[A2k] Report on SCCR_15 from IFLA's representative

[Barbara Stratton]

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Dear all

Below is the account and analysis of the proceedings at SCCR/15 last week from
my Danish colleague, Harald von Hielmcrone, who represented IFLA.

Barbara Stratton

Senior Adviser, Copyright at CILIP: the Chartered Institute of Librarians and
Information Professionals

Member, Copyright and other Legal Matters Committee Executive Board, IFLA:
International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions

CILIP, 7 Ridgmount Street, London WC1E 7AE United Kingdom

Tel: +44 (0)20 7255 0500 Fax: +44 (0)20 7255 0501 Textphone: +44 (0)20 7255
0505

General e-mail: info@cilip.org.uk[1]  Web: www.cilip.org.uk[2]

IFLA-CLM Web Site: http://www.ifla.org/III/clm/copyr.htm[3]

The result of the SCCR meeting in Geneva 11-13 September was a victory for
COMPROMISE, not a defeat.

When reading the accounts from the SCCR meeting one gets the impression that
the developing countries were overrun, and that the decision to recommend a
diplomatic conference on the Broadcast Treaty was a defeat. This is not the
case.

Most of the meeting was conducted as consultations, and rather few hours were
actually spent in plenary session. The reason was that the chair and others
tried to forge a compromise between the decisive parties, US on one hand and
Brazil and India on the other.

At an early stage it became clear that nobody was willing to take the
responsibility to dump the treaty at this meeting. Brazil kept a very low
profile. The US needed a way out of the impasse it had placed itself in. They
had come under strong pressure by the telecom industry. There seems also to
have been pressure from Hollywood on the question of cultural diversity.
Because of the all dominant position of the US film and television industry
such an article on cultural diversity might be used by other countries to
impose national restrictions on the admission of US film and soap operas in
order to protect national culture and to further cultural diversity.

At the plenary session on the 13th Brazil opened the ball by indicating that
consultations had moved in a positive direction and that they were flexible -
but they had procedural problems. What should be the text for the Basic
Proposal? They could not accept a diplomatic conference on the basis of a text
they had not seen yet. (The chair had proposed to draft an additional text in
the period between now and the preparatory meeting for the diplomatic
conference.) Fair enough. The meeting was again postponed.

At 4.45 pm Brazil opened the last round by restating its evaluation of the
positive direction the consultations had taken, and that they might overcome
the procedural problems provided the basis for the diplomatic conference
should be the Draft Basic Proposal that was on the table (SCCR/15/2). This
text was all inclusive and all views were represented on an equal footing.

Hardly had they said this when the EU and US intervened: EU stating that they
were very flexible, that articles were to be seen in conjunction with each
other, and under certain circumstances important articles might become less
important. That would all depend on the context. Signalling, it seems, that
they would accept (more or less) whatever US and Brazil (and evt. India) could
agree on. US stated that this was, of course, extremely difficult, but they
were willing to go into a signal oriented treaty, provided there were made
appropriate changes regarding art 2.3 and 4 (on cultural diversity). Again
this was very difficult but they were flexible and so forth.

After this India intervenes several times. The purpose was to make absolutely
certain that the only text to be used at the diplomatic conference will be
SCCR/15/2. Brazil comes in again outlining how they perceive a signal oriented
treaty. Argentina and Iran are supportive.

Now, India and others had previously warned that a diplomatic conference at
this stage - using an all inclusive basic text like SCCR 15/2 - was likely to
collapse, because it would be too complicated to negotiate a single treaty out
of this multitude of alternatives, but at this last stage nobody said that
they would oppose a diplomatic conference being convened.

On the other hand they could not be expected to weaken their position by
positively recommending it. Therefore the "silent consent". And I would be
very surprised if the chair used this procedure without having informed at
least the important players that he would eventually do so. But however this
may be, if India or Brazil really wanted to stop the treaty they could have
done so. But they did not want to do that. The necessary compromise had been
made, and they just wanted to fence in the territory preparing for the
negotiations ahead.

It is true that most developing countries would prefer not to have a
broadcasting treaty. On the other hand it is difficult to defend a situation
where signal piracy is legal, and I have not heard anybody do so. The US
wanted an all encompassing treaty. This looks as it is now definitely off the
table, and now we are heading for a treaty which focuses on signal protection.
This is a step forward. The job is not done yet. Lots of negotiating and
lobbying remains, but the decisive change of direction has been made, and that
is the fact one should focus on.

Harald von Hielmcrone

===References:===
  1. mailto:info@cilip.org.uk
  2. http://www.cilip.org.uk
  3. http://www.ifla.org/III/clm/copyr.htm