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the international scene
INTERNATIONAL PRESS--
Bill Gates and the musketeers
12/08/98
The Hindu
Copyright(C) 1998 THE HINDU
THE MICROSOFT FILE - The Secret Case against Bill Gates: Wendy Goldman
Rohm ; Times Books, Random House, New York, N.Y. 10022. U.S. $. 22.95,
Canada $. 35.95.
The dust jacket describes the book as "an intimate account of the
biggest business story of the decade," and goes on to add that it is an
"extraordinary fly-on-the-wall account of Microsoft's intent to
monopolise the computer industry." The author's account, which reads
like a modern day thriller, fully supports that view. She is an
award-winning writer to boot, and, according to the publishers, some of
the material in the book had appeared in The Boston Globe, The Chicago
Tribune, The Financial Times, Upside and Wired. Early on in the book the
author compares Bill Gates to the 19th century oil tycoon, John D.
Rockefeller of Standard Oil. It was a time when oil virtually dictated
the world economy and Rockefeller played an enormous role in changing
the lifestyle of the world. According to the author, Gates is playing a
similar role today in a world that is driven not necessarily by oil
alone, but more importantly, by the information industry. It would
appear that Bill Gates' motto is to try and own any market that he
creates much in the same way Rockefeller orchestrated his business
empire.
It all started in the Eighties when Bill Gates was just about "cementing
his monopoly power". It was a time when anti-trust enforcement
apparently lost its teeth at the hands of the Reagan Administration.
Nevertheless, as 1989 was drawing to a close, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) laid its groundwork for proceeding against Bill Gates
by setting in motion probes against him, with attorney Steve Newborn
(with the Musketeer nickname of D'Artagnan) playing his part as an ace
litigator. The question was, was it illegal for a company to have
cornered the market by its superior skill and foresight? Legally, as
well as logically, the answer was, "no". What then, in the eyes of the
law was illegal was monopolisation driven by an anti-competitive and
predatory zeal. Around this time Microsoft announced that it would hold
back certain features for its Windows operating system software in order
to spur the market acceptance of O/S2, the competing operating software
that had been jointly developed for Microsoft and IBM smelt a rat - if
Gates got hold of the desktop for Windows he would be calling the shots
with computer makers. Cannavino had even warned John Akers, IBM's CEO
that, where Bill Gates was concerned, he was on a "kamikaze mission".
Cannavino felt that Gates was really into Windows and not so much into
O/S2. By the time Cannavino came into IBM, Gates had already gained
control of DOS and was firmly entrenched - until DR-DOS appeared in
1988, and came out in 1990 with DR-DOS5, an updated version of DR-DOS.
Gates virtually shot that one down in 1991 with his "per processor"
licences forcing computer makers to pay Microsoft for its operating
system on every computer sold. Microsoft's DOS monopoly tied to Windows
would assure Gates of high revenues, at least for some time to come. Ray
Noorda, Chairman and CEO of Novell Inc., who had a close relationship
with Big Blue (IBM), went on record saying, "that little squirt",
meaning Bill Gates, would put every company out of business. He even
warned Gates that he was going to have trouble with the government and
IBM. Gates' retort was: "I know how to handle the government, and, IBM
does not count."
Citing any number of encounters that Bill Gates had with software
developers, big and the not-so-big, the author goes on to tell the
reader how the software giant preyed on numerous companies that were
trying to bring out their own products and compete in the software
market, adding for good measure, how Gates had broken legal contracts,
violated non-disclosure agreements with would-be partners, placed hidden
codes in applications to sabotage competing applications, and "stole"
intellectual property rights from competing companies. Gates effectively
drove everyone out of the PC operating system business. Software
developers like Micrografx that developed Mirrors, were not even keen to
show the programme to Microsoft for fear that it would be copied.
Nonetheless, Micrografx did enter into a development partnership with
IBM that would enable advanced versions of Mirrors technology to run
Windows applications faster under OS/2 than Windows itself. By February
1993, the FTC was still stalking Bill Gates to press an anti-trust suit
against Microsoft but got nowhere. The FTC could only force a case
provided it would result in remedies that could be easily enforced.
In the Fall of 1993 the Justice Department was preparing grounds to
press a litigation against Bill Gates. Earlier in the year, Gates was
bent upon going after Noorda for instigating the FEDS to proceed against
him. In the author's words, this was a classic example of Gates'
obsession with damaging his rivals by means, fair or foul. By now
Microsoft's market value had soared to $. 24 billion. The Department of
Justice's case failed yet again, while Gates continued to scale new
heights in the software industry even as Novell successfully
acquisitioned WordPerfect and QuattroPro. But Gates relentlessly
continued to push into new markets as competing companies and
applications - Lotus Development Corporation, Digital Research and
WordPerfect to mention a few - fell by the wayside. Now Gates was
focussed on the Internet. Microsoft was aware that Internet browsers
could become alternative platforms for launching various applications
and programmes and this could drastically cut into the dominance of
Windows. As things turned out, despite a court order, Microsoft refused
to remove Internet Explorer from the PCs sold by manufacturers. Later
on, when Attorney General Janet Reno proposed a fine of $. 1 million a
day, Gates is said to have bragged that he made a million dollars every
two and a half hours.
But Netscape, with its software for accessing the Net, was something
that bothered Gates. Netscape would succeed in convincing companies like
Apple to adopt its technology. Apple's attempt to nail Microsoft with a
patent infringement rights came almost to nought with Bill Gates
investing $. 250 millions in Apple as a way of settlement and stealing
the limelight in the process. If Apple had pressed with its charges
instead of going in for this settlement it would probably have come out
the winner and received royalties from Microsoft in perpetuity.
Meanwhile law took its lumbering course and caught up with Microsoft. A
temporary injunction was slapped on it asking it to take the Internet
browser off Windows and, later on, a contempt suit followed consequent
upon Gates' manner of complying with that injunction order. Sun
Microsystems sued Microsoft for infringement of its Java technology.
In short, the book is a veritable compendium of law suits and
inter-corporate battles, all trying to bring Bill Gates to heel. The
latest in this continually unfolding Microsoft saga (this is not
mentioned in the book) has come as a stinging defeat for Bill Gates
when, in mid-November this year, a federal judge backed the technology
claims of Sun Microsystems Inc., and gave Microsoft 90 days to modify
its Windows 98 operating system or pull it out of the market. Microsoft
was also issued a preliminary injunction that would bar the software
giant from selling products that use the Java programming language. Game
and set to Sun. But how will the match end? Knowing Bill Gates' will to
fight, it is hard to tell.
The author's account will no doubt be lapped up by the detractors of
Bill Gates and his software empire. But how do millions of users the
world over using Windows 95 (and now 98) feel about all this? In the
concluding pages of the book the author lets the reader in on this
question.
One technically savvy Windows 98 user reportedly told that not many
users would bother to choose Netscape over Internet Explorer (IE) and
the winner in the end by default is IE. He went on to emphasise that the
computer industry is moving too quickly and the users feel that this is
due to the innovations from Microsoft. Whether this is so or not, that
is the way millions of naive users all over the world feel. There are
others who feel that the government should leave Microsoft alone. For
them, as long as the software works and enables them to do what they
want they could not care less which company made it.
To sum it up, if, after reading the book the "naive computer user" comes
to the conclusion that this is a one-woman crusade against a man (whom
many regard as the software guru) for his "predatory" business tactics
aimed at snuffing out competition, one cannot blame the reader.
That, however, does not take away the credit the book richly deserves.
Whether or not one supports Bill Gates' way of doing business, the book
is well worth a perusal.
C. V. Subramaniam