the financial sector -- not to mention the rest of economy --
because the banks still have huge and growing losses for which they have
not accounted.
If the U.S. and other governments are to take expanded roles in the
world economy -- as they must, and will -- then the public must demand
something more than efforts to preserve the current system. The current
system brought on the financial meltdown and the worsening global
recession. As the government intervenes in the economy on behalf of the
public, it must reshape economic institutions to advance broad public
objectives, not the parochial concerns of the Wall Street and corporate
elite.
Robert Weissman is editor of the Washington, D.C.-based Multinational
Monitor, <http://www.multinationalmonitor.org> and director of Essential
Action <http://www.essentialaction.org>.
(c) Robert Weissman
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