[A2k] Re: Bilski First Impressions . . .

[Seth Johnson]

My comments from the note I put up on facebook:

(Just these four notes, no comments. The last link is to the case
abstract. Well . . . except: It is very simple to distinguish code
from patentability: anything in any physical form that serves as
instructions provided to a separate pure logic processor, is
inherently pure logical abstraction and not covered by patents, though
the process/confabulation as a whole might be. That is, patent
"computer-implemented inventions" if they qualify on their own terms;
just exclude the code within. Any problems with the legal system that
come from that are just the necessary consequences of a world in which
there are general purpose pure logic processors. The proof is that it
is clearly possible in principle to attach entirely different devices
implementing entirely different processes, to a logic processor
running the same exact code: this illustrates that the code itself is
"pure" abstraction, independent of empirical particulars. One person
explaining that to the judges would end all of the perennial disputes
-- and it sounds like this court would act on the basis of this
formulation, simply deciding on the basis of the exclusion of pure
abstraction from patentability. -- Seth)

Seth Johnson wrote:
>
> (4 emails concatenated below. The last link is the transcript. --
> Seth)
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Geza Giedke <ggiedke@ffii.org>
> To: softwarepatents@ffii.org
> Date: Mon, 09 Nov 2009 21:20:48 +0100 (**through Mon, 09 Nov 2009
> 23:28:39 +0100 -- Seth)
> Subject: [Softwarepatents] first word from the Bilski hearing
>
> first word form the Bilski hearing (which lasted about an hour):
>
> http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/analysis-the-lorenzo-jones-case-emerges/
>
> It would take a most inventive analyst to find a way in the argument
> for the risk-management idea under review to fit into the Patent Act's
> coverage. The idea had no defenders whatsoever on the bench
>
> The largest question left unanswered when the one-hour argument was
> over was whether the Court would go forward and issue a major new
> ruling interpreting patent law, when the practical result here seemed
> so evident.  Lawyers and judges have invested major resources in the
> Bilski case, and it does raise a fundamental question that may well
> need answering. But, when there may well be no formulation of patent
> law that would salvage the Bilski-Warsaw creation, why bother?
>
> ---
>
> Bilski Case Provokes Patent Skepticism from Justices
>
> [...] Justices overall seemed hostile to a broad view of patent
> eligibility that would include intangible business processes.
>
> > http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/11/bilski-case-provokes-patent-skepticism-from-justices.html
>
> ---
>
> a very interesting and detailed eye witness report from the hearing by
> IPWatch:
>
> > http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2009/11/09/bilski-arguments-complete-at-the-us-supreme-court/id=7217/
>
> According to the author, it seems that the SCOTUS doensn't like the
> Bilski patent but also doesn't like the "machine-or-transformation"
> test prescribed by the Appeals Court. The report gives the impression
> that probably Bilski will not get his patent but the patentability of
> software will not be restricted. One judge is quoted saying that
> "nothing in this case will change State Street" - i.e. the decision
> that opened the door to software patents in the first place.
>
> regards
>  Geza
>
> ---
>
> another analysis of the hearing
>
> http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/11/supreme-court-hears-bilski-v-kappos.html
>
> and the link to the transcript:
>
> http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-964.pdf

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