[Am-info] Shutting down the e-list -- call for alternatives

[Mitch Stone]

Gene,

Thanks for keeping the list alive when nobody else would. Sorry to see 
it wither away and die, but I suppose I'm the only person left on the 
list who spoke at one of the two events the list was created to promote 
so I suppose its time has come and gone.

Cheers all,

Mitch

On Feb 16, 2005, at 1:33 PM, Gene Gaines wrote:

> To all,
>
> The AM-INFO list has outlived its usefulness.  The last message
> posted was from Erick Andrews on Dec. 17, 2004.
>
> I now plan to shut it down in the next week.
>
> A LAST PIECE OF WORK.  If anyone has any favorite sites or
> email lists that cover the Microsoft issues, send them to
> the list in the next week.
>
> Finishing-up business.
>
> The AM-INFO list web page is at
> http://lists.essential.org/mailman/listinfo/am-info
>
> The AM-INFO list archive is at
> http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/am-info/
>
> I have no idea how long these will stay in place.
>
> Yes, there is a complete archive of all messages back to Sun,
> 19 Dec 1999.  That was not the beginning of the list, but
> I do not have any base of messages before that time.
>
> There you will find weekly message summaries, threads, weekly
> gzipped files, and a huge 39 MB text file of all emails in
> chronological order, a total of 13394 messages.
>
> If anyone wants a zipped version of the 39 MB raw text file, I
> will be glad to zip it up and send to them.
>
> I have attempted to spider/download all the files that make
> up the archive page.  I got em, some 6,500 files, but it would
> be a huge job set them up to be accessible on another web site.
>
> The AM-INFO list served a good purpose in its time, but I
> think the world has gone on to other things.
>
> Gene Gaines
> gene.gaines@gainesgroup.com
>  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
>
> Long-timers on the AM-INFO list will recall this email from
> December 1999:
>
>
> Subject: [Am-info] Ralph Nader on Consumer Harm in Microsoft case
> From: James Love love@cptech.org
> Date: Tue, 21 Dec 1999 19:38:23 -0500
>
> This is part of a talk that Ralph Nader gave to a recent
> Open Source event in NYC.
>
>    Jamie Love <love@cptec.org>
>
> (http://www.cptech.org/ms/harm.html)
>
>                  Consumer Harm in the Microsoft Case
>
>                             by Ralph Nader
>
>                               Address to
>               The Bazaar - An Open Source Software Event
>                           New York, New York
>                           December 15, 1999
>
>      Every time the Microsoft antitrust case moves forward, one
> observes a new wave of "where is the harm?" opinion articles in daily
> newspapers, presenting Microsoft's anticompetitive practices as
> harmful to competitors but not consumers.
>
>      Judge Jackson's 206 page findings of fact addressed the issue of
> consumer harm in ways that resonated with many computer experts.
> While Judge Jackson mentioned that Microsoft had considerable leeway
> in terms of pricing Microsoft Windows, citing an internal Microsoft
> memorandum comparing the benefits of a $49 or $89 price for an upgrade
> price for Windows 98, the findings of fact devoted considerable
> attention to the non-price issues, such as those relating to
> innovation, choice and software quality, that are key to the Microsoft
> case.
>
>      However, Judge Jackson's findings of fact are limited by the
> scope of the government lawsuit against Microsoft, both in terms of
> the types of anticompetitive conduct and the harm to consumers, and
> therefore understates the harm of Microsoft's monopoly to consumers.
> The US Department of Justice and State Attorney Generals have decided
> to prosecute a relatively narrow case against Microsoft, largely
> ignoring a plethora of issues relating to Microsoft's huge power in
> the desktop applications area, including the components of Microsoft
> Office, or the impact of its anticompetitive enterprise licensing
> strategies.
>
>      We often hear from consumers who say they are harmed by
> Microsoft's monopoly abuses.  Here are some of the complaints.
> Because this is a meeting about Linux, a free operating system, I will
> begin with the pricing issues.
>
>      Pricing Issues
>
>      Windows is too expensive.  The price for Microsoft Windows
> depends upon how you buy it.  A license for Windows is often bundled
> with a new PC.  That doesn't mean it is free -- only that the OEM has
> paid for the license.
>
>      When people talk about software prices, they sometimes forget
> that typically new technologies begin with high prices.  Television
> sets, compact disk recorders and personal computers are only a few
> examples of this.  Automobiles were very expensive when they were
> first introduced, costing around $10,000, or nearly $200,000 in
> today's dollars.  More efficient mass production was followed by much
> lower prices.  The Ford Model T, which was produced from 1908 to 1927,
> at one point sold for less than $260.
>
>      As prices for personal computers, scanners, printers and other
> computing devices have fallen, Microsoft has been able to charge high
> prices for many of its products.  For example, the OEM prices for
> Windows licenses have increased, making this license an ever larger
> share of the cost of a new computer.
>
