Duh! "Chemicals and bombs: A worrisome combination"

["Jackie Hunt Christensen" <jchristensen@iatp.org>]

June 14, 1999 
Volume 77, Number 24

Chemicals and bombs: A worrisome combination

Michael Heylin 
Nobody knows better than chemists that making, using, and distributing
chemicals on an industrial scale is potentially a very dangerous business.
Some chemical products are just plain nasty stuff. Estimates recently
required of industry indicate that plumes from worst-case scenario
accidents involving such chemicals can represent a health hazard as much as
25 miles away.

Chemists, above all, understand that such very hazardous products should be
made only by those who do so in a highly professional manner. And the
public insists it be done under government regulation.

The solid operating record of U.S. chemical makers is based on good
chemistry and chemical engineering, well-honed operating procedures, staff
training, a safety-first tradition, and decades of experience. Corporate
self-interest also has a role--safe plants are good business.

The commitment to further improve this record is reinforced by the now
almost worldwide Responsible Care program of good corporate practice. This
was developed and adopted by chemical producers in the aftermath of the
Bhopal, India, chemical disaster in 1984, when a leak of methyl isocyanate
killed thousands of people.

In the U.S., the degree of sensitivity to chemical hazards is reflected in
the Environmental Protection Agency's reporting requirements. For some
products, chemical makers have to report accidental leaks of as little as 1
lb to EPA within 24 hours.

In light of all this understanding of what it takes to keep the
chemical-making process both acceptable to the public and safe, the
chemical community should be somewhat disquieted by the recent attacks on
the Yugoslav chemical industry by North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces.

The last thing the chemical industry needs today is another Bhopal-like
incident--even one triggered by high-precision bombs and missiles and not
by shortcomings on its own part. Similarly, the last thing any military
campaign needs is a Bhopal.

There has been a ripple of concern. The Association of Greek Chemists urged
other chemical societies to inform their governments of the "immense and
irreversible ecological catastrophe that is taking place due to the war in
Serbia." It claims there have been large-scale releases of chlorine,
ethylene dichloride, phosgene, sulfur dioxide, vinyl chloride, mercury,
liquid and gaseous hydrochloric acid, phosphorus and nitrogen oxides,
phenol, benzene, styrene, and ammonia. The Serbian Chemical Society
appealed for help to stop the targeting of industrial complexes and the
resultant release of toxic materials.

The details of the attacks on Serbian chemical facilities are sketchy and
lack confirmation. But a few things appear reasonably certain.

First, the attacks came early in the campaign and struck chemical and
pharmaceutical facilities throughout Serbia. The largest complex struck is
at Panevo, on the Danube River about 10 miles northeast of Belgrade. Here
vinyl chloride, polyvinyl chloride, ethylene, chlor-alkali, ammonia, and
fertilizer units were hit.

Second, there has been no Bhopal. The Serbs report "poisonings" but no
immediate civilian deaths from chemicals released by the bombing. However,
environmental and longer term health impacts of the attacks will only
become apparent after hostilities end. In addition to large fires and other
atmospheric releases, Serb sources claim that hundreds of tons of
hydrofluoric acid, nitric acid, ammonia, hydrochloric acid, sodium
hydroxide, mercury, and other toxic chemicals have leaked--or been
released--into the Danube and Sava Rivers.

Third, there is a lot of important safety-related information that can
eventually be gleaned from these attacks. For instance, was the lack of
immediate deaths due to great precision in hitting only reactors and not
storage facilities? Was it due to the closing down of production units and
the dispersal or controlled disposal of chemical inventories prior to the
attacks? Were the attacks coordinated with appropriate wind and weather
conditions? Or was the lack of immediate deaths just luck?

Fourth, when much more is known, the U.S. chemical community--which earned
high credibility with the defense establishment with its expert support on
the treaty to ban chemical weapons--may be in a position to advise the
military on the potential drawbacks of dropping bombs on chemical plants.

There is little sign the military has much appreciation of any danger. For
instance, Serb claims of ecological problems have been dismissed by NATO
briefers, who have responded that the smoke from the attacks on Panevo was
less than the smoke from burning villages in Kosovo.

U.S. Air Force targeting guidelines point out that under the Law of Armed
Conflict (LOAC) only a military objective is a lawful object of military
attack. A military objective is anything that gives a military advantage.
(LOAC is a collection of international agreements concerning such matters
as the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilians.)

The likelihood of unintended or incidental damage--such as dead
civilians--does not preclude an attack on a military objective under LOAC.
But such so-called collateral damage should not be excessive in relation to
the military advantage gained by the attack.

These rules bring up two dilemmas for chemical plants. The first is which
are, and which are not, legitimate military targets. The second is the
potential of excessive collateral damage from attacking any of them.

There seems to be consensus that bombing nuclear power plants would be a
very bad idea. Maybe the chemical community, as part of its role as the
responsible guardian of the safe manufacture of chemical products, should
consider doing what it can to engender such an attitude toward chemical
facilities.