[A2k] TWN Climate Briefings: BALI CLIMATE TALKS TO DECIDE FATE OF KYOTO PROTOCOL

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Title : TWN Climate Briefings for Bali #2
Date : 04 December 2007

Contents:
TWN CLIMATE BRIEFINGS FOR BALI #2

Third World Network
Visit www.twnside.org. sg for full series

-----------------------------------------------------------

BALI CLIMATE TALKS TO DECIDE FATE OF KYOTO PROTOCOL

By Martin Khor, Third World Network

The Bali meetings on climate are the most important for many years.  They
may well determine the fate and the shape of the UN Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol.

There are also high expectations from the public, particularly environmenta=
l
groups, as reports on the dangers of climate change have been continuously
highlighted in the media, particularly due to the four reports of the
Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that were issued this
year.

It is now increasingly believed that climate change is the greatest threat
to the future of humanity and survival of the Earth.  The UN Secretary
General Mr. Ban Ki-moon has made climate change top of his agenda at the UN=
,
holding a one-day =B3high-level event=B2 in September in New York at which =
many
heads of governments and states took part.

There are actually two related events in Bali on 3-14 December: the 13th
conference of parties of the UNFCCC and the 3rd meeting of parties of the
Kyoto Protocol.

A high level segment towards the end of the meeting will bring together
Ministers, heads of international agencies, and a few government heads.  Th=
e
recently elected  new Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has said he will
come to Bali, where he announce his country=B9s acceptance of the Kyoto
Protocol, leaving only the United States as the only industrial country out
of the protocol.

Despite the emergence of consensus among governments about the seriousness
of the crisis and the need to take more urgent action, the Bali meetings ar=
e
likely to be contentious.  There are many complex issues in which there are
deep divisions, and which will be difficult to resolve.

Perhaps the most important issue for Bali to decide on is the fate and
future of the Kyoto Protocol.  As the Bali meetings approached, there has
been a steadily increasing reference by many political leaders, institution=
s
and the media to the need of a new =B3comprehensive=B2 negotiation and post=
-2012
agreement on climate change.

According to many reports, including in reputable newspapers, the Kyoto
Protocol expires in 2012, and Bali needs to establish a new protocol or
agreement to replace it.

This is misleading. The Kyoto Protocol was not created to last only a few
years.  Nor is there any agreement among the members that it has served its
purpose and must now expire, to be replaced by something else.

 The Kyoto Protocol was established in 1997 under the UN Convention on
Climate Change (which itself was adopted in 1992).  Under Kyoto, the
developed countries have to undertake two major commitments =AD to reduce
their Greenhouse Gas emissions, and to provide finance and technology to
developing countries to assist them in undertaking climate-related
responsibilities.

Under Kyoto, developed-country members (listed in Annex I of UNFCCC and
which have ratified Kyoto) are legally required to cut their greenhouse gas
emissions. They agreed to cut emissions collectively by 5.2% between 1990
and the end of the first commitment period, which is 2008 to 2012.   Each
country has its own specified target, and the targets are all listed in an
annex of the Kyoto protocol.

The developed countries are also obliged to provide financial resources and
technology transfer to developing countries.  Article 11 of Kyoto says
developed countries shall provide new and additional financial resources to
meet the agreed full costs of developing countries in implementing
commitments (for reporting on information) and provide financial resources
(including technology transfer) to meet the agreed full incremental costs
needed by developing countries to implement their commitments (which includ=
e
formulating and implementing national/regional programmes for mitigation an=
d
adaptation.).

Developing countries are not required under the UNFCCC to commit to emissio=
n
reductions, because of their lower development level, and as they
contributed little to the historical build up of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere.

However the developing countries, like the developed countries, did
undertake commitments under Article 4 (1) of UNFCCC to collect and submit
data; and to formulate and implement mitigation and adaptation measures,
plus other measures.

It was also agreed that the developing countries=B9 efforts would depend on
whether the developed countries meet their commitments on providing finance
and technology to developing countries.

The important Article 4 (7) of UNFCCC says that the extent to which
developing countries implement their commitments under the Convention will
depend on the effective implementation by developed countries of their
commitments related to financial resources and technology transfer, and wil=
l
take fully into account that economic and social development and poverty
eradication are the first and overriding priorities of developing countries=
.