>      Microsoft charges consumers a list price of $109 for an upgrade
> of Windows 98, which is discounted by retailers to $89 -- but to get
> this price you must already own Windows 95, so it is like a
> maintenance fee.  The list price for a new version of Windows 98 is
> $209.  Yahoo.com sells Windows 98 at a discount for $181.92, nearly
> half the price of buying a new low end PC, and more than three times
> the $49.99 price for the well reviewed BeOS.   BeOS is a
> technologically superior operating system that suffers from a paucity
> of third party applications, illustrating the significance of the
> consumer lock-in with Windows.
>
>      In addition, Microsoft is steadily tightening the conditions on
> licenses.  Many OEM licenses for Windows are tied to a single machine,
> and cannot be sold or transferred to another machine, even by the
> original owner.  Business users are facing restrictions on the use of
> concurrent licenses, requiring them to purchase more copies than
> before.  And for most models of PCs that consumers buy, the OEM has to
> purchase the license, even if the end user doesn't want the software.
>
>      The "required to buy" Windows problem is a particular galling
> issue for Linux users who are often actively trying to avoid using
> Microsoft products.  After our own efforts in 1998 to push the major
> OEMs to give consumers the chance to buy PCs without a Windows
> license, we have seem some modest improvement, as Dell and other PC
> manufacturers offer a limited number of PC models with Linux pre-
> installed.  But it is still the case that nearly all of the PC models
> sold by major OEMs, including Dell, require purchase of a Windows
> license.
>
>      A consumer who has been using computers since 1995 may have
> already purchased a half dozen or more Windows licenses.  You might
> have begun with Windows 95a, but bought Windows 95b so you could
> better use the large hard drives.  And then purchased one or more
> upgrade computers, with new Windows licenses.  Then one has to
> consider the number of computers that need licenses.  Often a person
> may have separate PCs for work and home, plus a laptop for travel.  So
> it isn't simply the price of Windows, it's the number of licenses for
> Windows that you end up buying, and how often you have to pay upgrade
> fees.
>
>      Microsoft forces upgrades of the operating system by introducing,
> even between official revisions, significant changes in the OS,
> including the important support for third party device drivers.
> Indeed, Windows 98 is already on its "second edition."  To get what
> are essentially bug fixes, Microsoft charges Windows 98 users $19.95,
> plus shipping and handling, for the second edition of the same
> product.  (Creating yet another opportunity to charge consumers more
> money so its products will function properly).
>
>      Any given version of Windows becomes obsolete within a few years,
> because it will no longer support the latest innovations in hardware.
> This is intentional, because Microsoft's biggest "competitor" in the
> OS market is its installed base of users who have already purchased
> Windows.  Microsoft forces consumers to buy what is essentially the
> same product again and again.
>
>      In 1997, analysts said that Microsoft had a ninety-five percent
> share of global revenues for sales of office suites.  Microsoft Office
> has become the global standard for word processing, spreadsheets and
> other desktop productivity applications.  The pricing for MS Office is
> high.  Microsoft's Office 2000 "standard" edition lists for $499, with
> a "street" price of $399. Even an upgrade to Office 2000 Standard has
> a list price of $249, and a discounted price of $195 - and this
> assumes you have already purchased the Microsoft Office before.
>
>      The "premium" version of MS Office is now priced at $799, or $449
> for an upgrade version.
>
>      These prices are much higher than the prices for Corel's Office
> 200 suite, which features WordPerfect.  For example, the list price
> for an upgrade of Corel's Standard Office 2000 suite lists for $99,
> about 40 percent of the Microsoft list price.  (And discounts for
> about $79, about 40 percent of the Microsoft discounted price).
>
>      Microsoft can command hefty prices for its Office Suite because
> consumers are often forced to upgrade - simply to read documents they
> receive from others.  Microsoft is constantly changing document
> formats so that owners of older versions of Microsoft Office cannot
> read the newer documents.  Again, Microsoft's main competitor is its
> own base of installed users.  And, here too Microsoft is a tough
> adversary, using interoperability and compatibility as weapons, to
> force upgrades and generate more earnings for Microsoft.
>
>      Millions of computer users who have perfectly functional copies
> of Microsoft Office 95 found it impossible to read documents prepared
> in Office 97, and one anticipates a new round of compatibility issues
> with Office 2000.
>
>      Microsoft knows that most consumers have little use for the
> endless expansion of word processor features, particularly as the
> world has come to rely upon the much simpler formats for information
> used in electronic mail.  Moreover, the newer versions nearly always
> contain new bugs, and necessitate more learning, and spark new
> predatory attacks on non-Microsoft products.
