[A2k] India's product patent protection regime

Soenke Zehle s.zehle@kein.org
Thu May 11 09:16:00 2006


-------- Original Message --------
Subject: New UNU-MERIT Working Papers
Maastricht Economic and social Research and training centre on
Innovation and Technology (UNU-MERIT)

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  New UNU-MERIT Working Paper
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India's product patent protection regime: Less or more of "pills for the
poor"?
  by P. Gehl Sampath

  [abstract]
  The year 2005 marks the end of transition period for many developing
  countries with competent pharmaceutical sectors that competed in
  supplying generic versions of patented drugs to LDCs before, thereby
  inducing price competition and enhancing access to medicines. In a
  post-2005 scenario, the critical issue is whether LDCs without adequate
  manufacturing capabilities can make use of compulsory licensing
  expeditiously to induce price competition and secure lower prices. This
  paper uses empirical evidence collected during a firm-level survey of
  the Indian pharmaceutical sector to generate evidence on emerging
  strategies of firms. It shows that the vigour of compulsory licensing as
  a price-leveraging instrument post-2005 is incumbent mainly on its
  economic feasibility. It shows that Indian firms view the market
  potential (in terms of market size and profits involved in such supply,
  especially if they have to make specific technological investments to
  produce the drug) of the mechanism much more severely than before, and
  may be less inclined to engage in such production if their commercial
  expectations are grossly unmet. The analysis assesses implications of
  emerging strategies of firms in the Indian pharmaceutical sector for
  access to medicines both domestically and internationally, and
  highlights the challenges involved.

  Key words: product patents, Indian pharmaceuticals, generics, access

  UNU-MERIT Working Papers
  ISSN 1871-9872
  http://www.merit.unu.edu/publications/wppdf/2006/wp2006-019.pdf