There are thus some important =B3development provisions=B2 in the UNFCCC an=
d in
Kyoto.

The importance of the year 2012 is simply because the first commitment
period of the developed countries ends then. The Protocol has a mandate for
further commitment periods. The second commitment period starts in 2013.

Article 3(7) of the protocol establishes the first commitment period of
2008-2012 for emission reduction for developed (Annex 1) countries. Article
3(9)   says commitments for subsequent periods for Annex 1 parties shall be
established by amending Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol (which contains
specific reduction commitments of each developed-country party).

Thus Kyoto=B9s first commitment period will end in 2012 and a second
commitment period is scheduled to start in 2013. Kyoto mandates further
commitment periods after the second period is completed.

Nowhere in the protocol is it stated that it will last only for the duratio=
n
of the 2008-2012 period, nor that it will automatically expire in 2012.  On
the contrary, the expectation of the drafters and founders was that the
protocol would last a long time.

By the start of 2013 the developed countries must have an agreed legally
binding set of targets for further reducing their emissions.  However,
developed countries=B9 officials say that by 2009 the targets for this next
period must already be set to enable a smooth transition from periods 1 to
2.

Thus, what is in the books is a negotiation for a second set of commitments
of the developed countries for the post-2012 period. In fact such a
negotiation has already been taking place, in an Ad hoc working group that
last met in Vienna in August.  The group will meet again in Bali.

It is thus wrong to claim that the Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012. Only the
first commitment period ends then, and a second period should begin in 2013=
.

Why then the publicity about the need for a =B3comprehensive post-2012
Treaty=B2, which Bali is supposed to launch, as a benchmark for its success=
?
There are probably at least three reasons.

First, the developed countries are no longer satisfied with the Kyoto
Protocol=B9s exemption of developing countries from binding emission cuts.
Nor are they happy that the implementation of existing commitments of
developing countries has been made conditional on the developed countries
providing them with financial and technology transfers.

It appears that they are now placing new conditions before setting emission
targets for themselves. And the main condition seems to be that developing
countries begin to take on more commitments.    At least they are targeting
highly populated countries like China and India and possibly more
industrialized and big  countries such as South Korea, Brazil, Mexico, Sout=
h
Africa and Indonesia.

The call for a =B3new post-2012 treaty=B2 and for =B3comprehensive negotiat=
ions=B2
is thus a code for pulling in developing countries into making more
commitments as well as more binding commitments, with different levels or
types of commitments for different developing countries. The differentiatio=
n
of developing countries and their commitments is one plank of the developed
countries=B9 strategy.

Since it is very controversial to place this demand so directly, there has
been the orchestration of publicity of the need for a =B3comprehensive
agreement=B2, to replace the Kyoto protocol which supposedly is =B3expiring=
.=B2

Secondly, there is the problem of the opting out of the US and Australia of
the protocol, though both are members of the Convention.  With Australia
soon coming on board, the US is the lone industrial country outside Kyoto=
=B9s
fold.

But it is a formidable loner, as it is the world=B9s largest emitting count=
ry.
Moreover, other industrial countries especially the Europeans feel =B3cheat=
ed=B2
in that they have to spend to become more environmentally efficient, while
the US gets a =B3free ride=B2, and their competitiveness may be affected as=
 US
firms do not have to spend so much to change their technology.

The European countries are determined to get the US involved in the next
phase of commitments.  The US=B9 well-known argument for staying out is tha=
t
the large developing countries do not have to commit.  Thus Europe and Japa=
n
are doubly keen to get the developing countries to make commitments =AD
because they themselves desire this, and because the US requires it.

Several European countries, having woken up to the realities of climate
science, desperately want the US to be part of a post-2012 set of targets
for emission cuts, and to somehow also pull in some developing countries
either to commit to cut their emissions or to undertake some semi-hard
commitments.

Third, the developed countries are lagging behind in meeting their emission
reduction commitments and have failed very badly in fulfilling their financ=
e
and technology transfer commitments.  In their next phase of commitments,
they want a =B3comprehensive=B2 agreement in which developing countries hav=
e to
make some payment, in order for they themselves to be ready to commit again=
.

Bringing in developing countries and pressurizing them to commit in a
=B3comprehensive agreement=B2 can help the developed countries to reduce th=
eir
embarrassment of not having fulfilled their first-period commitments, and
reduce the pressure on them in negotiations for the second-period
emission-reduction commitments.