>
>      Plus, as MS Office and Windows become ever larger, they require
> huge increases in computing resources.  For consumers this often means
> a costly and time consuming hardware upgrade -- an event highly
> correlated with losses of user data.  But for Microsoft, a hardware
> upgrade is usually just another source of revenue -- as nearly every
> new PC ships with a new license for Windows and other Microsoft
> software.
>
>      One feature of Microsoft's pricing is the huge difference between
> its list prices and the prices paid by large buyers, including OEMs,
> big corporations, governments or universities.  Microsoft knows that
> these large buyers need licenses to Microsoft products, and that they
> don't want to pay the high list prices.  All of these large buyers get
> Microsoft products at significant discounts.  However, for many big
> users, Microsoft insists on "enterprise" type licenses, which
> effectively force big organizations to buy licenses for many products
> for all employees (or students).  When Microsoft gives an organization
> a blanket license for Windows and Office, they make it next to
> impossible for rivals to compete, since the organization has already
> paid Microsoft a license fee for all the computer users.  Microsoft's
> pricing strategies are designed to give organizations no realistic
> options, if they want to avoid sky high list prices for Microsoft
> Office and Windows.
>
>      This is also an issue for the OEMs, since the price of software
> is a significant component of cost in the highly competitive PC
> market.  Microsoft can use the threat of higher prices for OEM
> licenses -- for Windows or Office -- to discipline OEMs, and reduce
> opportunities for Microsoft competitors.
>
>      Non-Pricing Issues
>
>      While the pricing issues are an important measure of the cost of
> the Microsoft monopoly, we hear more often from consumers about non-
> price issues, including many of the non-price issues raised by Judge
> Jackson.
>
>      The most common complaint is that Microsoft crashes.  "At least
> once a day," according to many Microsoft Windows users.  We also hear
> countless complaints that Microsoft attacks non-Microsoft products, so
> they don't work.  For example, when Microsoft released its Windows
> Media player, as a competitor against the RealAudio player, consumers
> wrote to say it disabled dozens of third party multimedia software
> programs.  Little wonder that people call Microsoft's Internet
> Explorer, the "Internet Exploder," because it attacks and disables an
> unpredictable number of non-Microsoft applications.
>
>      The documents in the Microsoft trial shed new light on the
> seemingly endless compatibility and interoperability problems with
> Windows and Microsoft Office.  When Microsoft executives proposed
> making "running any other browser . . . a jolting experience," they
> were simply adding yet another example of the "DOS isn't done until
> Lotus won't run," corporate legacy.
>
>      Microsoft could never have succeeded as a software company if its
> intentions to sabotage third party products were known earlier, before
> consumers and third party developers invested billions of dollars and
> countless hours around the Windows platform.
>
>      Even before you consider issues surrounding deliberate hostility
> to users, you have the typical problem of a monopoly that can get away
> with poor products.  Because it is so costly and difficult to migrate
> to a new platform, Microsoft can succeed even when its core products
> suffer hugely from poor stability, limited interoperabilty, and
> endless security problems.  The fact that millions of users tolerate
> daily crashes of Windows says volumes about the costs of migration
> away from Windows.
>
>      But, as Judge Jackson points out, and as most computer experts
> know, not all of the quality problems are innocent.  In its internal
> emails and by countless examples, Microsoft has demonstrated that it
> believes it benefits when consumers cannot make competitor's products
> work correctly.  Microsoft has a range of methods to undermine its
> competitor's products.  When it does not use deliberate sabotage, it
> can withhold important technical information or refuse to license
> technology to its competitors, such as when it refused to permit
> Netscape to distribute a utility to log-on to Internet Service
> Providers, or when it withholds or unexpectedly changes applications
> programming interfaces and data file formats.
>
>      Microsoft can also destroy the quality of rival software by using
> predatory business practices, such as the enterprise licensing of
> Windows and MS Office, exclusionary OEM and ISP licensing, or bundling
> of products with "must have" Windows and Office products.
>
>      When Netscape cannot effectively distribute its browser through
> ISP or OEM channels, and when Microsoft's Internet Explorer product is
> bundled in with Windows and MS Office, Netscape can no longer justify
> continued R&D in the product. This harms consumers who prefer
> Netscape. When Microsoft bundles Outlook Express, its personal
> information manager and email client, into Windows, millions of users
> who relied upon rival products, like ECCO Pro, were stranded when
> their products were abandoned by publishers who could not compete with
