[corp-focus] Corporations and Their Proxies Defeated in Miami -- But They Refuse to Give Up

[Robert Weissman]

Corporations and Their Proxies Defeated in Miami -- But They Refuse to
Give Up
By Russell Mokhiber and Robert Weissman

There was good news and bad news from inside the negotiations of the
Ministerial meeting for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), held
last week in Miami.

The good news: Brazil has succeeded in putting forward a framework that
would alleviate the worst aspects of the U.S.-backed extremist proposals
that threaten public health, the environment, and worker rights. With
mobilized populations at home demanding nothing less, Brazil, Argentina
and other countries appear to have defeated the U.S. effort to expand
NAFTA to the entire hemisphere.

In at least four separate places, the final statement of the meeting,
known as the Ministerial Declaration, reiterates the need for a
"balanced" agreement. The key phrase of the Declaration states that,
"Ministers recognize that countries may assume different levels of commitments."

What this means in practice is that countries will not be required to
adhere to the market fundamentalist proposals advanced by the United
States in the areas of intellectual property, investment, services and
other areas.

While it would be best if there were no agreements in these areas
whatsoever -- since the agreements in various ways are designed to
subordinate public interest considerations to the commercial interests
of multinational corporations -- at least no country will be required to
agree to these proposals as a condition of participating in the FTAA.

Those countries that agree to specific commitments, in the investment
area, say, will be required to honor them. But none of the Latin
American or Caribbean countries have any real interest in doing so.
There aren't many Uruguayan or Honduran investors looking for special
protections in the U.S. market.

Brazil gained the upper hand by responding effectively to the U.S.
position that it could not negotiate key agricultural issues within the
FTAA. U.S. negotiators said they wanted to move on agricultural issues
of concern to Brazil and other countries, but these matters had to be
handled at the World Trade Organization (WTO), where they could be
negotiated as well with the European Union and Japan. Well, said Brazil,
if agriculture is a WTO issue, then so is intellectual property, which
is already covered by a WTO agreement, and so are other controversial issues.

Given this move by Brazil, the United States was happy to maintain even
opt-in agreements as part of the FTAA.

But there's no question the United States has lost its ability to impose
its maniacal NAFTA vision on the hemisphere. "This is not what we
wanted, and we have serious concerns," said Frank Vargo, U.S. National
Association of Manufacturers vice president for international economic
affairs. A good sign.

Unfortunately, the inside news from Miami wasn't all good. The United
States violated the spirit of the ministerial declaration by announcing
an intensified strategy of negotiating bilateral and mini-regional
agreements containing exactly the horrific proposals -- on intellectual
property, investment, and other areas -- that it failed to ram through
in the FTAA.

The United States has already concluded a free trade agreement with
Chile, and is scheduled to conclude negotiations over a free trade
agreement with the Central American countries next month. In Miami, U.S.
Trade Representative Robert Zoellick announced that the United States
would soon commence negotiations over trade deals with the Dominican
Republic, Panama, Colombia and Peru, as well as supposedly with Ecuador
and Bolivia.

We asked the trade minister of a small country, the Bahamas, what he
thought about the U.S. strategy of negotiating bilaterals.

"Most countries in the hemisphere have concerns" about the U.S.
approach, Bahamian Minister of Trade and Industry Leslie Miller told us.
"It's just pressure tactics. The U.S. wants to consolidate its position."

The strategy is euphemistically called "competitive liberalization" by
its advocates, but it's little more than divide and conquer. The idea is
to pit countries in the hemisphere against each other, negotiating
individual deals that offer incremental benefits of improved access to
the U.S. market, in exchange for massive concessions for U.S.
multinationals. As countries watch others enter into free trade deals,
they worry about being left behind, and agree to similar terms.

Whereas developing countries when united can stand up to U.S. pressure
and demands, in isolation and in competition with each other, they are
easy pickings.

Notwithstanding the benefits, this strategy has significant limitations
from the U.S. corporate perspective, which is why some business groups
have been publicly critical. The strategy requires too many negotiations
with too many countries, and may leave the biggest markets out. Noting
that Chile and Mexico already have free trade deals with the United
States, Mark Weisbrot of the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Economic
and Policy Research points out that 70 percent of the remaining Latin
American market (measured by economic output) is attributable to Brazil,
Argentina and Venezuela -- countries with no interest in signing on to
bilateral agreements with the United States that advance the U.S.
extremist economic agenda.

Still, there's no getting around the fact that existing trade pacts,
plus those under negotiation and those for which negotiations are
pending, will lock up a huge chunk of Latin America, and significantly
deprive countries of freedom to pursue independent economic policies.

Whether the USTR bilateral trade agreement offensive can be halted may
turn on the U.S.-Central American agreement. If brought before the U.S.
Congress next year and defeated, U.S. trade negotiators may be forced to
abandon their present approach. A victory for U.S. negotiators and their
business controllers will give renewed life to a model that has failed
by any objective measure, other than serving multinational corporate
interests.


Russell Mokhiber is editor of the Washington, D.C.-based Corporate Crime
Reporter, http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com. Robert Weissman is
editor of the Washington, D.C.-based Multinational Monitor,
http://www.multinationalmonitor.org. They are co-authors of Corporate
Predators: The Hunt for MegaProfits and the Attack on Democracy (Monroe,
Maine: Common Courage Press; http://www.corporatepredators.org).

(c) Russell Mokhiber and Robert Weissman

This article is posted at: <http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/corp-focus/2003/000167.html>.