The developed countries would then have something to =B3trade off=B2 =AD to=
 have
an agenda that includes new and more binding commitments of the developing
countries, to balance off the new commitments of developed countries, while
the latter also hold up as carrot the promise of finance and technology
transfer (which they are supposed to provide anyway, which they have not
provided satisfactorily, and which they will once again use as an
=B3incentive=B2).

If this seems familiar, it may be because there is an analogy with the
recent history of developed countries=B9 behaviour in the trade arena.
Developed countries had agriculture exempted from GATT rules for many
decades because they could not compete freely.  In effect the developing
countries were providing concessions and special and differential treatment
to the developed countries.

In exchange for putting agriculture back in the trading system GATT-WTO, th=
e
developed countries initiated a comprehensive negotiation =AD the Uruguay
Round =AD in which they got the developing countries to accept new treaties
(in services, intellectual property, investment measures) in exchange for
doing what they should have done anyway.

The developing countries succeeded in having the Uruguay Round agreements t=
o
mandate another round of negotiations on agriculture.  This is similar to
the Kyoto protocol having a second-commitment period.

Indeed, a second agriculture round in the built-in agenda after the Uruguay
Round was seen as necessary as the developed countries in effect did not
liberalise their agriculture as their tariffs were set very high on key
products and they could continue their subsidies due to the nature of the
subsidy =B3boxes=B2 or categories (Amber, Blue and Green) in the agricultur=
e
agreement.

While another agriculture negotiation was already on the table, the EU and
US pressured developing countries to enter a new comprehensive negotiation
under the Doha Work Programme by promising developing countries some
development gains while actually putting new market access issues into the
negotiations =AD investment, competition, government procurement, and a new
round of industrial tariff cuts.

In the broad and complex negotiations that followed, the developed countrie=
s
could work on trade offs and put pressure on the developing countries while
shielding their agriculture sector once again.

In the climate negotiations, the developed countries have not inspired much
confidence, largely because they have not fulfilled their two major
commitments.

They have not made enough progress in meeting their reduction targets so
far.  The UNFCCC=B9s Greenhouse Gas Data 2006 report exposed =B3worrying=B2=
 upward
trends in the 2000-2004 period.

Although overall emissions by developed-country parties overall dropped 3.3=
%
in 1990-2004, this most mostly due to a 36.8% decrease by countries in
transition (Eastern and Central Europe or EITs) because of their sharp
economic contraction.

Most worrying was that other industrialized countries registered a 11%
increase.  An additional concern is that the EITs are now increasing their
emissions (up 4% in 2000-2004).   According to UNEP=B9s Geodata, CO2 emissi=
ons
rose from 1990 to 2003 in Western Europe from 3.5 to 3.6 billion metric ton=
s
and in North America from 5.5 to 6.4 tons.

Meeting the first-commitment period targets should thus be a top priority o=
f
the next years (to 2012).

The developed countries have also failed in providing enough financial
resources to developing countries, and they have completely failed in
setting technology transfer into motion.

In Bali, most of the developed countries will seek to change the agenda and
even to change the structure of the Kyoto Protocol and perhaps also of
UNFCCC, through proposing a comprehensive negotiation, and the setting up o=
f
an overall negotiating group, that will cover a wide range of issues.

But many developing countries are not yet ready to undertake legally bindin=
g
or semi-binding commitments. For a start, the developed countries have not
yet lived up to their two major commitments.

Second, the developing countries are likely to argue that what is important
is not the total emissions put out by a country, but its per capita
emissions. And most developing countries=B9 emissions per person are still =
low
compared to developed countries=B9 levels.

Third, they are concerned that if they have to curb their emissions, their
economic and social development will be affected. There are recent studies
showing that growth will be hardly affected (only reduced by 0.12% a year)
if the required deep emission cuts are done in a proper way.

But there are hardly any comprehensive studies showing what the new
=B3development pathways=B2 are, nor any successful model on which to base t=
he
new development models.

Thus a major battle on the fate of the Kyoto Protocol and on the nature of
the negotiating process and agenda is likely to take place in Bali.

It is premature to declare an end to the Kyoto Protocol or to predict a
decision to create a =B3new post-2012 climate treaty=B2.

 Author :

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