> a bundled product having a zero marginal cost to consumers.  And there
> are countless other examples of this in the software market.
>
>      Despite the colossal sums of money being invested in ecommerce
> ventures, there is very little investment for desktop productivity
> software.  And while the stock market seems crazy about some Linux
> stocks, and with all due respect to this gathering, and in light on
> the fact that we are using Linux extensively in our offices, Linux is
> still primarily a server technology, without significant penetration
> in the PC "client" space.   For this to change, there will have to be
> considerable improvements in Linux documentation and in Linux desktop
> applications.
>
>      For most PC users, there is a steadily shrinking number of
> choices for a growing number of important applications.  Microsoft is
> squeezing the life out of markets for word processors, spreadsheets,
> desktop database software, presentation graphics, personal information
> managers, email clients and Internet browsers -- the applications that
> most computer users need.
>
>      Some observers, such as Robert J. Samuelson, seem to think that
> Microsoft has provided a public service.  By eliminating competitors,
> Microsoft gives everyone a common standard, and making life simpler
> has benefits, Samuelson says.
>
>      I think most people here see the poverty of this analysis.  There
> are, of course, alternative methods of setting standards than relying
> upon a private monopoly.  The Internet is a powerful and relevant
> example of how a non-monopolistic standard can facilitate enormous
> innovation.  And, as pointed out in Judge Jackson's findings of fact,
> Microsoft has sought to crush third party technologies, such as Java,
> that create cross platform standards that Microsoft does not control.
>
>      The free software movement actively embraces a more open approach
> to software development.  A distribution of Linux isn't the creation
> of a single firm.  It is a collection of hundreds of programs
> developed by different individuals and groups, that work together.
> The disclosure of the source code is designed to make it easier to
> design software programs that work together, to solve user problems.
> There is competition among distributions of Linux, and users can
> choose alternative graphical user interfaces, programming tools,
> utilities and applications.  As described in the so called Halloween
> memorandums, Microsoft's response to the popularity of Linux is to
> seek ways to cripple interoperability, by deploying proprietary and
> patented software interfaces.  And so far, Microsoft has resisted
> efforts by OEMs to ship computers ready to dual boot Windows and Linux
> or Windows and BeOS.
>
>      There are, of course, huge costs associated with forcing everyone
> into a software monoculture.  Some of the issues concern security.
> Microsoft's security breach of the week wouldn't be such a huge
> problem if its software wasn't so ubiquitous.  But this is only one of
> many issues.
>
>      There are also large costs associated with the disappearance of
> the products that Microsoft crushes.  In the beginning, Microsoft had
> a tiny presence in desktop applications, and businesses and
> individuals invested money and time around non-Microsoft products.
> The forced migration to Microsoft's Johnny-come-lately imitations is
> costly.
>
>      Consumers value choice, about a wide range of software
> characteristics.  WordPerfect and Microsoft Word have different
> approaches to document management.  Netscape Navigator,  Microsoft
> Explorer and Opera appeal to differ users.  Every software product has
> its own fans and its own critics.  Robert Samuelson seems to think of
> this as an inefficiency, but the contrary is true.  A "one size fits
> all" world harms consumers, and lowers productivity.
>
>      Competition among software products leads to innovation and
> improvements in software quality.  This competition moves the industry
> to solve the problems consumers face, and leads to more productive and
> reliable products.  Indeed, perhaps the most important consideration
> is that Microsoft is not a leader in product development -- it is an
> imitator, and this is the most significant harm to consumers -- the
> stifling of innovations that we never see.   As pointed out by Judge
> Jackson, even Intel, the other half of Wintel, was forced by Microsoft
> to stop development of a promising new multimedia technology.
>
>      We recognize that in software markets, there may be cases where
> the market coalesces around a single product with a large market
> share.  But it is one thing for that decision to be made on the basis
> of competition for consumer satisfaction, based upon product quality
> and price, and something else when consumers are forced to pick
> Microsoft, by an endless array of underhanded, coercive and non-
> meritorious tactics.  Consumers are harmed when there is no real
> choice, except to succumb to the Microsoft Borg.
>
>      Thank you.
>
>
> For more information, see http://www.cptech.org/ms
>
> Contact Ralph Nader at ralph@essential.org
>
>
> -- 
> James Love / Director, Consumer Project on Technology
> http://www.cptech.org / love@cptech.org
> P.O. Box 19367, Washington, DC 20036
> voice 202.387.8030 / fax 202.234.5176
>
>
>
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